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Monographie Kein Zugriff

Institutional Congruence

The Riddle of Leviathan and Hydra
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Verlag:
 04.01.2019

Zusammenfassung

Was ist die Grundlage einer soliden Finanzarchitektur? Wie lässt sich stetig wachsenden Steuern, Schulden und Mehrausgaben und der Fehlallokation von finanziellen Ressourcen entgegenwirken? Die Theorie der institutionellen Kongruenz gibt darauf eine klare Antwort: Die Kreise von Entscheidungsträgern, Nutznießern und Zahlern für eine Entscheidung müssen weitestgehend übereinstimmen. Dafür bedarf es einer konsequenten Zentralisierung oder Dezentralisierung von Entscheidungsgewalt und Verantwortung bei Steuern, Ausgaben und Schulden. Wie sich das in der Praxis umsetzen lässt zeigen dabei die Analyse verschiedener staatlicher und unterstaatlicher Gebietskörperschaften in der Euro-Zone, Deutschland, Frankreich, Kanada, den USA, der Schweiz sowie die Analyse von Staatsschuldenkrisen autonomer Schuldnerstaaten.

Schlagworte

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Bibliographische Angaben

Copyrightjahr
2019
Erscheinungsdatum
04.01.2019
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-5599-8
ISBN-Online
978-3-8452-9775-0
Verlag
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Reihe
Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie
Band
16
Sprache
Englisch
Seiten
224
Produkttyp
Monographie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis Kein Zugriff 1 - 12
    1. Two Ways Towards Financial Sustainability Kein Zugriff
    2. Structure Kein Zugriff
    1. Preliminary Considerations Kein Zugriff
      1. Ricardo-Barro Equivalence Theorem Kein Zugriff
      2. The Sustainability of Sovereign and Public Debt Kein Zugriff
      3. The Sirens’ Song: Low Interest Rates Kein Zugriff
      1. The Homo Economicus in Politics Kein Zugriff
      2. Political Agents in Asymmetric Relations Kein Zugriff
      3. Building Bureaucratic and Public Empires Kein Zugriff
      4. Interest Group Lobbying Kein Zugriff
      5. Rent-Seeking Kein Zugriff
    1. Preliminary Considerations Kein Zugriff
      1. Race to the Best Fit, to the Top, or to the Bottom? Kein Zugriff
      2. Centralisation: Returns to Scale Kein Zugriff
      3. Hercules and Hydra: The Political Architecture Kein Zugriff
      4. Economic Performance in the Shadow of Federalism Kein Zugriff
      1. The Principle Kein Zugriff
      2. Market Control v Central Government Control Kein Zugriff
        1. No Bail-Out Regime Kein Zugriff
        2. Tax and Budget Autonomy Kein Zugriff
        3. Self-Imposed Borrowing and Deficit Constraints Kein Zugriff
        4. Rules for Restructuring and Governance Reform Kein Zugriff
        5. Ratings Kein Zugriff
        1. Top-Down Directives Kein Zugriff
        2. Cooperative Budget-Rules Kein Zugriff
        3. Vertical and/or Horizontal Transfers Kein Zugriff
        4. Bail-Out Guarantee/ Shared Debt Responsibility Kein Zugriff
        5. Imposed Borrowing and Deficit Constraints Kein Zugriff
      5. Summary: Autonomy, Integration, and Mixed Models Kein Zugriff
      6. Institutional Congruence Index Kein Zugriff
    1. Institutions Matter Kein Zugriff
      1. Canada Kein Zugriff
      2. France Kein Zugriff
      3. Germany Kein Zugriff
      4. Switzerland Kein Zugriff
        1. Fiscal Architecture Kein Zugriff
        2. Puerto Rico Case Study Kein Zugriff
    3. Institutional Congruence: Comparative Review Kein Zugriff
    1. Preliminary Considerations Kein Zugriff
    2. The Prelude to the European Monetary Union Kein Zugriff
      1. Preliminary Considerations Kein Zugriff
      2. Decisions about Spending Kein Zugriff
      3. Decisions about Taxation Kein Zugriff
      4. Decisions about Debt Kein Zugriff
        1. Explicit Transfers from the EU Budget Kein Zugriff
        2. The EU Bailout Policy Kein Zugriff
        3. The Threefold Bailout Subsidy Kein Zugriff
      6. The Greek Debt Restructuring Kein Zugriff
      7. Bailout and Crisis Management Top-Down: A New Era? Kein Zugriff
      8. Contagion, Systematic Risk and Banking Union Kein Zugriff
      9. Institutional Congruence Review Kein Zugriff
    4. The European Tragedy and the Way Forward Kein Zugriff
    1. Challenge and Solution Kein Zugriff
      1. Bold Players in a Game With Weak Rules Kein Zugriff
      2. The Legal Basics Kein Zugriff
      3. Bargain and Blackmail Kein Zugriff
      4. The Enforcement Game Kein Zugriff
        1. Capital Costs Kein Zugriff
        2. Spill-Over Costs Kein Zugriff
      6. Conclusion Kein Zugriff
      1. Chaos versus Orderly Sovereign Insolvency Kein Zugriff
      2. Lessons from Corporate and Personal Insolvency Kein Zugriff
        1. Private v Public Ordering Kein Zugriff
        2. Acceleration Kein Zugriff
        3. Collective v Individual Action and Decision-Making Kein Zugriff
        4. Debtor’s Commitment to a ‘Fair Procedure’ Kein Zugriff
        5. Inter-Creditor Relations: Who gets paid how much? Kein Zugriff
        6. Governance Reform Kein Zugriff
        7. Plan and Plan Enforcement Kein Zugriff
        8. Coordination and Supervision Kein Zugriff
      4. Summary: Proposal for a Sovereign Insolvency Mechanism Kein Zugriff
        1. Conclusion: Leviathan, Hydra, or Institutional Congruence Kein Zugriff
  8. BIBLIOGRAPHY Kein Zugriff 207 - 207
  9. Bibliographic sources with author reference Kein Zugriff 207 - 221
  10. Other resources Kein Zugriff 222 - 224

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