Cover of book: The Law between Objectivity and Power
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The Law between Objectivity and Power

Editors:
Publisher:
 2022

Summary

The volume examines law in the tension field between objectivity and power: is law an instrument of the powerful or – on the contrary – an objective reality that limits power? The book deals with this question through an international, interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary approach. In doing so, it does not only take a theoretical perspective. Instead, it integrates insights from practical, doctrinal contributions as well. In that way, the book follows the idea of Constitutional Pragmatism, sketched out in its introductory chapter: each position in the epistemological dispute about the possibilities and limits of objectivity within the law entails normative implications; thus, the constitutional and doctrinal statements that normally settle normative disputes have to be taken into account when talking about epistemological issues as well.

Keywords



Bibliographic data

Copyright year
2022
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-8334-2
ISBN-Online
978-3-7489-2721-1
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Language
English
Pages
477
Product type
Edited Book

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/InhaltsverzeichnisPages 1 - 16 Download chapter (PDF)
    1. Philip M. Bender Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionPhilip M. Bender
      2. Philip M. Bender
        1. Philip M. Bender
          1. a. The irrelevance of positivismPhilip M. Bender
          2. Philip M. Bender
            1. aa. Observational mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
            2. bb. Deontological mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
            3. cc. Consequentialist mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
          3. Philip M. Bender
            1. aa. Decisionist mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
            2. bb. Procedural mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
            3. cc. Critical mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
          4. Philip M. Bender
            1. aa. Objectivist approaches to contract lawPhilip M. Bender
            2. bb. Subjectivist approaches to contract lawPhilip M. Bender
            3. cc. The objectivist dimension of private autonomy in heteronomous lawmakingPhilip M. Bender
        2. Philip M. Bender
          1. a. Subjectivity and objectivity in interpretationPhilip M. Bender
          2. Philip M. Bender
            1. aa. Productional subjectivity and applicational objectivity (‘Subjectivists’)Philip M. Bender
            2. bb. Productional objectivity and applicational objectivity (‘Objectivists’)Philip M. Bender
            3. cc. Productional subjectivity and applicational subjectivity (‘full nihilists’)Philip M. Bender
            4. dd. Productional objectivity and applicational subjectivity (‘partial nihilists’)Philip M. Bender
          3. c. Parallels in private lawmakingPhilip M. Bender
      3. Philip M. Bender
        1. Philip M. Bender
          1. a. The meaning of legitimacy and its connection to objectivityPhilip M. Bender
          2. b. The criterion of legitimacy and its connection to objectivityPhilip M. Bender
          3. Philip M. Bender
            1. aa. Field-specificity and empirical legitimacyPhilip M. Bender
            2. bb. Field-specificity and normative legitimacyPhilip M. Bender
        2. Philip M. Bender
          1. Philip M. Bender
            1. aa. Three core aspects of philosophical PragmatismPhilip M. Bender
            2. bb. The different perspective of pragmatic adjudicationPhilip M. Bender
          2. Philip M. Bender
            1. aa. Pragmatism and the constitution intertwinedPhilip M. Bender
            2. Philip M. Bender
              1. (1) Epistemological statements on the productional levelPhilip M. Bender
              2. (2) Epistemological statements on the applicational levelPhilip M. Bender
      4. Philip M. Bender
        1. 1. StructuralismPhilip M. Bender
        2. Philip M. Bender
          1. a. DistinctnessPhilip M. Bender
          2. b. Unconsciousness and necessityPhilip M. Bender
          3. Philip M. Bender
            1. aa. Form and substance: bundle-structures IPhilip M. Bender
            2. bb. Substance and substance: bundle-structures IIPhilip M. Bender
            3. cc. Thought-structuresPhilip M. Bender
            4. dd. Reception-structuresPhilip M. Bender
        3. 3. Parallels in private lawmakingPhilip M. Bender
        4. 4. Why to think about structural objectivityPhilip M. Bender
      5. V. ConclusionPhilip M. Bender
    1. Hans Christoph Grigoleit Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionHans Christoph Grigoleit
      2. Hans Christoph Grigoleit
        1. 1. Distinguishing reference points of subjectivism, objectivism, and intuitionismHans Christoph Grigoleit
