Cover of book: Institutional Congruence
Buy in shop
, to see if you have full access to this publication.
Book Titles No access

Institutional Congruence

The Riddle of Leviathan and Hydra
Authors:
Publisher:
 04.01.2019

Summary

What is the foundation of solid financial architecture? How is it possible to prevent a constant increase in taxes, debts and the misallocation of financial resources? The theory of institutional congruence provides a clear answer: The circles of decision makers, beneficiaries and payers must overlap to the greatest possible extent. This requires the consistent institutional centralisation or decentralisation of power and responsibilities regarding taxes, expenditure and debts. This study’s analysis of sovereign and subnational public entities in the eurozone, Germany, France, Canada, the USA and Switzerland as well as of debt crises among autonomous sovereign debtors shows how the implementation of institutional congruence works in practice.

Keywords

Bibliographic data

Copyright year
2019
Publication date
04.01.2019
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-5599-8
ISBN-Online
978-3-8452-9775-0
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series
Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie
Volume
16
Language
English
Pages
224
Product type
Book Titles

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access 1 - 12
    1. Two Ways Towards Financial Sustainability No access
    2. Structure No access
    1. Preliminary Considerations No access
      1. Ricardo-Barro Equivalence Theorem No access
      2. The Sustainability of Sovereign and Public Debt No access
      3. The Sirens’ Song: Low Interest Rates No access
      1. The Homo Economicus in Politics No access
      2. Political Agents in Asymmetric Relations No access
      3. Building Bureaucratic and Public Empires No access
      4. Interest Group Lobbying No access
      5. Rent-Seeking No access
    1. Preliminary Considerations No access
      1. Race to the Best Fit, to the Top, or to the Bottom? No access
      2. Centralisation: Returns to Scale No access
      3. Hercules and Hydra: The Political Architecture No access
      4. Economic Performance in the Shadow of Federalism No access
      1. The Principle No access
      2. Market Control v Central Government Control No access
        1. No Bail-Out Regime No access
        2. Tax and Budget Autonomy No access
        3. Self-Imposed Borrowing and Deficit Constraints No access
        4. Rules for Restructuring and Governance Reform No access
        5. Ratings No access
        1. Top-Down Directives No access
        2. Cooperative Budget-Rules No access
        3. Vertical and/or Horizontal Transfers No access
        4. Bail-Out Guarantee/ Shared Debt Responsibility No access
        5. Imposed Borrowing and Deficit Constraints No access
      5. Summary: Autonomy, Integration, and Mixed Models No access
      6. Institutional Congruence Index No access
    1. Institutions Matter No access
      1. Canada No access
      2. France No access
      3. Germany No access
      4. Switzerland No access
        1. Fiscal Architecture No access
        2. Puerto Rico Case Study No access
    3. Institutional Congruence: Comparative Review No access
    1. Preliminary Considerations No access
    2. The Prelude to the European Monetary Union No access
      1. Preliminary Considerations No access
      2. Decisions about Spending No access
      3. Decisions about Taxation No access
      4. Decisions about Debt No access
        1. Explicit Transfers from the EU Budget No access
        2. The EU Bailout Policy No access
        3. The Threefold Bailout Subsidy No access
      6. The Greek Debt Restructuring No access
      7. Bailout and Crisis Management Top-Down: A New Era? No access
      8. Contagion, Systematic Risk and Banking Union No access
      9. Institutional Congruence Review No access
    4. The European Tragedy and the Way Forward No access
    1. Challenge and Solution No access
      1. Bold Players in a Game With Weak Rules No access
      2. The Legal Basics No access
      3. Bargain and Blackmail No access
      4. The Enforcement Game No access
        1. Capital Costs No access
        2. Spill-Over Costs No access
      6. Conclusion No access
      1. Chaos versus Orderly Sovereign Insolvency No access
      2. Lessons from Corporate and Personal Insolvency No access
        1. Private v Public Ordering No access
        2. Acceleration No access
        3. Collective v Individual Action and Decision-Making No access
        4. Debtor’s Commitment to a ‘Fair Procedure’ No access
        5. Inter-Creditor Relations: Who gets paid how much? No access
        6. Governance Reform No access
        7. Plan and Plan Enforcement No access
        8. Coordination and Supervision No access
      4. Summary: Proposal for a Sovereign Insolvency Mechanism No access
        1. Conclusion: Leviathan, Hydra, or Institutional Congruence No access
  8. BIBLIOGRAPHY No access 207 - 207
  9. Bibliographic sources with author reference No access 207 - 221
  10. Other resources No access 222 - 224

Bibliography (256)

