
The Law between Objectivity and Power
- Editors:
- Publisher:
- 2022
Summary
The volume examines law in the tension field between objectivity and power: is law an instrument of the powerful or – on the contrary – an objective reality that limits power? The book deals with this question through an international, interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary approach. In doing so, it does not only take a theoretical perspective. Instead, it integrates insights from practical, doctrinal contributions as well. In that way, the book follows the idea of Constitutional Pragmatism, sketched out in its introductory chapter: each position in the epistemological dispute about the possibilities and limits of objectivity within the law entails normative implications; thus, the constitutional and doctrinal statements that normally settle normative disputes have to be taken into account when talking about epistemological issues as well.
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Bibliographic data
- Copyright year
- 2022
- ISBN-Print
- 978-3-8487-8334-2
- ISBN-Online
- 978-3-7489-2721-1
- Publisher
- Nomos, Baden-Baden
- Language
- English
- Pages
- 477
- Product type
- Edited Book
Table of contents
- Titelei/InhaltsverzeichnisPages 1 - 16 Download chapter (PDF)
- Philip M. Bender Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- a. The irrelevance of positivismPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- aa. Observational mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
- bb. Deontological mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
- cc. Consequentialist mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- aa. Decisionist mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
- bb. Procedural mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
- cc. Critical mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- aa. Objectivist approaches to contract lawPhilip M. Bender
- bb. Subjectivist approaches to contract lawPhilip M. Bender
- cc. The objectivist dimension of private autonomy in heteronomous lawmakingPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- a. Subjectivity and objectivity in interpretationPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- aa. Productional subjectivity and applicational objectivity (‘Subjectivists’)Philip M. Bender
- bb. Productional objectivity and applicational objectivity (‘Objectivists’)Philip M. Bender
- cc. Productional subjectivity and applicational subjectivity (‘full nihilists’)Philip M. Bender
- dd. Productional objectivity and applicational subjectivity (‘partial nihilists’)Philip M. Bender
- c. Parallels in private lawmakingPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- a. The meaning of legitimacy and its connection to objectivityPhilip M. Bender
- b. The criterion of legitimacy and its connection to objectivityPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- aa. Field-specificity and empirical legitimacyPhilip M. Bender
- bb. Field-specificity and normative legitimacyPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- aa. Three core aspects of philosophical PragmatismPhilip M. Bender
- bb. The different perspective of pragmatic adjudicationPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- aa. Pragmatism and the constitution intertwinedPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- (1) Epistemological statements on the productional levelPhilip M. Bender
- (2) Epistemological statements on the applicational levelPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- 1. StructuralismPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- a. DistinctnessPhilip M. Bender
- b. Unconsciousness and necessityPhilip M. Bender
- Philip M. Bender
- aa. Form and substance: bundle-structures IPhilip M. Bender
- bb. Substance and substance: bundle-structures IIPhilip M. Bender
- cc. Thought-structuresPhilip M. Bender
- dd. Reception-structuresPhilip M. Bender
- 3. Parallels in private lawmakingPhilip M. Bender
- 4. Why to think about structural objectivityPhilip M. Bender
- V. ConclusionPhilip M. Bender
- Hans Christoph Grigoleit Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionHans Christoph Grigoleit