        2. 2. The postulate of methodical accuracy – avoiding ‘pseudo-subjectivism’Hans Christoph Grigoleit
      3. III. Subjectivism vs Objectivism in Private Law: Referring Legal Solutions to the Parties’ IntentionsHans Christoph Grigoleit
      4. Hans Christoph Grigoleit
        1. 1. General perspective: dependence of the legislator’s intention on fairness and reasonHans Christoph Grigoleit
        2. Hans Christoph Grigoleit
          1. a. The personal soft spotHans Christoph Grigoleit
          2. b. The lingual soft spotHans Christoph Grigoleit
          3. c. The dynamic dimension soft spotHans Christoph Grigoleit
        3. 3. Impossibility of complete legislative pre-determination by ‘authoritative’ legal sourcesHans Christoph Grigoleit
        4. 4. The legitimacy of correcting the legislator’s intention on the application/court levelHans Christoph Grigoleit
      5. Hans Christoph Grigoleit
        1. 1. Tendency to overstate the uncertainty issueHans Christoph Grigoleit
        2. 2. Intersubjective reliability as ‘first degree objectivity’ of legal reasoningHans Christoph Grigoleit
        3. 3. Framing intuition as ‘second degree objectivity’ of legal reasoningHans Christoph Grigoleit
    2. Franz Bauer Download chapter (PDF)
      1. Franz Bauer
        1. 1. Historical argumentsFranz Bauer
        2. 2. Dynamic interpretationFranz Bauer
        3. 3. ObjectivityFranz Bauer
      2. Franz Bauer
        1. 1. The problem of objectivityFranz Bauer
        2. 2. The practical problem: the availability of historical evidenceFranz Bauer
        3. 3. Theoretical problems: will and formFranz Bauer
        4. 4. Objectivity attenuatedFranz Bauer
      3. III. Dynamic Interpretation and ObjectivityFranz Bauer
      4. Franz Bauer
        1. 1. The impermissibility of ‘direct’ historical argumentationFranz Bauer
        2. 2. Meaning and purpose: two types of legislative intentFranz Bauer
        3. Franz Bauer
          1. a. Multiple purposes and the presumption in favour of meaningFranz Bauer
          2. b. Interconnected purposes and the presumption in favour of the lower levelFranz Bauer
        4. Franz Bauer
          1. a. Specific purposesFranz Bauer
          2. b. Supplementary purposesFranz Bauer
          3. c. Dynamic interpretation beyond historical argumentsFranz Bauer
      5. V. ConclusionFranz Bauer
    1. Peter M. Huber Download chapter (PDF)
      1. Peter M. Huber
        1. 1. Historical overviewPeter M. Huber
        2. Peter M. Huber
          1. a. General observationsPeter M. Huber
          2. b. The judiciary between rule of law and democracyPeter M. Huber
      2. Peter M. Huber
        1. 1. General remarksPeter M. Huber
        2. 2. The Bundesverfassungsgericht and PowerPeter M. Huber
      3. Peter M. Huber
        1. 1. Dogmatics as a tool to reduce judicial powerPeter M. Huber
        2. 2. Constitutional adjudication, special techniques, and case lawPeter M. Huber
      4. IV. The Bundesverfassungsgericht as a Constitutional OrganPeter M. Huber
    2. Daniel Wolff Download chapter (PDF)
      1. Daniel Wolff
        1. 1. Preliminary no 1: why we should careDaniel Wolff
        2. 2. Preliminary no 2: some assumptionsDaniel Wolff
        3. 3. Preliminary no 3: a brief summary of today’s originalismDaniel Wolff
      2. II. Conceptual Clarifications: Theories of Law, Theories of Interpretation, and Theories of AdjudicationDaniel Wolff
      3. Daniel Wolff
        1. 1. Legal positivismDaniel Wolff
        2. Daniel Wolff
          1. a. The core of the theory: decision-making (only) according to rulesDaniel Wolff
          2. b. The three key claims of formalismDaniel Wolff
        3. 3. The case against the compatibility of legal positivism with formalismDaniel Wolff
        4. 4. ConclusionDaniel Wolff
      4. Daniel Wolff
        1. 1. Theories of constitutional law: what does American constitutional law consist of?Daniel Wolff
        2. 2. Theories of legal interpretation: how to determine the content of American constitutional law?Daniel Wolff
        3. 3. Theories of adjudication: how must courts resolve constitutional disputes?Daniel Wolff
      5. V. ConclusionDaniel Wolff
    1. Ben Köhler Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionBen Köhler
      2. II. Remedies, Discretion, and System-building: Some ClassificationsBen Köhler
      3. Ben Köhler
        1. Ben Köhler
          1. a. Remedial discretion in equitable remediesBen Köhler
          2. b. Statutory discretionBen Köhler
          3. c. Remedial constructive trusts and ‘discretionary remedialism’Ben Köhler
        2. Ben Köhler
          1. a. No theory of remedial discretion in private law (yet)Ben Köhler
          2. b. Contract concretisation and adaptationBen Köhler
          3. c. Good faithBen Köhler
          4. d. The quantification of damagesBen Köhler
        3. 3. ComparisonBen Köhler
      4. Ben Köhler