  1. AFONSO, ANTÓNIO, ‘Understanding the Determinants of Government Debt Ratings: Evidence for the Two Leading Agencies’ (2003) 27 (1) Journal of Economics and Finance 56. Open Google Scholar
  2. AKERLOF, GEORGE, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 (3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488. Open Google Scholar
  3. ALCHIAN, ARMEN and DEMSETZ, HAROLD, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’ (1972) 62 (5) The American Economic Review 777. Open Google Scholar
  4. ALESINA, ALBERTO and TABELLINI, GUIDO, ‘A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debts’ (1990) 57 Review of Economic Studies 403. Open Google Scholar
  5. ALLEN, MARK and LEIPZIGER, DANNY, ‘Operational Framework for Debt Sustainability Assessment in Low-Income Countries–Further Considerations’ (International Monetary Fund and International Development Association 2005). Open Google Scholar
  6. ALLEN, MARK and LEIPZIGER, DANNY, ‘Applying the Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries Post Debt Relief (International Monetary Fund and International Development Association 2006). Open Google Scholar
  7. ANDERHUB, VITAL and ENGELMANN, DIRK and GÜTH, WERNER, ‘An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information’ (2002) 48 (2) Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 197. Open Google Scholar
  8. ARROW KENNETH and DEBREU, GERARD, ‘Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy’ (1954) 22 (3) Econometrica 265. Open Google Scholar
  9. ARTETA, CARLOS and HALE, GALINA, ‘Sovereign Debt Crisis and Credit to the Private Sector’ (2008) 74 (1) Journal of International Economics 53. Open Google Scholar
  10. AYOTTE, KENNETH and SKEEL, DAVID, ‘Bankruptcy or Bailouts?’ (2010) 35 The Journal of Corporation Law 469. Open Google Scholar
  11. BARETTI, CHRISTIAN, ‘Wird gute Standortpolitik bestraft? Die Anreizeffekte des kommunalen Finanzsystems’ (2002) 7 ifo Schnelldienst 10. Open Google Scholar
  12. BARRO, ROBERT ‘Are government bonds net wealth?’ (1974) 82 (6) Journal of Political Economy 1095. Open Google Scholar
  13. BARRO, ROBERT, ‘On the Determination of the Public Debt’ (1979) 87 (5) Journal of Political Economy 940. Open Google Scholar
  14. BAYOUMI, TAMIM and GOLDSTEIN, MORRIS and WOGLOM, GEOFFREY, ‘Do Capital Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States’ (1995) 27 (4) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 1046. Open Google Scholar
  15. BERNANKE, BEN, ‘The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit’ (March 10, 2005) Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke, At the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, Virginia. Open Google Scholar
  16. BESLEY, TIMOTHY and CASE, ANNE, ‘Incumbent Behaviour: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition’ (1995) 85 (1) The American Economic Review 25. Open Google Scholar
  17. BESLEY, TIM and HENNESSY, PETER, Letter to Her Majesty the Queen (British Academy, 22 July 2009). Open Google Scholar
  18. BEETSMA, ROEL and POPLAWSKI RIBEIRO, MARCOS and SCHABERT, ANDREAS, ‘A Comparison of Debt and Primary-Deficit Constraints’ CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6897. Open Google Scholar
  19. BIRD, RICHARD and TASSONYI, ALMOS, ‘Constraints on provincial and municipal borrowing in Canada: markets, rules, and norms’ (2001) 44 (1) Canadian Public Administration 84. Open Google Scholar
  20. BLAIS, ANDRÉ and DION, STÉPHANE, ‘Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers? The Niskanen Model & Its Critics’ (1990) 22 (4) Polity 655. Open Google Scholar
  21. BLANCHARD, OLIVER and CHOURAQUI, JEAN-CLAUDE and HAGEMANN, ROBERT and SARTOR, NICOLA ‘The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy: New Answers to an Old Question’ (1990) 15 OECD Economic Studies 8. Open Google Scholar
  22. BLANKART, CHARLES, ‘An Economic Theory of Switzerland’ (2011) 3 CESifo DICE Report 74. Open Google Scholar
  23. BLANKART, CHARLES, Föderalismus in Deutschland und Europa (Nomos 2007). Open Google Scholar
  24. CHARLES BLANKART, “Ich werbe für das Schweizer Modell” Zeit Online, Interview (14 March 2013) <https://www.zeit.de/2013/12/Interview-Charles-Blankart-Schweiz>. Open Google Scholar
  25. BLANKART, CHARLES, Öffentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie (Vahlen 2017). Open Google Scholar
  26. BLANKART, CHARLES, ‘Oil and Vinegar: A Positive Fiscal Theory of the Euro Crisis’ (2013) 66 (4) Kyklos, International Review for Social Sciences’ 497. Open Google Scholar
  27. BLANKART, CHARLES, ‘Swiss Role–What the Eurozone Could Learn from Switzerland’ (2015) 2 CESifo Forum 39. Open Google Scholar
  28. BLANKART, CHARLES, ‘The Process of Government Centralisation: A Constitutional View’ (2000) 11 (1) Constitutional Political Economy 27. Open Google Scholar
  29. BLANKART, CHARLES, ‘Wie finanzieren sich Völkergemeinschaften? Vom Kaiserreich zur Eurokrise–Drei Modelle im Vergleich’ (2012) 61 (3) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 241. Open Google Scholar
  30. BLANKART, CHARLES, ‘What the eurozone could learn from Switzerland’ (2015, 18 May) Institute of Economic Affairs <https://iea.org.uk/blog/what-the-euro-zone-could-learn-from-switzerland>. Open Google Scholar
  31. BLANKART, CHARLES and EHMKE, DAVID, ‘Alternative Voting Rules for the EU Budget’ (typescript). Open Google Scholar
  32. BLANKART, CHARLES and EHMKE, DAVID, ‘Are euro and transfer union the price for German reunification?’ in Wulf Kaal, Matthias Schmidt, and Andreas Schwartze (Mohr Siebeck 2014) Festschrift in Honour of Christian Kirchner 665. Open Google Scholar
  33. BLANKART, CHARLES and EHMKE, DAVID, ‘Collective Decisions on Public Debts’ (2016) 3 CESifo DICE report 3. Open Google Scholar
  34. BLANKART, CHARLES and EHMKE, DAVID, ‘Kommunaler Bail-Out oder beschränkter Insolvenzfähigkeit–Zum Umgang mit überschuldeten Kommunen’ (2014) 63 (2) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 173. Open Google Scholar
  35. BLANKART, CHARLES and EHMKE, DAVID, ‘Overcoming the Rent-Seeking Defect in Regional Policy: Time to Re-think the Institutional Design’ (2015) 3 CESifo DICE Report 44. Open Google Scholar
  36. BLANKART, CHARLES and FASTEN, ERIK, ‘Schuldengrenzen im Föderalismus: Ein Optionsmodell für Vielfalt in Einheit’ (2017, 3 March) 53 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Open Google Scholar
  37. BLANKART, CHARLES and KIRCHNER, CHRISTIAN, ‘The Deadlock of the EU Budget’ in Charles Blankart and Dennis Mueller (eds) A Constitution for the European Union (MIT Press 2004) 109. Open Google Scholar
  38. BLANKART, CHARLES and KLAIBER, ACHIM, ‘Subnational Government Organisation and Public Debt Crisis’ (2006) Economic Affairs 48. Open Google Scholar
  39. BLANKART, CHARLES and KOESTER, GERRIT, ‘Refocusing the EU Budget–An Institutional View’ (2009) Journal of Public Finance and Management, Special Issue on EU finances 536. Open Google Scholar
  40. BOADWAY, ROBIN and WATTS, RONALD, ‘Fiscal Federalism in Canada, the USA, and Germany’ (2004) 6 IIGR Working Paper, Queen’s University. Open Google Scholar
  41. BOHN, HENNING and INMAN, ROBERT, ‘Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence From U.S. States’ (1996) NBER Working Paper 5533. Open Google Scholar
  42. BOLTON, PATRICK and SKEEL, DAVID, ‘Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?’ (2004) 53 Emory Law Journal 763. Open Google Scholar
  43. BOLTON, PATRICK and FREIXAS, XAVIER and SHAPIRO, JOEL, ‘The Credit Ratings Game’ (2012) 67 (1) The Journal of Finance 85. Open Google Scholar
  44. BOLTON, PATRICK and ROLAND, GERARD, ‘The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis’ (1997) 112 (4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1057. Open Google Scholar