- Hans Christoph Grigoleit
- 1. Distinguishing reference points of subjectivism, objectivism, and intuitionismHans Christoph Grigoleit
- 2. The postulate of methodical accuracy – avoiding ‘pseudo-subjectivism’Hans Christoph Grigoleit
- III. Subjectivism vs Objectivism in Private Law: Referring Legal Solutions to the Parties’ IntentionsHans Christoph Grigoleit
- Hans Christoph Grigoleit
- 1. General perspective: dependence of the legislator’s intention on fairness and reasonHans Christoph Grigoleit
- Hans Christoph Grigoleit
- a. The personal soft spotHans Christoph Grigoleit
- b. The lingual soft spotHans Christoph Grigoleit
- c. The dynamic dimension soft spotHans Christoph Grigoleit
- 3. Impossibility of complete legislative pre-determination by ‘authoritative’ legal sourcesHans Christoph Grigoleit
- 4. The legitimacy of correcting the legislator’s intention on the application/court levelHans Christoph Grigoleit
- Hans Christoph Grigoleit
- 1. Tendency to overstate the uncertainty issueHans Christoph Grigoleit
- 2. Intersubjective reliability as ‘first degree objectivity’ of legal reasoningHans Christoph Grigoleit
- 3. Framing intuition as ‘second degree objectivity’ of legal reasoningHans Christoph Grigoleit
- Franz Bauer Download chapter (PDF)
- Franz Bauer
- 1. Historical argumentsFranz Bauer
- 2. Dynamic interpretationFranz Bauer
- 3. ObjectivityFranz Bauer
- Franz Bauer
- 1. The problem of objectivityFranz Bauer
- 2. The practical problem: the availability of historical evidenceFranz Bauer
- 3. Theoretical problems: will and formFranz Bauer
- 4. Objectivity attenuatedFranz Bauer
- III. Dynamic Interpretation and ObjectivityFranz Bauer
- Franz Bauer
- 1. The impermissibility of ‘direct’ historical argumentationFranz Bauer
- 2. Meaning and purpose: two types of legislative intentFranz Bauer
- Franz Bauer
- a. Multiple purposes and the presumption in favour of meaningFranz Bauer
- b. Interconnected purposes and the presumption in favour of the lower levelFranz Bauer
- Franz Bauer
- a. Specific purposesFranz Bauer
- b. Supplementary purposesFranz Bauer
- c. Dynamic interpretation beyond historical argumentsFranz Bauer
- V. ConclusionFranz Bauer
- Peter M. Huber Download chapter (PDF)
- Peter M. Huber
- 1. Historical overviewPeter M. Huber
- Peter M. Huber
- a. General observationsPeter M. Huber
- b. The judiciary between rule of law and democracyPeter M. Huber
- Peter M. Huber
- 1. General remarksPeter M. Huber
- 2. The Bundesverfassungsgericht and PowerPeter M. Huber
- Peter M. Huber
- 1. Dogmatics as a tool to reduce judicial powerPeter M. Huber
- 2. Constitutional adjudication, special techniques, and case lawPeter M. Huber
- IV. The Bundesverfassungsgericht as a Constitutional OrganPeter M. Huber
- Daniel Wolff Download chapter (PDF)
- Daniel Wolff
- 1. Preliminary no 1: why we should careDaniel Wolff
- 2. Preliminary no 2: some assumptionsDaniel Wolff
- 3. Preliminary no 3: a brief summary of today’s originalismDaniel Wolff
- II. Conceptual Clarifications: Theories of Law, Theories of Interpretation, and Theories of AdjudicationDaniel Wolff
- Daniel Wolff
- 1. Legal positivismDaniel Wolff
- Daniel Wolff
- a. The core of the theory: decision-making (only) according to rulesDaniel Wolff
- b. The three key claims of formalismDaniel Wolff
- 3. The case against the compatibility of legal positivism with formalismDaniel Wolff
- 4. ConclusionDaniel Wolff
- Daniel Wolff
- 1. Theories of constitutional law: what does American constitutional law consist of?Daniel Wolff
- 2. Theories of legal interpretation: how to determine the content of American constitutional law?Daniel Wolff
- 3. Theories of adjudication: how must courts resolve constitutional disputes?Daniel Wolff
- V. ConclusionDaniel Wolff
- Ben Köhler Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionBen Köhler
- II. Remedies, Discretion, and System-building: Some ClassificationsBen Köhler
- Ben Köhler
- Ben Köhler
- a. Remedial discretion in equitable remediesBen Köhler
- b. Statutory discretionBen Köhler
- c. Remedial constructive trusts and ‘discretionary remedialism’Ben Köhler
- Ben Köhler
- a. No theory of remedial discretion in private law (yet)Ben Köhler