        1. 1. The uneasy case for remedial discretionBen Köhler
        2. 2. Unfettered power? Remedial discretion and the rule of lawBen Köhler
      5. V. ConclusionBen Köhler
    2. Victor Jouannaud Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. Judicial Development of the Law as a Constitutional Problem – General AspectsVictor Jouannaud
      2. Victor Jouannaud
        1. 1. Development of the requirement of a statutory provision (Vorbehalt des Gesetzes)Victor Jouannaud
        2. 2. Constitutional basis of the requirement of a statutory provision as developed under the Federal Constitutional Court’s essential-matters doctrineVictor Jouannaud
        3. 3. Characteristics of the Federal Constitutional Court’s essential-matters doctrineVictor Jouannaud
        4. 4. Institutional extension of the essential-matters doctrine – application to the judiciaryVictor Jouannaud
      3. Victor Jouannaud
        1. Victor Jouannaud
          1. a. Differentiation based on the parties to the disputeVictor Jouannaud
          2. b. Change of position? – Application to constellations opposing private individualsVictor Jouannaud
        2. Victor Jouannaud
          1. a. Judges duty to adjudicate in civil disputesVictor Jouannaud
          2. b. The conciliatory character of private lawVictor Jouannaud
        3. Victor Jouannaud
          1. a. Different functions of private lawVictor Jouannaud
          2. Victor Jouannaud
            1. aa. Regulation and fundamental rightsVictor Jouannaud
            2. bb. Regulation and democratic legitimacy – who defines the common good?Victor Jouannaud
          3. c. The functions of balancing interests and of providing infrastructureVictor Jouannaud
      4. IV. ConclusionVictor Jouannaud
    3. Andreas Engel Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. Introduction: Private International Law, Objectivity, and PowerAndreas Engel
      2. Andreas Engel
        1. 1. European private international lawAndreas Engel
        2. Andreas Engel
          1. a. Federal lawAndreas Engel
          2. b. State lawAndreas Engel
      3. Andreas Engel
        1. 1. Public policy exceptionAndreas Engel
        2. 2. Overriding mandatory provisionsAndreas Engel
      4. Andreas Engel
        1. 1. Federal lawAndreas Engel
        2. 2. State law: Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of LawsAndreas Engel
      5. V. Conclusion: Comparative RemarksAndreas Engel
    1. Lucia Sommerer Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionLucia Sommerer
      2. Lucia Sommerer
        1. 1. Sources of lack of objectivityLucia Sommerer
        2. 2. Is algorithmic lack of objectivity superior to human lack of objectivity?Lucia Sommerer
      3. Lucia Sommerer
        1. 1. Concealing controversyLucia Sommerer
        2. Lucia Sommerer
          1. a. Man-made definitions of riskLucia Sommerer
          2. b. Uneven distribution of risksLucia Sommerer
          3. c. Tolerated risksLucia Sommerer
      4. Lucia Sommerer
        1. 1. Away from the public eye – undemocratic decision-makingLucia Sommerer
        2. 2. Away from law enforcement officials – de-skillingLucia Sommerer
        3. 3. Away from the courts – limited legal scrutiny due to complexityLucia Sommerer
        4. 4. From tool to authority figure – algorithmic thoughtlessnessLucia Sommerer
        5. 5. From the logic of the law to the logic of algorithms – ‘machine logic’Lucia Sommerer
      5. V. ConclusionLucia Sommerer
    2. Martín D. Haissiner Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. Introduction to the Concept of InnocenceMartín D. Haissiner
      2. II. An Epistemological PresumptionMartín D. Haissiner
      3. III. An Axiological PrincipleMartín D. Haissiner
      4. IV. A Protected StatusMartín D. Haissiner
      5. V. ConclusionMartín D. Haissiner
    1. Fabio Núñez del Prado Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionFabio Núñez del Prado
      2. II. Arbitration as a Spontaneous OrderFabio Núñez del Prado
      3. Fabio Núñez del Prado
        1. 1. Disappointing experience: the elimination of the recourse of annulment in Belgium in 1985Fabio Núñez del Prado
        2. 2. Successful experience: the recognition of the non-signatory theories in the Peruvian Law of Arbitration in 2014Fabio Núñez del Prado
      4. Fabio Núñez del Prado
        1. 1. The spontaneous evolution of the concept of consentFabio Núñez del Prado
        2. Fabio Núñez del Prado
          1. a. The original criterion of arbitrability: economic nature or similar conceptsFabio Núñez del Prado
          2. b. The expansion of arbitrability: broad interpretation of the general criterionFabio Núñez del Prado
          3. c. Concrete examples of extended arbitrabilityFabio Núñez del Prado
          4. d. Towards universal arbitrabilityFabio Núñez del Prado
      5. V. ConclusionFabio Núñez del Prado
    2. Santiago Oñate Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionSantiago Oñate