  45. BOLTON, PATRICK and SKEEL, DAVID, ‘Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?’ (2004) 53 Emory Law Journal 763. Open Google Scholar
  46. BORDIGNON, MASSIMO and CEMIGLIA, FLORINA and REVELLI, FEDERICO, ‘In Search for Yardstick Competition: Property Tax Rates and Electoral Behaviour in Italian Cities’ (2002) CESifo Working Paper No. 644. Open Google Scholar
  47. BORDIGNON, MASSIMO and MANESSE, PAOLO and TABELLINI, GUIDO, ‘Optimal Regional Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information’ (2001) 91 (3) The American Economic Review 709. Open Google Scholar
  48. BORDO, MICHAEL, ‘The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview’ in Michael Bordo and Barry Eichengreen (eds) A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform (University of Chicago Press 1993) 3. Open Google Scholar
  49. BOUND, JOHN and GROEN, JEFFREY and KEZDI, GABOR and TURNER, SARAH, ‘Trade in university training: cross-state variation in the production and stick of college-educated labor’ (2009) 112 Journal of Econometrics 143. Open Google Scholar
  50. BOVENBERG, LANS and KREMERS, JERON and MASSON, PAUL, ‘Economic and Monetary Union in Europe and Constraints on National Budgetary Policies’ (1991) 38 (2) IMF Staff Papers 374. Open Google Scholar
  51. BREDFORD, DAVID and OATES, WALLACE, ‘Towards a Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants’ (1971) 61 (2) The American Economic Review 440. Open Google Scholar
  52. BREMMER, IAN, ‘Managing Risk in an Unstable World’ (2005) June Issue, Harvard Business Review 2. Open Google Scholar
  53. BRENDEL, MATTHIAS and JOST, SEBASTIAN, ‘Jeder druckt für sich allein’ (2012, 20 May) Welt <https://www.welt.de/print/wams/wirtschaft/article106344100/Jeder-druckt-fuer-sich-allein.html> Open Google Scholar
  54. BRENNAN, GEOFFREY and BUCHANAN, JAMES, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (Liberty Fund 1980). Open Google Scholar
  55. BREWER, ELIJAH and JAGTIANI, JULAPA, ‘How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-to-Fail and to Become Systemically Important’ (2013) 48 (1) Journal of Financial Services Research 1. Open Google Scholar
  56. BRUECKNER, JAN, ‘Fiscal Decentralisation with Distortionary Taxation: Tiebout vs. Tax Competition’ (2004) 11 International Tax and Public Finance 133. Open Google Scholar
  57. BUCHANAN, JAMES and FAITH, ROGER, ‘Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Towards a Theory of Internal Exit’ (1987) 77 (5) The American Economic Review 1023. Open Google Scholar
  58. BUCHANAN, JAMES and TULLOCK, GORDEN, The Calculus of Consent (University of Michigan Press 1962). Open Google Scholar
  59. BUCHANAN, JAMES and WAGNER, RICHARD, Democracy in deficit: The political legacy of Lord Keynes (Academic Press 1977). Open Google Scholar
  60. BUITER, WILLEM, ‘Kornai on Soft Budget Constraints, Bail-Outs and the Financial Crisis’ (2009, 14 October) Financial Times <http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/10/kornai-on-soft-budget-constraints-bail-outs-and-the-financial-crisis/#axzz48n7wBrlF>. Open Google Scholar
  61. CARLSEN, FREDERICK, ‘Rational Partisan Theory: Empirical Evidence for the United States’ (1998) 65 (1) Southern Economic Journal 64. Open Google Scholar
  62. CHATTERJEE, SATYAJIT and EYIGUNGOR, BURCU, ‘A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt’ (2015) 105 (12) American Economic Review 3740. Open Google Scholar
  63. CHOI, ALBERT and POSNER, ERIC, ‘A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine’ (2007) 70 (3) Law and Contemporary Problems 33. Open Google Scholar
  64. CHOI, STEPHAN and GULATI, MITU and POSNER, ERIC, ‘Pricing terms in sovereign debt contracts: a Greek case study with implications for the European crisis resolution mechanism’ (2011) 6 (2) Capital Markets Law Journal 163. Open Google Scholar
  65. COATE, STEPHEN and MORRIS, STEPHEN, ‘On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests’ (1995) 103 (6) The Journal of Political Economy 1210. Open Google Scholar
  66. COLE, HAROLD and KEHOE, PATRICK, ‘Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial Versus General Reputations’ (1998) 39 International Economic Review 55. Open Google Scholar
  67. CORKERY, MICHAEL and WALSH, MARY WILLIAMS, ‘Message of Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Easy Bets Sometimes Lose’ (2017, 7 May) The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-creditors-hedge-funds.html>. Open Google Scholar
  68. COTTARELLI, CARLO and MOGHADAM, REZA, ‘Modernizing the Framework for Fiscal Policy and Public Debt Sustainability Analysis’ (International Monetary Fund 2011). Open Google Scholar
  69. CRUCES, JUAN and TREBESCH, CHRISTOPH, ‘Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts’ (2013) 5 (3) American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 85. Open Google Scholar
  70. DAS, UDAIBIR and PAPAIOANNOU, MICHAEL and TREBESCH, CHRISTOPH, ‘Sovereign Default Risk and Private Sector Access to Capital in Emerging Markets’ (2010) IMF Working Paper WP/10/10. Open Google Scholar
  71. DÖRING, THOMAS and VOIGT, STEFAN, ‘Reforming Federalism German Style: A First Step in the Right Direction’ (2006) July/August, Intereconomics 201. Open Google Scholar
  72. DRAGHI, MARIO Verbatim of the remarks made by Mario Draghi at the Global Investment Conference in London (26 July 2012) <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html>. Open Google Scholar
  73. EATON, JONATHAN and GERSOVITZ, MARK, ‘Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (1981) 48 (2) The Review of Economic Studies 289. Open Google Scholar
  74. EHMKE, DAVID, ‘Sovereign Debtors in Distress’ (2015) 12 (1) University of St. Thomas Law Journal 1. Open Google Scholar
  75. EICHENGREEN, BARRY and WYPLOSZ, CHARLES, ‘Minimal Conditions for the Survival of the Euro’ (2016) 1 Intereconomics 24. Open Google Scholar
  76. ENGELMANN, DIRK and NIKIFORAKIS, NIKOS, ‘In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments’ (2015) 45 (3) Social Choice and Welfare 561. Open Google Scholar
  77. EWING, JACK, ‘Is Greek Debt Risk-Free? European Banking Officials Think So’ (2011, 21 July) The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/business/global/europes-new-bank-rules-still-favor-government-debt.html>. Open Google Scholar
  78. FAIRCHILD, LISA and KOCH, TIMOTHY, ‘The Impact of State Disclosure Requirements on Municipal Yields’ (1998) 51 (4) National Tax Journal 733. Open Google Scholar
  79. FASTEN, ERIK, ‘Sudden Death or Glorious Convalescence: Risk Transfers, Cross-Country Spillovers and Sovereign Defaults’ in Financial Markets and Public Finance (Nomos 2012) 19. Open Google Scholar
  80. FASTEN, ERIK, ‘Two-Sided Certification: The market for Rating Agencies’ in Financial Markets and Public Finance (Nomos 2012) 86. Open Google Scholar
  81. FELD, LARS, Braucht die Schweiz eine materielle Steuerharmonisierung? (economiesuisse 2009). Open Google Scholar
  82. FELD, LARS and FUERST, CLEMENS and HAUCAP, JUSTUS and SCHWEIZER, HEIKE and WIELAND, VOLKER and WIGGER, BERTHOLD, ‘Für eine echte Reform der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehung’ (2016) 62 Kronberger Kreis, Stiftung Marktwirtschaft. Open Google Scholar
  83. FELD, LARS and KALB, ALEXANDER and MOESSINGER, MARC-DANIEL and OSTERLOH, STEFFEN, ‘Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules and no-bailout clauses: The Swiss experience’ (2013) ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 13-034. Open Google Scholar
  84. FELD, LARS and KIRCHGÄSSNER, GEBHARD, ‘On the Effectiveness of Debt Brakes: The Swiss Experience’ in Reinhard Neck and Jan-Egbert Sturm (eds) Sustainability of Public Debts (MIT Press 2008) 223. Open Google Scholar