- b. Contract concretisation and adaptationBen Köhler
- c. Good faithBen Köhler
- d. The quantification of damagesBen Köhler
- 3. ComparisonBen Köhler
- Ben Köhler
- 1. The uneasy case for remedial discretionBen Köhler
- 2. Unfettered power? Remedial discretion and the rule of lawBen Köhler
- V. ConclusionBen Köhler
- Victor Jouannaud Download chapter (PDF)
- I. Judicial Development of the Law as a Constitutional Problem – General AspectsVictor Jouannaud
- Victor Jouannaud
- 1. Development of the requirement of a statutory provision (Vorbehalt des Gesetzes)Victor Jouannaud
- 2. Constitutional basis of the requirement of a statutory provision as developed under the Federal Constitutional Court’s essential-matters doctrineVictor Jouannaud
- 3. Characteristics of the Federal Constitutional Court’s essential-matters doctrineVictor Jouannaud
- 4. Institutional extension of the essential-matters doctrine – application to the judiciaryVictor Jouannaud
- Victor Jouannaud
- Victor Jouannaud
- a. Differentiation based on the parties to the disputeVictor Jouannaud
- b. Change of position? – Application to constellations opposing private individualsVictor Jouannaud
- Victor Jouannaud
- a. Judges duty to adjudicate in civil disputesVictor Jouannaud
- b. The conciliatory character of private lawVictor Jouannaud
- Victor Jouannaud
- a. Different functions of private lawVictor Jouannaud
- Victor Jouannaud
- aa. Regulation and fundamental rightsVictor Jouannaud
- bb. Regulation and democratic legitimacy – who defines the common good?Victor Jouannaud
- c. The functions of balancing interests and of providing infrastructureVictor Jouannaud
- IV. ConclusionVictor Jouannaud
- Andreas Engel Download chapter (PDF)
- I. Introduction: Private International Law, Objectivity, and PowerAndreas Engel
- Andreas Engel
- 1. European private international lawAndreas Engel
- Andreas Engel
- a. Federal lawAndreas Engel
- b. State lawAndreas Engel
- Andreas Engel
- 1. Public policy exceptionAndreas Engel
- 2. Overriding mandatory provisionsAndreas Engel
- Andreas Engel
- 1. Federal lawAndreas Engel
- 2. State law: Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of LawsAndreas Engel
- V. Conclusion: Comparative RemarksAndreas Engel
- Lucia Sommerer Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionLucia Sommerer
- Lucia Sommerer
- 1. Sources of lack of objectivityLucia Sommerer
- 2. Is algorithmic lack of objectivity superior to human lack of objectivity?Lucia Sommerer
- Lucia Sommerer
- 1. Concealing controversyLucia Sommerer
- Lucia Sommerer
- a. Man-made definitions of riskLucia Sommerer
- b. Uneven distribution of risksLucia Sommerer
- c. Tolerated risksLucia Sommerer
- Lucia Sommerer
- 1. Away from the public eye – undemocratic decision-makingLucia Sommerer
- 2. Away from law enforcement officials – de-skillingLucia Sommerer
- 3. Away from the courts – limited legal scrutiny due to complexityLucia Sommerer
- 4. From tool to authority figure – algorithmic thoughtlessnessLucia Sommerer
- 5. From the logic of the law to the logic of algorithms – ‘machine logic’Lucia Sommerer
- V. ConclusionLucia Sommerer
- Martín D. Haissiner Download chapter (PDF)
- I. Introduction to the Concept of InnocenceMartín D. Haissiner
- II. An Epistemological PresumptionMartín D. Haissiner
- III. An Axiological PrincipleMartín D. Haissiner
- IV. A Protected StatusMartín D. Haissiner
- V. ConclusionMartín D. Haissiner
- Fabio Núñez del Prado Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionFabio Núñez del Prado
- II. Arbitration as a Spontaneous OrderFabio Núñez del Prado
- Fabio Núñez del Prado
- 1. Disappointing experience: the elimination of the recourse of annulment in Belgium in 1985Fabio Núñez del Prado
- 2. Successful experience: the recognition of the non-signatory theories in the Peruvian Law of Arbitration in 2014Fabio Núñez del Prado
- Fabio Núñez del Prado
- 1. The spontaneous evolution of the concept of consentFabio Núñez del Prado
- Fabio Núñez del Prado
- a. The original criterion of arbitrability: economic nature or similar conceptsFabio Núñez del Prado
- b. The expansion of arbitrability: broad interpretation of the general criterionFabio Núñez del Prado