      2. Santiago Oñate
        1. 1. The localist approachSantiago Oñate
        2. 2. The pluralist approachSantiago Oñate
        3. 3. The autonomous order approachSantiago Oñate
      3. III. The World Order ApproachSantiago Oñate
      4. Santiago Oñate
        1. 1. Projects and systems (Kahn)Santiago Oñate
        2. 2. Dédoublement fonctionnel (Scelle)Santiago Oñate
        3. 3. Transnational legal process (Jessup and Koh)Santiago Oñate
      5. V. ConclusionSantiago Oñate
    1. Peter Zickgraf Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionPeter Zickgraf
      2. II. Positive vs. Normative Economic Analysis of LawPeter Zickgraf
      3. III. Economic Analysis and the Legislative ProcessPeter Zickgraf
      4. Peter Zickgraf
        1. Peter Zickgraf
          1. Peter Zickgraf
            1. aa. Positive Economic AnalysisPeter Zickgraf
            2. bb. Normative Economic AnalysisPeter Zickgraf
          2. Peter Zickgraf
            1. aa. Positive Economic AnalysisPeter Zickgraf
            2. Peter Zickgraf
              1. (1) Existing interpretation of the statutory rule in case law and legal scholarshipPeter Zickgraf
              2. (2) Non-existent interpretation of the statutory rule in case law and legal scholarshipPeter Zickgraf
              3. (3) Absence of legal principlesPeter Zickgraf
        2. Peter Zickgraf
          1. Peter Zickgraf
            1. aa. General features of legal principlesPeter Zickgraf
            2. bb. Two ways of establishing legal principles: inference through induction and traceability to the idea of lawPeter Zickgraf
          2. Peter Zickgraf
            1. Peter Zickgraf
              1. (1) Positive lawPeter Zickgraf
              2. (2) Legal precedentPeter Zickgraf
            2. bb. Traceability to the idea of lawPeter Zickgraf
          3. c. Efficiency as the normative basis of an enhancement of the lawPeter Zickgraf
      5. V. ConclusionPeter Zickgraf
    2. Emilia Jocelyn-Holt Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
      2. II. The Oresteia: Law as the Institutionalization of PowerEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
      3. III. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: Law as the Language of PowerEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
      4. IV. The Trial: Law as the Instrument of PowerEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
      5. V. ConclusionEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
    1. Jan-Erik Schirmer Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionJan-Erik Schirmer
      2. Jan-Erik Schirmer
        1. 1. Three judgments, two and a half opinions, one issueJan-Erik Schirmer
        2. 2. Core question: burden of proofJan-Erik Schirmer
      3. Jan-Erik Schirmer
        1. 1. Metaphorical feedback-effectJan-Erik Schirmer
        2. 2. Some empirical evidenceJan-Erik Schirmer
      4. Jan-Erik Schirmer
        1. Jan-Erik Schirmer
          1. a. The corporation is a different personJan-Erik Schirmer
          2. b. The inner structure stays hiddenJan-Erik Schirmer
        2. Jan-Erik Schirmer
          1. a. The corporation is a networkJan-Erik Schirmer
          2. b. The inner structure is revealedJan-Erik Schirmer
      5. Jan-Erik Schirmer
        1. 1. Come to stayJan-Erik Schirmer
        2. 2. Metaphors matterJan-Erik Schirmer
    2. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia Download chapter (PDF)
      1. I. IntroductionAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
      2. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
        1. 1. Historical foundationsAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
        2. 2. Social and legal scholarshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
        3. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
          1. a. Non-exclusivenessAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
          2. b. Not enoughAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
      3. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
        1. 1. Historical foundationsAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
        2. 2. Social and legal scholarshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
        3. 3. Mapping citizenship law as an instrument of powerAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
        4. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
          1. a. Reclaiming citizenshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
          2. b. Instrumental turn of citizenshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
      4. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
        1. 1. Indigenous peoplesAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
        2. 2. TerritoriansAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
      5. V. ConclusionAlvin Padilla-Babilonia

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