  85. FELD, LARS and KIRCHGÄSSNER, GEBHARD and SCHALTEGGER, CHRISTOPH, ‘Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments’ (2010) 77 (1) Southern Economic Journal 27. Open Google Scholar
  86. FINOCCHIARO, CHARLES and ROHDE, DAVID, ‘War for the Floor: Partisan Theory and Agenda Control In the U.S. House of Representatives’ (2008) 33 Legislative Studies Quarterly 35. Open Google Scholar
  87. FONTEVECCHIA, AGUSTINO, ‘The Real Story Of How A Hedge Fund Detained A Vessel In Ghana And Even Went For Argentina’s ‘Air Force One’ (2012, 5 October) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the-real-story-behind-the-argentine-vessel-in-ghana-and-how-hedge-funds-tried-to-seize-the-presidential-plane/#3df9238b25aa>. Open Google Scholar
  88. FORELLE, CHARLES and MINCZESKI, PAT, and BENTLEY, ELLIOT, ‘Greece’s Debt Due’ (2017) The Wall Street Journal <https://graphics.wsj.com/greece-debt-timeline/>. Open Google Scholar
  89. FUENTES, MIGUEL and SARAVIA, DIEGO, ‘Sovereign defaulters: Do international capital markets punish them?’ (2010) 91 Journal of Development Economics 336. Open Google Scholar
  90. FUEST, CLEMENS and THÖNE, MICHAEL, Reform des Finanzföderalismus in Deutschland (Stiftung Marktwirtschaft 2009). Open Google Scholar
  91. GARRETT, THOMAS, ‘State Balanced-Budget and Debt Rules’ (2011) 33 Economic Synopses, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Open Google Scholar
  92. GEITHNER, TIMOTHY, ‘Assessing Sustainability’ (International Monetary Fund 2002). Open Google Scholar
  93. GEITHNER, TIMOTHY, ‘Assessing Sustainability–Review of Application and Methodological Refinements’ (International Monetary Fund 2003). Open Google Scholar
  94. GEY, PETER and SCHREIBER, BENJAMIN, ‘Frankreich: Wird der Staat jetzt umgebaut?’ (2014) Working Paper Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Open Google Scholar
  95. GIANVITI, FRANCOIS and GEITHNER, TIMOTHY, ‘The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism – Further Considerations’ (International Monetary Fund 2002). Open Google Scholar
  96. GIANVITI, FRANCOIS and GEITHNER, TIMOTHY, ‘Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism’ (International Monetary Fund 2003). Open Google Scholar
  97. GILETTE, CLAYTON, ‘In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law’ (1991) 67 Chicago-Kent Law Review 959. Open Google Scholar
  98. GILETTE, CLAYTON and SKEEL, DAVID, ‘A Two-Step Plan for Puerto Rico’ (2016) Research-Paper No. 16–3. Open Google Scholar
  99. GILETTE, CLAYTON and SKEEL, DAVID, ‘Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy’ (2016) 125 The Yale Law Journal 1150. Open Google Scholar
  100. GÖTZ, MARTIN and HASELMANN, RAINER and KRAHNEN, JAN PIETER and STEFFEN, SASCHA, ‘Did emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of the ECB delay the bankruptcy of Greek banks? (2015) Policy Letter No. 46. SAFE–Frankfurt House of Finance. Open Google Scholar
  101. GNEEZY, URI and HARUVY, ERNAN and YAFE, HADAS, ‘The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill’ (2004) 114 The Economic Journal 265–280. Open Google Scholar
  102. GREENBERG, SCOTT and EKINS, GAVIN, ‘Tax Policy Helped Create Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Crisis’ (2015, 30 June) Tax Foundation <https://taxfoundation.org/tax-policy-helped-create-puerto-rico-s-fiscal-crisis/>. Open Google Scholar
  103. GRIFFIN, JOHN and NICKERSON, JORDAN and TANG, DRAGON YONGJUN, ‘Rating Shopping or Catering An Examination of the Response to Competitive Pressure for CDO Ratings’ (2013) 26 (9) The Review of Financial Studies 2270. Open Google Scholar
  104. GROS, DANIEL and SCHOENMAKER, DIRK, ‘European Deposit Insurance and Resolution in the Banking Union’ (2014) 52 (3) Journal of Common Market Studies 529. Open Google Scholar
  105. GROSSMAN, GENE and HELPMAN, ELHANAN, ‘Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics’ (1996) 63 (2) The Review of Economic Studies 265. Open Google Scholar
  106. GRUND, SEBASTIAN, ‘Enforcing Sovereign Debt in Court – A Comparative Analysis of Litigation and Arbitration Following the Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012’ (2017) 1 University of Vienna Law Review 35. Open Google Scholar
  107. GRUND, SEBASTIAN, ‘Restructuring government debt under local law: the Greek case and implications for investor protection in Europe’ (2017) 12 (2) Capital Markets Law Journal 253. Open Google Scholar
  108. GUZMAN, ANDREW, ‘Against Consent’ (2012) 52 (4) Virgina Journal of International Law 747. Open Google Scholar
  109. HAMILTON, BRUCE, ‘The Flypaper Effect and Other Anomalies’ (1983) 22 Journal of Public Economics 347. Open Google Scholar
  110. HANNIMAN, KYLE, ‘Provinces in the Credit Market: Market Discipline and the New Classic Federalism’ in Bruce Doern and Christopher Stoney (eds) How Ottawa Spends (Queens-McGill University Press 2013). Open Google Scholar
  111. HARDIN, GARRET, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 (3859) Science 1243. Open Google Scholar
  112. HART, OLIVER, ‘An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm (1989) 89 (7) Columbia Law Review 1757. Open Google Scholar
  113. HEPP, RALF and VON HAGEN, JÜRGEN, ‘Fiscal Federalism in Germany: Stabilisation and Redistribution Before and After Unification’ (2010) ZEI Working Paper B 02. Open Google Scholar
  114. HIBBS, DOUGLAS, ‘Partisan theory after fifteen years’ (1992) 8 European Journal of Political Economy 361. Open Google Scholar
  115. HIBBS, DOUGLAS, ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy’ (1977) 71 (4) The American Political Science Review 1467. Open Google Scholar
  116. HIBBS, DOUGLAS, ‘The Partisan Model of Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory and Evidence for the United States’ (1994) 6 (1) Economic and Politics 1. Open Google Scholar
  117. HILL, NOBMAN, ‘Unanimous Consent in International Organization’ (1928) 22 (2) The American Journal of International Law 319. Open Google Scholar
  118. HINES, JAMES and THALER, RICHARD, ‘Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect’ (1995) 9 (4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 217. Open Google Scholar
  119. HOBBES, THOMAS, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651) PART I On Man, and PART II On Commonwealth. Open Google Scholar
  120. HOPE, KERIN, ‘Greece open for business, head of privatization programme says’ (2015, 19 October) Financial Times <https://www.ft.com/content/562c85d8-75b8-11e5-933d-efcdc3c11c89?mhq5j=e5Y>. Open Google Scholar
  121. HORNBACK, JOHN F, ‘Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the “Holdouts”’(2013) Congressional Research Service <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41029.pdf>. Open Google Scholar
  122. HOWARTH, DAVID and QUAGLIA, LUCIA, ‘Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s Banks and ‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary Union’ (2013) 51 (Annual Review) Journal of Common Market Studies 103. Open Google Scholar
  123. INMAN, ROBERT, ‘Federal Assistance and Local Services in the United States: The Evolution of a New Federalist Fiscal Order’ in Harvey Rosen (ed) Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies (University of Chicago Press 1988) 33. Open Google Scholar
  124. INMAN, ROBERT, ‘Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with Lessons from U.S. Federalism’ in Jonathan Rodden, Gunnar Eskeland, and Jennie Litvack (eds) Fiscal Decentralisation and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2013) 35. Open Google Scholar
  125. JAYACHANDRAN, SEEMA and KREMER, MICHAEL, ‘Odious Debt’ (2006) 96 (1) The American Economic Review 82. Open Google Scholar
  126. JENSEN, MICHAEL and MECKLING, WILLIAM, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. Open Google Scholar
