The Law between Objectivity and Power

Philip M. Bender

doi:10.5771/9783748927211

Zusammenfassung

Der Band untersucht das Recht im Spannungsfeld von Objektivität und Macht: Ist Recht ein Instrument der Macht oder im Gegenteil in der Lage, Macht aufgrund seines objektiven Charakters einzugrenzen? Dieser Frage wird im Rahmen eines internationalen sowie inter- und intradisziplinären Ansatzes nachgegangen.Eine Besonderheit des Buches besteht dabei darin, das zentrale Problem nicht nur aus einer theoretischen Perspektive zu beleuchten, sondern auch praktische, am positiven Recht orientierte Beiträge aufzunehmen. Damit folgt das Buch der in seiner Einleitung skizzierten Idee eines an der Verfassung orientierten Pragmatismus (Constitutional Pragmatism): Jede Position im Streit um die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Objektivität im Recht bringt normative Implikationen mit sich, sodass die verfassungsrechtlichen und die über die Verfassung legitimierten einfachrechtlichen Vorgaben, die normalerweise über Wertungskonflikte entscheiden, auch bei der Lösung dieser epistemologischen Frage zu beachten sind.

Schlagworte

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Bibliographische Angaben

Copyrightjahr: 2022
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-8334-2
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7489-2721-1
Verlag: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Sprache: Englisch
Seiten: 477
Produkttyp: Sammelband

