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Monograph No access

Making Auditors Effective

Theory, Evidence, Perspectives
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Publisher:
 2008

Summary

Öffentlichen Rechnungsprüfern (z. B. Rechnungshöfen) wird eine wichtige Rolle bei der Kontrolle von Regierung und Verwaltung zugesprochen. Trotzdem wurden sie bisher aus ökonomischer Sicht kaum untersucht. Dieses Buch ist die erste systematische ökonomische Analyse des Einflusses von Rechnungsprüfern im öffentlichen Sektor. Es werden zwei wichtige Merkmale identifiziert, die den Einfluss von Rechnungsprüfern auf die öffentliche Leistungserbringung prägen: Das Prüfmandat und der Wahlmechanismus. Das Prüfmandat beinhaltet typischerweise die ex post Prüfung der Bücher, d.h. die Buchprüfung erfolgt nach der politischen Entscheidung. Die empirischen Analysen zeigen, dass eine Erweiterung des Prüfmandates um eine ex post Wirtschaftlichkeitsprüfung, und um eine ex ante Prüfung der Budgetvoranschläge und einzelner Politikprojekte zu großen Effizienzgewinnen führt. Die Erweiterung des Prüfmandates sollte mit einer Direktwahl des Rechnungsprüfers durch die Bürger kombiniert werden, wodurch die Wirkung des Rechnungsprüfers besonders fruchtbar wird. Darüber hinaus werden theoretische und empirische Erkenntnisse aus dem öffentlichen Bereich auf die Revisoren im privaten Bereich übertragen.



Bibliographic data

Edition
1/2008
Copyright Year
2008
ISBN-Print
978-3-8329-3437-8
ISBN-Online
978-3-8452-0851-0
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series
Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie
Volume
4
Language
English
Pages
167
Product Type
Monograph

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 2 - 12
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  2. List of Tables and Graphs No access Pages 13 - 14
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  3. List of Abbreviations No access Pages 15 - 16
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  4. Introduction No access Pages 17 - 20
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    1. Introduction No access Pages 21 - 22
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      1. Authors:
        1. The basic impact of independent audits No access
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        2. Auditors and transparency No access
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      2. Authors:
        1. Auditor independence: Election vs. appointment of auditors No access
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        2. Performance audits No access
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        3. Additional aspects important for auditor effectiveness No access
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      1. The basic hypotheses No access Pages 28 - 29
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      2. Authors:
        1. Selection mechanisms: Election vs. legislative appointment vs. executive appointment No access
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        2. Interaction between auditor selection and performance audits No access
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        1. Government scale: Expenditures and revenues No access
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        2. Deficits and debt No access
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        1. State credit ratings No access
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        2. Government performance ratings No access
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        3. Substitution of institutional control mechanisms No access
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      1. US state auditing institutions No access Pages 36 - 38
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      2. Dependent variables No access Pages 38 - 39
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      3. Control variables No access Pages 39 - 39
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      1. Basic strategy and causality No access Pages 39 - 40
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      2. Authors:
        1. Government expenditures No access
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        2. Government revenues No access
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        3. Government surpluses No access
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        4. Government debt No access
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        5. Exploiting institutional variation over time No access
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      3. Authors:
        1. Moody’s state credit ratings No access
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        2. Government Performance Rating No access
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        3. Substitution among institutional features to control the government No access
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        4. Alternative approaches: What we have learned No access
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    2. Summary and Conclusion No access Pages 61 - 64
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    1. Introduction No access Pages 65 - 67
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      1. A crucial asymmetry No access Pages 67 - 69
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      2. Authors:
        1. Expert models of strategic information transmission No access
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        2. Experts, asymmetric interest representation, and auditors No access
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      3. Authors:
        1. The model No access
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        2. Equilibrium with one winning proposal No access
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        3. Equilibrium with two proposals No access
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        4. Summary and intuition No access
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        5. Comparative static of the model with and without auditors No access
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      4. Authors:
        1. Legislative committees No access
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        2. Political parties No access
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      5. Hypotheses No access Pages 79 - 80
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        1. Local auditors in the policy making process No access
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        2. Election and selection of local auditors in Switzerland No access
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      2. ‘Quantifying’ auditor influence No access Pages 84 - 85
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      1. Swiss federal structures and institutions No access Pages 85 - 87
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      2. Authors:
        1. Municipal data No access
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        2. Cantonal data No access
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        3. Expected influence of our control variables No access
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      3. Are fiscal variables adequate? No access Pages 91 - 92
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        1. Municipal data No access
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        2. Cantonal data No access
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        3. Basic strategy and robustness No access
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        4. Causality issues No access
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      2. Authors:
        1. Hypothesis 1: Municipal data No access
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        2. Hypothesis 1: Cantonal data No access
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        3. Hypothesis 2: Municipal data No access
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        4. Causality issues No access
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        5. Further evidence and discussion No access
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        6. Empirical evidence: The big picture No access
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      1. Election No access Pages 112 - 114
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      2. Selection No access Pages 114 - 115
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      3. Authors:
        1. Extension of traditional audit mandate No access
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        2. Election of auditors No access
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        3. Separation of traditional auditing services from policy evaluation No access
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    2. Summary and Conclusion No access Pages 117 - 118
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    1. Introduction No access Pages 119 - 120
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        1. Threats to auditor independence No access
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        2. Proposals to improve auditor independence No access
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      2. Mandatory auditor rotation: The main pros and cons No access Pages 123 - 124
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      3. Empirical evidence No access Pages 124 - 126
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      1. Analogies between the corporate and the public sector No access Pages 126 - 127
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      2. US state auditors No access Pages 127 - 129
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      3. Authors:
        1. Empirical Strategy No access
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        2. Empirical Results No access
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      4. Discussion and implications No access Pages 133 - 134
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    2. Summary and Conclusion No access Pages 134 - 136
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    1. Summary No access Pages 137 - 140
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    2. Further Research No access Pages 140 - 142
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  5. References No access Pages 143 - 152
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  6. No access Pages 153 - 156
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  7. No access Pages 157 - 158
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  8. No access Pages 159 - 159
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  9. No access Pages 160 - 163
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  10. No access Pages 164 - 165
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  11. No access Pages 166 - 167
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