  127. JEVONS, WILLIAM STANLEY, Theory of Political Economy (Macmillan and Co. 1871). Open Google Scholar
  128. JOFFE, MARC, Provincial Solvency and Federal Obligations (Macdonald-Laurier Institute 2012). Open Google Scholar
  129. JOHNSON, CRAIG and KRIZ, KENNETH, ‘Fiscal Institutions, Credit Ratings, and Borrowing Costs’ (2005) Public Budgeting & Finance 84. Open Google Scholar
  130. JONES, MARK and MELONI, OSVALDO and TOMMASI, MARIANO, ‘Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and Accountability in Federal Systems’ (2012) 24 (2) Economics & Politics 135. Open Google Scholar
  131. JULIEN, VIOLA, ‘Französische Gebietskörperschaften’ (2012, 5 October) Helaba Volkswirtschaft/Research. Open Google Scholar
  132. KALT, JOSEPH and ZUPAN, MARK, ‘The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing For Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions’ (1990) 33 Journal of Law and Economics 103. Open Google Scholar
  133. KARNITSCHNIG, MATTHEW and STAMOULI, NEKTARIA, ‘Greece Struggles to Get Citizens to Pay Their Taxes’ (2015, 25 February) The Wall Street Journal <https://www.wsj.com/articles/greece-struggles-to-get-citizens-to-pay-their-taxes-1424867495>. Open Google Scholar
  134. KAZARIAN, PAUL, ‘Strengthening Democracy Through Government Financial Management: Greece and the EU’ (2016, 6 October) The Accountant & International Accounting Bulleting Conference and Awards <http://www.theaccountant-online.com/Uploads/Event/218/Resources/Paul_Kazarian_Japonica.pdf>. Open Google Scholar
  135. KAZARIN, PAUL and PELAGIDIS, THEODORE, ‘Greece’s New Agreement with Europe: Is This Time Different?’ (2015) 5 Intereconomics 281. Open Google Scholar
  136. KELSEN, HANS, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (J.C.B. Mohr 1920). Open Google Scholar
  137. KING, JEFF, ‘Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate’ (2007) 32 (4) North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation’ 605. Open Google Scholar
  138. KIRCHNER, CHRISTIAN and EHMKE, DAVID, ‘Economics of Legal Concepts for Management Compensation Schemes in the Credit Sector and Their Regulation’ (2013) 2 Oxford University Comparative Law Forum. Open Google Scholar
  139. KIRCHNER, CHRISTIAN, ‘Ökonomik: Eigennutz, Fairness und Empathie’ (manuscript) Chapter 2.3.1. Open Google Scholar
  140. KIRCHNER, CHRISTIAN and EHMKE, DAVID, ‘Private Ordering in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Reforming the London Club’ (2012) 3 Oxford University Comparative Law Forum. Open Google Scholar
  141. KIRCHNER, CHRISTIAN and EHMKE, DAVID, ‘Staat und Recht’ in Rainer Kollmorgen, Wolfgang Merkel, and Hans-Jürgen Wagener (eds) Handbuch für Transformationsforschung (Springer VS 2015) 455. Open Google Scholar
  142. KIRCHNER, CHRISTINA, ‘Speech at the 69th U.N. General Assembly’ (2014, 24 September) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EyShGogzIn4#t=1267> (video with English subtitles). Open Google Scholar
  143. KIRCHGÄSSNER, GEBHARD, ‘Fiscal Institutions at the Cantonal Level in Switzerland’ (2013) 149 (2) Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 139. Open Google Scholar
  144. KITSANTONIS, NIKI, ‘14 Airports in Greece to Be Privatized in $1.3 Billion Deal’ (2015, 14 December) The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/business/international/14-airports-in-greece-to-be-privatized-in-1-3-billion-deal.html?mcubz=1>. Open Google Scholar
  145. KORNAI, JANOS, ‘Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constraint Systems’ (1979) 47 (7) Econometrica 801. Open Google Scholar
  146. KNÖPFEL, CARLO, ‘Sozialstaatliche Rahmenbedingungen in der Schweiz’ in B Wütherich et al. (eds) Soziale Versorgung zukunftsfähig gestalten (Springer 2015). Open Google Scholar
  147. KRUEGER, ANNE, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (2001) Address by Anne O Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, IMF, Given at the National Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner, November 26. Open Google Scholar
  148. KRUEGER, ANNE, ‘A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (International Monetary Fund 2002). Open Google Scholar
  149. KRUEGER, ANNE, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’ (1974) 64 (3) The American Economic Review 291. Open Google Scholar
  150. KRUGMAN, PAUL, ‘Greece: Think Flows, Not Stocks’ (2015, 26 January) New York Times <https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/greece-think-flows-not-stocks/?mcubz=0> . Open Google Scholar
  151. LANCASTER, THOMAS, ‘Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics’ (1986) 7 (1) International Political Science Review 67. Open Google Scholar
  152. LANDON, STUART and SMITH, CONSTANCE, ‘Government debt spillovers and creditworthiness in a federation’ (2000) 33 (3) Canadian Journal of Economics 634. Open Google Scholar
  153. LECOURS, ANDRE and BELAND, DANIEL, ‘Federalism and Fiscal Policy: The Politics of Equalisation in Canada’ (2010) 40 (4) Publius 569. Open Google Scholar
  154. LITINA, ANASTASIA and PALIVOS, THEODORE, ‘Corruption and Tax Evasion: Reflections on Greek Tragedy’ (2015, June) Bank of Greece Working Paper No. 193 <http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Paper2015193.pdf>. Open Google Scholar
  155. LIU, LILI and GAILLARD, NORBERT and WEIBEL, MICHAEL, ‘France’s Subnational Insolvency Framework’ in Otaviano Canuto and Lili Liu (eds) Until Debt Do Us Part (The World Bank 2013). Open Google Scholar
  156. LLOYD, WILLIAM, Two Lectures on the Checks To Population (Oxford University Press 1833). Open Google Scholar
  157. LUECHINGER, SIMON and MEIER, STEPHAN and STUTZER, ALOIS, ‘Bureaucratic Rents and Life Satisfaction’ (2008) 24 (2) Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 476. Open Google Scholar
  158. LUTZ, BYRON and FOLETTE, GLENN, ‘Fiscal Rules, What Does the American Experience Tell Us? (2012) Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Working Paper 2012-38, Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C. Open Google Scholar
  159. MANDER, BENEDICT, ‘Rufo expiry will test Argentina’s willingness to settle debt’ (2014, 30 December) Financial Times. <https://www.ft.com/content/e554502e-8fa4-11e4-9ea4-00144feabdc0>. Open Google Scholar
  160. MARLOW, MICHAEL, ‘Fiscal decentralisation and government size’ (1988) 56 Public Choice 259. Open Google Scholar
  161. MASSON, PAUL, ‘The Dangers of an Extended Period of Low Interest Rates: Why the Bank of Canada Should Start Raising Them Now’ (2013) C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 381. Open Google Scholar
  162. MENGER, CARL, Principles of Economics (original: Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre 1871, tr James Dingwall and Bert Hoselitz, Ludwig von Mises Institute 2007). Open Google Scholar
  163. MEYERS, HARRY, ‘Displacement Effects of Federal Highway Grants’ (1987) 40 (2) National Tax Journal 221. Open Google Scholar
  164. MILLER, EDWARD, ‘The Economics of Matching Grants: The ABC Highway Program’ (1974) 27 (2) National Tax Journal 221. Open Google Scholar
  165. MILLER, MERTON and MODIGLIANI, FRANCO, ‘Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares’ (1961) 34 (4) The Journal of Business 411. Open Google Scholar
  166. MODIGLIANI, FRANCO and MILLER, MERTON, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and th Theory of Finance’ (1958) 48 (3) The American Economic Review 261. Open Google Scholar
  167. MONTINOLA, GABRIELLA and QIAN, YINGYI and WEINGAST, BARRY, ‘Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success’ (1996) 1 World Politics 50. Open Google Scholar
  168. MORRISON, ALAN, ‘Systematic Risk and the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem’ (2011) 27 (3) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 498. Open Google Scholar