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten

Titelei/InhaltsverzeichnisSeiten 1 - 16 Download Kapitel (PDF)
1. Philip M. Bender Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionPhilip M. Bender
  2. Philip M. Bender
    1. Philip M. Bender
      1. a. The irrelevance of positivismPhilip M. Bender
      2. Philip M. Bender
        aa. Observational mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
        bb. Deontological mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
        cc. Consequentialist mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
      3. Philip M. Bender
        aa. Decisionist mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
        bb. Procedural mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
        cc. Critical mode of thoughtPhilip M. Bender
      4. Philip M. Bender
        aa. Objectivist approaches to contract lawPhilip M. Bender
        bb. Subjectivist approaches to contract lawPhilip M. Bender
        cc. The objectivist dimension of private autonomy in heteronomous lawmakingPhilip M. Bender
    2. Philip M. Bender
      1. a. Subjectivity and objectivity in interpretationPhilip M. Bender
      2. Philip M. Bender
        aa. Productional subjectivity and applicational objectivity (‘Subjectivists’)Philip M. Bender
        bb. Productional objectivity and applicational objectivity (‘Objectivists’)Philip M. Bender
        cc. Productional subjectivity and applicational subjectivity (‘full nihilists’)Philip M. Bender
        dd. Productional objectivity and applicational subjectivity (‘partial nihilists’)Philip M. Bender
      3. c. Parallels in private lawmakingPhilip M. Bender
  3. Philip M. Bender
    1. Philip M. Bender
      1. a. The meaning of legitimacy and its connection to objectivityPhilip M. Bender
      2. b. The criterion of legitimacy and its connection to objectivityPhilip M. Bender
      3. Philip M. Bender
        aa. Field-specificity and empirical legitimacyPhilip M. Bender
        bb. Field-specificity and normative legitimacyPhilip M. Bender
    2. Philip M. Bender
      1. Philip M. Bender
        aa. Three core aspects of philosophical PragmatismPhilip M. Bender
        bb. The different perspective of pragmatic adjudicationPhilip M. Bender
      2. Philip M. Bender
        aa. Pragmatism and the constitution intertwinedPhilip M. Bender
        Philip M. Bender
        (1) Epistemological statements on the productional levelPhilip M. Bender
        (2) Epistemological statements on the applicational levelPhilip M. Bender
  4. Philip M. Bender
    1. 1. StructuralismPhilip M. Bender
    2. Philip M. Bender
      1. a. DistinctnessPhilip M. Bender
      2. b. Unconsciousness and necessityPhilip M. Bender
      3. Philip M. Bender
        aa. Form and substance: bundle-structures IPhilip M. Bender
        bb. Substance and substance: bundle-structures IIPhilip M. Bender
        cc. Thought-structuresPhilip M. Bender
        dd. Reception-structuresPhilip M. Bender
    3. 3. Parallels in private lawmakingPhilip M. Bender
    4. 4. Why to think about structural objectivityPhilip M. Bender
  5. V. ConclusionPhilip M. Bender
1. Hans Christoph Grigoleit Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionHans Christoph Grigoleit
  2. Hans Christoph Grigoleit
    1. 1. Distinguishing reference points of subjectivism, objectivism, and intuitionismHans Christoph Grigoleit
    2. 2. The postulate of methodical accuracy – avoiding ‘pseudo-subjectivism’Hans Christoph Grigoleit
  3. III. Subjectivism vs Objectivism in Private Law: Referring Legal Solutions to the Parties’ IntentionsHans Christoph Grigoleit
  4. Hans Christoph Grigoleit
    1. 1. General perspective: dependence of the legislator’s intention on fairness and reasonHans Christoph Grigoleit
    2. Hans Christoph Grigoleit
      1. a. The personal soft spotHans Christoph Grigoleit
      2. b. The lingual soft spotHans Christoph Grigoleit
      3. c. The dynamic dimension soft spotHans Christoph Grigoleit
    3. 3. Impossibility of complete legislative pre-determination by ‘authoritative’ legal sourcesHans Christoph Grigoleit
    4. 4. The legitimacy of correcting the legislator’s intention on the application/court levelHans Christoph Grigoleit
  5. Hans Christoph Grigoleit
    1. 1. Tendency to overstate the uncertainty issueHans Christoph Grigoleit
    2. 2. Intersubjective reliability as ‘first degree objectivity’ of legal reasoningHans Christoph Grigoleit
    3. 3. Framing intuition as ‘second degree objectivity’ of legal reasoningHans Christoph Grigoleit
2. Franz Bauer Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. Franz Bauer
    1. 1. Historical argumentsFranz Bauer
    2. 2. Dynamic interpretationFranz Bauer
    3. 3. ObjectivityFranz Bauer
  2. Franz Bauer
    1. 1. The problem of objectivityFranz Bauer
    2. 2. The practical problem: the availability of historical evidenceFranz Bauer
    3. 3. Theoretical problems: will and formFranz Bauer
    4. 4. Objectivity attenuatedFranz Bauer
  3. III. Dynamic Interpretation and ObjectivityFranz Bauer
  4. Franz Bauer
    1. 1. The impermissibility of ‘direct’ historical argumentationFranz Bauer
    2. 2. Meaning and purpose: two types of legislative intentFranz Bauer
    3. Franz Bauer
      1. a. Multiple purposes and the presumption in favour of meaningFranz Bauer
      2. b. Interconnected purposes and the presumption in favour of the lower levelFranz Bauer
    4. Franz Bauer
      1. a. Specific purposesFranz Bauer
      2. b. Supplementary purposesFranz Bauer
      3. c. Dynamic interpretation beyond historical argumentsFranz Bauer
  5. V. ConclusionFranz Bauer
1. Peter M. Huber Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. Peter M. Huber