- c. Concrete examples of extended arbitrabilityFabio Núñez del Prado
- d. Towards universal arbitrabilityFabio Núñez del Prado
- V. ConclusionFabio Núñez del Prado
- Santiago Oñate Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionSantiago Oñate
- Santiago Oñate
- 1. The localist approachSantiago Oñate
- 2. The pluralist approachSantiago Oñate
- 3. The autonomous order approachSantiago Oñate
- III. The World Order ApproachSantiago Oñate
- Santiago Oñate
- 1. Projects and systems (Kahn)Santiago Oñate
- 2. Dédoublement fonctionnel (Scelle)Santiago Oñate
- 3. Transnational legal process (Jessup and Koh)Santiago Oñate
- V. ConclusionSantiago Oñate
- Peter Zickgraf Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionPeter Zickgraf
- II. Positive vs. Normative Economic Analysis of LawPeter Zickgraf
- III. Economic Analysis and the Legislative ProcessPeter Zickgraf
- Peter Zickgraf
- Peter Zickgraf
- Peter Zickgraf
- aa. Positive Economic AnalysisPeter Zickgraf
- bb. Normative Economic AnalysisPeter Zickgraf
- Peter Zickgraf
- aa. Positive Economic AnalysisPeter Zickgraf
- Peter Zickgraf
- (1) Existing interpretation of the statutory rule in case law and legal scholarshipPeter Zickgraf
- (2) Non-existent interpretation of the statutory rule in case law and legal scholarshipPeter Zickgraf
- (3) Absence of legal principlesPeter Zickgraf
- Peter Zickgraf
- Peter Zickgraf
- aa. General features of legal principlesPeter Zickgraf
- bb. Two ways of establishing legal principles: inference through induction and traceability to the idea of lawPeter Zickgraf
- Peter Zickgraf
- Peter Zickgraf
- (1) Positive lawPeter Zickgraf
- (2) Legal precedentPeter Zickgraf
- bb. Traceability to the idea of lawPeter Zickgraf
- c. Efficiency as the normative basis of an enhancement of the lawPeter Zickgraf
- V. ConclusionPeter Zickgraf
- Emilia Jocelyn-Holt Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
- II. The Oresteia: Law as the Institutionalization of PowerEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
- III. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: Law as the Language of PowerEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
- IV. The Trial: Law as the Instrument of PowerEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
- V. ConclusionEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
- Jan-Erik Schirmer Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionJan-Erik Schirmer
- Jan-Erik Schirmer
- 1. Three judgments, two and a half opinions, one issueJan-Erik Schirmer
- 2. Core question: burden of proofJan-Erik Schirmer
- Jan-Erik Schirmer
- 1. Metaphorical feedback-effectJan-Erik Schirmer
- 2. Some empirical evidenceJan-Erik Schirmer
- Jan-Erik Schirmer
- Jan-Erik Schirmer
- a. The corporation is a different personJan-Erik Schirmer
- b. The inner structure stays hiddenJan-Erik Schirmer
- Jan-Erik Schirmer
- a. The corporation is a networkJan-Erik Schirmer
- b. The inner structure is revealedJan-Erik Schirmer
- Jan-Erik Schirmer
- 1. Come to stayJan-Erik Schirmer
- 2. Metaphors matterJan-Erik Schirmer
- Alvin Padilla-Babilonia Download chapter (PDF)
- I. IntroductionAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
- 1. Historical foundationsAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- 2. Social and legal scholarshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
- a. Non-exclusivenessAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- b. Not enoughAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
- 1. Historical foundationsAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- 2. Social and legal scholarshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- 3. Mapping citizenship law as an instrument of powerAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
- a. Reclaiming citizenshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- b. Instrumental turn of citizenshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
- 1. Indigenous peoplesAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- 2. TerritoriansAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
- V. ConclusionAlvin Padilla-Babilonia