  169. NISKANEN, WILLIAM, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Aldine Transaction 1971). Open Google Scholar
  170. NISKANEN, WILLIAM, ‘Comment on Tax Policy from 1990 to 2001’ in Jeffrey Frankel and Peter Orszag (eds) American Economic Policy in the 1990s (MIT Press 2002) 184. Open Google Scholar
  171. NISKANEN, WILLIAM, ‘Limiting Government: The Failure of “Starve the Beast”’ (2006) 26 (3) Cato Journal 553. Open Google Scholar
  172. NORDHAUS, WILLIAM, ‘The Political Business Cycle’ (1975) Review of Economic Studies 169. Open Google Scholar
  173. NORDHAUS, WILLIAM and ALESINA, ALBERTO and SCHULTZE, CHARLES, ‘Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle’ (1989) 2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1. Open Google Scholar
  174. OATES, WALLACE, Fiscal Federalism (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich 1972). Open Google Scholar
  175. OATES, WALLACE, ‘Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study’ (1985) 75 (4) The American Economic Review 748. Open Google Scholar
  176. OATES, WALLACE, ‘Searching for Leviathan: A Reply and Some Further Reflections’ (1989) 79 (3) The American Economic Review 578. Open Google Scholar
  177. OATES, WALLACE and SCHWAB, ROBERT, ‘Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?’ (1988) 35 Journal of Public Economics 333. Open Google Scholar
  178. OLSEN, MANCUR, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press 1965). Open Google Scholar
  179. OLSEN, MANCUR, ‘The principle of “fiscal equivalence”: The Devision of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government’ (1969) 59 (2) The American Economic Review 479. Open Google Scholar
  180. OLSEN, MANCUR, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (Yale University Press 1982). Open Google Scholar
  181. ÖZLER, SULE, ‘Have Commercial Banks Ignored History’ (1993) 83 (3) The American Economic Review 608. Open Google Scholar
  182. PAULUS, CHRISTOPH, ‘A Resolving Proceeding for Defaulting Sovereigns’ (2012) International Insolvency Law Review 1. Open Google Scholar
  183. PAULUS, CHRISTOPH, ‘A Standing Arbitral Tribunal as a Procedural Solution for Sovereign Debt Restructurings’ in Braga, Primo, and Vincelette, Galli (eds), Sovereign Debt and the Financial Crisis - Will This Time be Different?’ (Worldbank 2010) 317. Open Google Scholar
  184. PAULUS, CHRISTOPH, ‘Staatsinsolvenzen: Gläubiger oder neutral Instanz – wer soll das schlingernde Schiff steuern?’ (2012) 10 (1) Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 30. Open Google Scholar
  185. POTERBA, JAMES, ‘Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the States’ (1995) 48 (3) National Tax Journal 329. Open Google Scholar
  186. QIAN, YINGYI and WEINGAST, BARRY, ‘China’s Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style’ (1996) 1 Journal of Policy Reform 149. Open Google Scholar
  187. RANKIN, JENNIFER and SMITH, HELENA, ‘The great Greece fire sale’ (2015, 24 July) The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/24/greek-debt-crisis-great-greece-fire-sale>. Open Google Scholar
  188. REINHART, CARMEN, ‘Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Debt Ratings’ (2002) 16 (2) The World Bank Economic Review 151. Open Google Scholar
  189. REINHARDT, CARMEN an ROGOFF, KENNETH, This Time is Different (Princeton University Press 2011). Open Google Scholar
  190. RICARDO, DAVID, ‘Essay on the Funding System’ (1820) in John Ramsay McCulloch (ed.) The Works of David Ricardo (Morrison and Gibb 1888) 516. Open Google Scholar
  191. RICHARDSON, JESSE, ‘Dillon’s Rule is from Mars, Home Rule is From Venus: Local Government Autonomy and the Rules of Statutory Construction’ (2011) 41 (4) Publius: The Journal of Federalism 662. Open Google Scholar
  192. RICHMOND, CHRISTINE and DIAS, DANIEL, ‘Duration of Capital Market Exclusion: An Empirical Investigation’ (2009) SSRN Manuscript <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027844>. Open Google Scholar
  193. RIZZO, MICHAEL and EHRENBERG, RONALD, ‘Resident and Nonresident Tuition and Enrollment at Flagship State Universities’ in Caroline Hoxby (ed) College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay For It (University of Chicago Press 2004) 303. Open Google Scholar
  194. ROCHOLL, JÖRG and STAHMER, AXEL, ‘Where did the Greek bailout money go?’ (2016) ESMT No. WP–16–02. Open Google Scholar
  195. RODDEN, JONATHAN, ‘Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government’ (2003) 57 International Organization 695. Open Google Scholar
  196. RODDEN, JONATHAN, ‘Sovereignty and Orderly Defaults’ (12 July 2016 Library of Law and Liberty) <http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/sovereignty-and-orderly-defaults/>. Open Google Scholar
  197. RODDEN, JONATHAN, ‘Soft Budget Constraints and German Federalism’ in Jonathan Rodden, Gunnar Eskeland, and Jennie Litvack (eds) Fiscal Decentralisation and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2013) 161. Open Google Scholar
  198. RODDEN, JONATHAN, ‘Strengths in Numbers? Representation and Redistribution in the European Union’ (2002a) 3 (2) European Union Politics 151. Open Google Scholar
  199. RODDEN, JONATHAN ‘The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance Around the World’ (2002) 46 (3) American Journal of Political Science 670. Open Google Scholar
  200. RODDEN, JONATHAN and ROSE-ACKERMAN, SUSAN, ‘Does Federalism Preserve Markets?’ (1997) 83 (7) Virginia Law Review 1521. Open Google Scholar
  201. RODDEN, JONATHAN and WIBBELS, ERIK, ‘Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems’ (2002) 54 World Politics 494. Open Google Scholar
  202. ROHTER, LARRY, ‘Puerto Rico Fighting to Keep Its Tax Breaks for Businesses’ (1993, 10 May) The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/10/business/puerto-rico-fighting-to-keep-its-tax-breaks-for-businesses.html?pagewanted=all>. Open Google Scholar
  203. ROGOFF, KENNETH and ZETTELMEYER, JEROMIN, ‘Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976 – 2001’ (2002) IMF Working Paper WP/02/133. Open Google Scholar
  204. RUSSELL, JON and BOSTROM, AARON, ‘Federalism, Dillon Rule and Home Rule’ (2016) January, White Paper, American City County Exchange 1. Open Google Scholar
  205. ROSE, ANDREW, ‘One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade’ (2005) 77 (1) Journal of Development Economics 189. Open Google Scholar
  206. ROY-CÉSAR, ÉDISON, ‘In Brief: Canada’s Equalization Formula’ (2013) Library of Parliament, Publication No. 2008-20-E, 10 November 2008, Revised 4 September 2013. Open Google Scholar
  207. SANDLERIS, GUIDO, ‘Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit’ (1998) 76 (2) Journal of International Economics 267. Open Google Scholar
  208. SANDLERIS, GUIDO, ‘The Costs of Sovereign Default: Theory and Empirical Evidence’ (2016) 16 (2) Economia 1. Open Google Scholar
  209. SCHUKNECHT, LUDGER, ‘Political Business Cycles and Fiscal Policies in Developing Countries’ (1996) 49 Kyklos 155. Open Google Scholar
  210. SCHUMACHER, JULIAN and WEDER DI MAURO, BEATRE, ‘Debt sustainability puzzles: Implications for Greece’ (2015, 12 July) VOX CEPR’S Policy Portal <http://voxeu.org/article/debt-sustainability-puzzles-implications-greece>. Open Google Scholar
  211. SHLEIFER, ANDREI, ‘A theory of yardstick competition’ (1985) 16 (3) Rand Journal of Economics 319. Open Google Scholar
  212. SHIELDS, YVETTE and WEBSTER, KEELEY, ‘Why Pensions Beat Bonds in Bankruptcy Court’ The Bond Buyer. (2016) <http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/markets-buy-side/why-pensions-beat-bonds-in-bankruptcy-court-1111233-1.html>. Open Google Scholar