    1. 1. Historical overviewPeter M. Huber
    2. Peter M. Huber
      1. a. General observationsPeter M. Huber
      2. b. The judiciary between rule of law and democracyPeter M. Huber
  2. Peter M. Huber
    1. 1. General remarksPeter M. Huber
    2. 2. The Bundesverfassungsgericht and PowerPeter M. Huber
  3. Peter M. Huber
    1. 1. Dogmatics as a tool to reduce judicial powerPeter M. Huber
    2. 2. Constitutional adjudication, special techniques, and case lawPeter M. Huber
  4. IV. The Bundesverfassungsgericht as a Constitutional OrganPeter M. Huber
2. Daniel Wolff Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. Daniel Wolff
    1. 1. Preliminary no 1: why we should careDaniel Wolff
    2. 2. Preliminary no 2: some assumptionsDaniel Wolff
    3. 3. Preliminary no 3: a brief summary of today’s originalismDaniel Wolff
  2. II. Conceptual Clarifications: Theories of Law, Theories of Interpretation, and Theories of AdjudicationDaniel Wolff
  3. Daniel Wolff
    1. 1. Legal positivismDaniel Wolff
    2. Daniel Wolff
      1. a. The core of the theory: decision-making (only) according to rulesDaniel Wolff
      2. b. The three key claims of formalismDaniel Wolff
    3. 3. The case against the compatibility of legal positivism with formalismDaniel Wolff
    4. 4. ConclusionDaniel Wolff
  4. Daniel Wolff
    1. 1. Theories of constitutional law: what does American constitutional law consist of?Daniel Wolff
    2. 2. Theories of legal interpretation: how to determine the content of American constitutional law?Daniel Wolff
    3. 3. Theories of adjudication: how must courts resolve constitutional disputes?Daniel Wolff
  5. V. ConclusionDaniel Wolff
1. Ben Köhler Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionBen Köhler
  2. II. Remedies, Discretion, and System-building: Some ClassificationsBen Köhler
  3. Ben Köhler
    1. Ben Köhler
      1. a. Remedial discretion in equitable remediesBen Köhler
      2. b. Statutory discretionBen Köhler
      3. c. Remedial constructive trusts and ‘discretionary remedialism’Ben Köhler
    2. Ben Köhler
      1. a. No theory of remedial discretion in private law (yet)Ben Köhler
      2. b. Contract concretisation and adaptationBen Köhler
      3. c. Good faithBen Köhler
      4. d. The quantification of damagesBen Köhler
    3. 3. ComparisonBen Köhler
  4. Ben Köhler
    1. 1. The uneasy case for remedial discretionBen Köhler
    2. 2. Unfettered power? Remedial discretion and the rule of lawBen Köhler
  5. V. ConclusionBen Köhler
2. Victor Jouannaud Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. Judicial Development of the Law as a Constitutional Problem – General AspectsVictor Jouannaud
  2. Victor Jouannaud
    1. 1. Development of the requirement of a statutory provision (Vorbehalt des Gesetzes)Victor Jouannaud
    2. 2. Constitutional basis of the requirement of a statutory provision as developed under the Federal Constitutional Court’s essential-matters doctrineVictor Jouannaud
    3. 3. Characteristics of the Federal Constitutional Court’s essential-matters doctrineVictor Jouannaud
    4. 4. Institutional extension of the essential-matters doctrine – application to the judiciaryVictor Jouannaud
  3. Victor Jouannaud
    1. Victor Jouannaud
      1. a. Differentiation based on the parties to the disputeVictor Jouannaud
      2. b. Change of position? – Application to constellations opposing private individualsVictor Jouannaud
    2. Victor Jouannaud
      1. a. Judges duty to adjudicate in civil disputesVictor Jouannaud
      2. b. The conciliatory character of private lawVictor Jouannaud
    3. Victor Jouannaud
      1. a. Different functions of private lawVictor Jouannaud
      2. Victor Jouannaud
        aa. Regulation and fundamental rightsVictor Jouannaud
        bb. Regulation and democratic legitimacy – who defines the common good?Victor Jouannaud
      3. c. The functions of balancing interests and of providing infrastructureVictor Jouannaud
  4. IV. ConclusionVictor Jouannaud
3. Andreas Engel Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. Introduction: Private International Law, Objectivity, and PowerAndreas Engel
  2. Andreas Engel
    1. 1. European private international lawAndreas Engel
    2. Andreas Engel
      1. a. Federal lawAndreas Engel
      2. b. State lawAndreas Engel
  3. Andreas Engel
    1. 1. Public policy exceptionAndreas Engel
    2. 2. Overriding mandatory provisionsAndreas Engel
  4. Andreas Engel
    1. 1. Federal lawAndreas Engel
    2. 2. State law: Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of LawsAndreas Engel
  5. V. Conclusion: Comparative RemarksAndreas Engel
1. Lucia Sommerer Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionLucia Sommerer
  2. Lucia Sommerer
    1. 1. Sources of lack of objectivityLucia Sommerer
    2. 2. Is algorithmic lack of objectivity superior to human lack of objectivity?Lucia Sommerer
  3. Lucia Sommerer
    1. 1. Concealing controversyLucia Sommerer
    2. Lucia Sommerer
      1. a. Man-made definitions of riskLucia Sommerer
      2. b. Uneven distribution of risksLucia Sommerer
      3. c. Tolerated risksLucia Sommerer
  4. Lucia Sommerer
    1. 1. Away from the public eye – undemocratic decision-makingLucia Sommerer
    2. 2. Away from law enforcement officials – de-skillingLucia Sommerer
    3. 3. Away from the courts – limited legal scrutiny due to complexityLucia Sommerer
    4. 4. From tool to authority figure – algorithmic thoughtlessnessLucia Sommerer
    5. 5. From the logic of the law to the logic of algorithms – ‘machine logic’Lucia Sommerer
  5. V. ConclusionLucia Sommerer
2. Martín D. Haissiner Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. Introduction to the Concept of InnocenceMartín D. Haissiner