  213. SIMON, ELLEN GINSBURG and CRAWFORD, MONTY, ‘The Impact of Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.: Why the Supreme Court’s Ruling Against Argentina Avoided a Host of Unintended Consequences’ (2015) 30 (1) Maryland Journal of International Law 55. Open Google Scholar
  214. SINN, HANS-WERNER, ‘Die Target-Kredite der Deutschen Bank’ (2012, 21 March) ifo Schnelldienst Sonderausgabe. Open Google Scholar
  215. SINN, HANS-WERNER and WOLLMERSHÄUSER, TIMO, ‘Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility’ (2012) 19 International Tax and Public Finance 468. Open Google Scholar
  216. SINN, HANS-WERNER and WOLLMERSHÄUSER, TIMO, ‘Target-Kredite, Leistungsbilanzsalden und Kapitalverkehr: Der Rettungsschirm der EZB’ (2011, 24 Juni) ifo Schnelldienst. Open Google Scholar
  217. SKEEL, DAVID, ‘An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 1325. Open Google Scholar
  218. SKEEL, DAVID, ‘Can Pensions be Restructured in (Detroit’s) Municipal Bankruptcy? (2013) ILE Research Paper No. 13-33. Open Google Scholar
  219. SKEEL, DAVID, ‘From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit’ (2015) 24 Widener Law Journal 121, 136–148. Open Google Scholar
  220. SKEEL, DAVID, ‘Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?’ (2013) 50 (4) Houston Law Review 1063. Open Google Scholar
  221. SKEEL, DAVID, ‘States of Bankruptcy’ (2012) 79 (2) The University of Chicago Law Review 677. Open Google Scholar
  222. SKEEL, DAVID, ‘When Should Bankruptcy be an Option (for People, Places, or Things)? (2014) 55 William & Mary Law Review 2217, 2232–2233. Open Google Scholar
  223. SKRETA, VASILIKO and VELDKAMP, LAURA, ‘Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation’ (2009) 56 (5) Journal of Monetary Economics 678. Open Google Scholar
  224. SMITH, ADAM, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (original 1776, MetaLibri 2007) Book IV, 349 <http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf>. Open Google Scholar
  225. STEIN, ERNESTO, ‘Fiscal Decentralisation and Government Size in Latin America’ (1999) 2 (2) Journal of Applied Economics 357. Open Google Scholar
  226. STEVENSON, ALEXANDRA, ‘How Argentina Settled a Billion-Dollar Debt Dispute With Hedge Funds’ (2016, 25 April) NY Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/business/dealbook/how-argentina-settled-a-billion-dollar-debt-dispute-with-hedge-funds.html?mcubz=0>. Open Google Scholar
  227. STIGLER, GEORGE, ‘The Process of Economic Regulation’ (1972) The Antitrust Bulletin 207. Open Google Scholar
  228. STIGLER, GEORGE, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 (1) The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 3. Open Google Scholar
  229. STIGLITZ, JOSEPH, ‘Greece, the Sacrificial Lamb’ (2015, July 25) The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/opinion/greece-the-sacrificial-lamb.html?mcubz=1>. Open Google Scholar
  230. STRATHMAN, JAMES, ‘Migration, Benefit Spillover and State Support of Higher Education’ (1994) 31 (6) Urban Studies 913. Open Google Scholar
  231. TAYLOR, JOHN, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective’ (2002) Remarks at the Conference “Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards?” of the Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. by the Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs <http://web.stanford.edu/~johntayl/taylorspeeches/Sovereign%20Debt%20Restructuring%20(2%20April%2002).doc>. Open Google Scholar
  232. TIEBOUT, CHARLES, ‘A Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64 (5) Journal of Political Economy 416. Open Google Scholar
  233. TREBESCH, CHRISTOPH, ‘Inexcusable Sovereign Default’ (2010) Working Paper. <https://sites.google.com/site/christophtrebesch/research/Trebesch-InexcusableSovereignDefault.pdf>. Open Google Scholar
  234. TREMBLAY, JEAN-FRANCOIS, ‘Fiscal Federalism and Public Service Provision in Canada’ (2007) 3 (1) Public Policy Review 51. Open Google Scholar
  235. TULLOCK, GORDON, ‘Federalism of Scale’ (1969) 6 Public Choice 19. Open Google Scholar
  236. TULLOCK, GORDON, ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’ (1967) 5 (3) Western Economic Review 224. Open Google Scholar
  237. TURNBULL, GEOFFREY, ‘Fiscal Illusion, uncertainty, and the flypaper effect’ (1992) 48 (2) Journal of Public Economics 207. Open Google Scholar
  238. VAUBEL, ROLAND, ‘Probleme der Bankenunion: Falsche Lehren aus der Krise’ (2013) 46 (3) Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 281. Open Google Scholar
  239. VON HAGEN, JÜRGEN, ‘Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance’ (2002) 33 (3) The Economic and Social Review 263. Open Google Scholar
  240. VON HAGEN, JÜRGEN and EICHENGREEN, BARRY, ‘Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union’ (1996) 86 (2) The American Economic Review 134. Open Google Scholar
  241. VON HAYEK, FRIEDRICH AUGUST, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society (1945) 35 (4) American Economic Review 519. Open Google Scholar
  242. VON HAYEK, FRIEDRICH AUGUST, ‘Competition as Discovery Procedure’ (2002, first 1969) 5 (3) The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 9 (translated by Marcellus Snow). Open Google Scholar
  243. VON MISES, LUDWIG, The Theory of Money and Credit (first published 1912, English version, Yale University Press 1953). Open Google Scholar
  244. VON WEIZSÄCKER, CARL CHRISTIAN, ‘Kapitalismus in der Krise?’ (2015) 16 (2) Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 189. Open Google Scholar
  245. WALRAS, LÉON, Elements of Pure Economics (original: Éléments d’économie politique pure 1874, tr William Jaffe Routledge 2010). Open Google Scholar
  246. WALSH, MARRY WILLIAMS, ‘How Puerto Rico is Grappling With a Debt Crisis’ (2017, 16 May) The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt-bankruptcy.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FPuerto %20Rico&action=click&contentCollection=us&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=20&pgtype=collection>. Open Google Scholar
  247. WALSH, MARRY WILLIAMS, ‘Puerto Rico: A Debt Problem That Kept Boiling Over’ (2017, 5 May) The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt.html>. Open Google Scholar
  248. WALSH, MARRY WILLIAMS, ‘Puerto Rico Declares a Form of Bankruptcy’ (2017, 3 May) The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FPuerto%20Rico> . Open Google Scholar
  249. WALSH, MARRY WILLIAMS, ‘Puerto Rico Defaults on Bond Payments’ (2015, 3 August) The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-decides-to-skip-bond-payment.html>. Open Google Scholar
  250. WATERMAN, RICHARD and MEIER, KENNETH, ‘Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?’ (1998) 8 (2) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 173. Open Google Scholar
  251. WEIDEMEIER, MARK and GULATI, MITU, ‘Market Practice and the Evolution of Foreign Sovereign Immunity’ (forthcoming) Law & Social Inquiry. Open Google Scholar
  252. WEINGAST, BARRY, ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’ (1995) 11 (1) The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizations 1. Open Google Scholar
  253. WILLIAMSON, OLIVER, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (The Free Press 1985). Open Google Scholar
  254. ZAX, JEFFREY, ‘Is there a Leviathan in Your Neighbourhood?’ (1989) 79 (3) The American Economic Review 560. Open Google Scholar
  255. ZHANG, TAO and ZOU, HENG-FU, ‘Fiscal decentralisation, public spending, and economic growth in China’ (1998) 67 Journal of Public Economics 221. Open Google Scholar
  256. ZODROW, GEORGE and MIESZKOWSKI, PETER, ‘Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Public Goods’ (1986) 19 Journal of Urban Economics 356. Open Google Scholar