  2. II. An Epistemological PresumptionMartín D. Haissiner
  3. III. An Axiological PrincipleMartín D. Haissiner
  4. IV. A Protected StatusMartín D. Haissiner
  5. V. ConclusionMartín D. Haissiner
1. Fabio Núñez del Prado Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionFabio Núñez del Prado
  2. II. Arbitration as a Spontaneous OrderFabio Núñez del Prado
  3. Fabio Núñez del Prado
    1. 1. Disappointing experience: the elimination of the recourse of annulment in Belgium in 1985Fabio Núñez del Prado
    2. 2. Successful experience: the recognition of the non-signatory theories in the Peruvian Law of Arbitration in 2014Fabio Núñez del Prado
  4. Fabio Núñez del Prado
    1. 1. The spontaneous evolution of the concept of consentFabio Núñez del Prado
    2. Fabio Núñez del Prado
      1. a. The original criterion of arbitrability: economic nature or similar conceptsFabio Núñez del Prado
      2. b. The expansion of arbitrability: broad interpretation of the general criterionFabio Núñez del Prado
      3. c. Concrete examples of extended arbitrabilityFabio Núñez del Prado
      4. d. Towards universal arbitrabilityFabio Núñez del Prado
  5. V. ConclusionFabio Núñez del Prado
2. Santiago Oñate Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionSantiago Oñate
  2. Santiago Oñate
    1. 1. The localist approachSantiago Oñate
    2. 2. The pluralist approachSantiago Oñate
    3. 3. The autonomous order approachSantiago Oñate
  3. III. The World Order ApproachSantiago Oñate
  4. Santiago Oñate
    1. 1. Projects and systems (Kahn)Santiago Oñate
    2. 2. Dédoublement fonctionnel (Scelle)Santiago Oñate
    3. 3. Transnational legal process (Jessup and Koh)Santiago Oñate
  5. V. ConclusionSantiago Oñate
1. Peter Zickgraf Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionPeter Zickgraf
  2. II. Positive vs. Normative Economic Analysis of LawPeter Zickgraf
  3. III. Economic Analysis and the Legislative ProcessPeter Zickgraf
  4. Peter Zickgraf
    1. Peter Zickgraf
      1. Peter Zickgraf
        aa. Positive Economic AnalysisPeter Zickgraf
        bb. Normative Economic AnalysisPeter Zickgraf
      2. Peter Zickgraf
        aa. Positive Economic AnalysisPeter Zickgraf
        Peter Zickgraf
        (1) Existing interpretation of the statutory rule in case law and legal scholarshipPeter Zickgraf
        (2) Non-existent interpretation of the statutory rule in case law and legal scholarshipPeter Zickgraf
        (3) Absence of legal principlesPeter Zickgraf
    2. Peter Zickgraf
      1. Peter Zickgraf
        aa. General features of legal principlesPeter Zickgraf
        bb. Two ways of establishing legal principles: inference through induction and traceability to the idea of lawPeter Zickgraf
      2. Peter Zickgraf
        Peter Zickgraf
        (1) Positive lawPeter Zickgraf
        (2) Legal precedentPeter Zickgraf
        bb. Traceability to the idea of lawPeter Zickgraf
      3. c. Efficiency as the normative basis of an enhancement of the lawPeter Zickgraf
  5. V. ConclusionPeter Zickgraf
2. Emilia Jocelyn-Holt Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
  2. II. The Oresteia: Law as the Institutionalization of PowerEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
  3. III. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: Law as the Language of PowerEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
  4. IV. The Trial: Law as the Instrument of PowerEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
  5. V. ConclusionEmilia Jocelyn-Holt
1. Jan-Erik Schirmer Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionJan-Erik Schirmer
  2. Jan-Erik Schirmer
    1. 1. Three judgments, two and a half opinions, one issueJan-Erik Schirmer
    2. 2. Core question: burden of proofJan-Erik Schirmer
  3. Jan-Erik Schirmer
    1. 1. Metaphorical feedback-effectJan-Erik Schirmer
    2. 2. Some empirical evidenceJan-Erik Schirmer
  4. Jan-Erik Schirmer
    1. Jan-Erik Schirmer
      1. a. The corporation is a different personJan-Erik Schirmer
      2. b. The inner structure stays hiddenJan-Erik Schirmer
    2. Jan-Erik Schirmer
      1. a. The corporation is a networkJan-Erik Schirmer
      2. b. The inner structure is revealedJan-Erik Schirmer
  5. Jan-Erik Schirmer
    1. 1. Come to stayJan-Erik Schirmer
    2. 2. Metaphors matterJan-Erik Schirmer
2. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia Download Kapitel (PDF)
  1. I. IntroductionAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
  2. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
    1. 1. Historical foundationsAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
    2. 2. Social and legal scholarshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
    3. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
      1. a. Non-exclusivenessAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
      2. b. Not enoughAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
  3. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
    1. 1. Historical foundationsAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
    2. 2. Social and legal scholarshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
    3. 3. Mapping citizenship law as an instrument of powerAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
    4. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
      1. a. Reclaiming citizenshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
      2. b. Instrumental turn of citizenshipAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
  4. Alvin Padilla-Babilonia
    1. 1. Indigenous peoplesAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
    2. 2. TerritoriansAlvin Padilla-Babilonia
  5. V. ConclusionAlvin Padilla-Babilonia