Similar publications

from the topics "Economics", "International Organizations & NGOs", "Competition Policy & Economic Order Policy & Economic Policy"
Cover of book: Weltbilder und Weltordnung
Educational Book No access
Gert Krell, Peter Schlotter, Alexandra Homolar, Frank A. Stengel
Weltbilder und Weltordnung
Cover of book: Kapital als Medium
Book Titles No access
Michael Mayer
Kapital als Medium
Cover of book: Le sanzioni dell’UE nei confronti della Russia tra sicurezza internazionale e diritti umani
Edited Book No access
Antonino Alì
Le sanzioni dell’UE nei confronti della Russia tra sicurezza internazionale e diritti umani
Cover of book: European Union, How Comes?
Book Titles No access
Hartmut Marhold
European Union, How Comes?
Book Titles No access
Marco Portmann
Parliamentary Representation of Citizens’ Preferences

Notice

This work is protected by copyright and may only be used in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Use and License Agreement. Any use of the work beyond this is expressly prohibited and will be prosecuted.

Give feedback

We welcome your feedback on content and features. Your message helps us to continuously improve our service.

Rating
Attach images
or drag and drop
PNG or JPG (max. 3 MB)

Login

Forgotten your password?
Login via Open Athens
Don't have an account yet?
Register now

Cite publication

Download: RIS BibTex