Selection of Public Servants into Politics: An Economic Analysis of Its Causes and Consequences

Dr. Thomas Brändle

doi:10.5771/9783845246437

Summary

Die Selektion öffentlicher Bediensteter in die Politik ist ein weitverbreitetes, jedoch kaum verstandenes Phänomen. Einerseits generiert die starke Vertretung öffentlicher Bediensteter in der Politik Interessenkonflikte und weckt Bedenken bezüglich des Gewaltenteilungsprinzips. Andererseits bringen öffentliche Bedienstete relevante Erfahrung in den Gesetzgebungs- und Aufsichtsprozess ein.

Diese Studie ist die erste systematische, ökonomische Analyse der institutionellen Bestimmungsgründe und der Konsequenzen der Selektion öffentlicher Bediensteter in die Politik. Der Autor unterstreicht die Bedeutung von politischen Institutionen für das Verhalten und die Selektion von politischen Entscheidungsträgern.

Search publication

Bibliographic data

Edition: 1/2013
Copyright Year: 2013
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-0307-4
ISBN-Online: 978-3-8452-4643-7
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series: Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie
Volume: 12
Language: English
Pages: 166
Product Type: Monograph

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 2 - 12
Authors:
Introduction No access Pages 13 - 16
Authors:
1. 1. Political sanctioning No access Pages 17 - 18
    Authors:
  2. Political selection No access Pages 18 - 20
    Authors:
2. 1. Pay for politicians No access Pages 20 - 25
    Authors:
  2. Electoral rules and parties No access Pages 25 - 26
    Authors:
3. 1. Businessmen in politics No access Pages 26 - 29
    Authors:
  2. Lawyers in politics No access Pages 29 - 31
    Authors:
4. Discussion No access Pages 31 - 34
  Authors:
1. Introduction No access Pages 35 - 36
  Authors:
2. 1. A short recapitulation of (in)compatibility regimes No access Pages 36 - 38
    Authors:
  2. Selection effects of incompatibility rules No access Pages 38 - 39
    Authors:
3. 1. Data No access Pages 39 - 41
    Authors:
  2. Results No access Pages 41 - 47
    Authors:
4. 1. The trade-off between conflicts of interest and competence No access Pages 47 - 49
    Authors:
  2. Empirical analysis No access Pages 49 - 53
    Authors:
5. Concluding remarks No access Pages 53 - 54
  Authors:
1. Introduction No access Pages 55 - 57
  Authors:
2. 1. Ineligibility and incompatibility of public service with a parliamentary mandate No access Pages 57 - 58
    Authors:
  2. The cost-benefit calculus of running for political office No access Pages 58 - 63
    Authors:
  3. Public servants as voters No access Pages 63 - 64
    Authors:
3. 1. Data No access Pages 64 - 69
    Authors:
  2. Results No access Pages 69 - 74
    Authors:
4. Concluding remarks No access Pages 74 - 76
  Authors:
1. Introduction No access Pages 77 - 79
  Authors:
2. 1. Relevance of parliamentary oversight No access Pages 79 - 80
    Authors:
  2. Incentives for parliamentary oversight No access Pages 80 - 81
    Authors:
  3. Public servants as legislators No access Pages 81 - 82
    Authors:
  4. Additional determinants of parliamentary oversight No access Pages 82 - 84
    Authors:
  5. Hypotheses on parliamentary oversight No access Pages 84 - 85
    Authors:
3. Institutional background No access Pages 85 - 86
  Authors:
4. 1. Data No access Pages 86 - 89
    Authors:
  2. Results No access Pages 89 - 97
    Authors:
5. Concluding remarks No access Pages 97 - 98
  Authors:
1. Introduction No access Pages 99 - 100
  Authors:
2. 1. Political partisanship No access Pages 100 - 101
    Authors:
  2. Political patronage No access Pages 101 - 102
    Authors:
  3. Political selection of public servants No access Pages 102 - 103
    Authors:
3. 1. Data No access Pages 103 - 105
    Authors:
  2. Estimation strategy and empirical results No access Pages 105 - 114
    Authors:
4. Concluding remarks No access Pages 114 - 114
  Authors:
1. Summary No access Pages 115 - 117
  Authors:
2. Implications for constitutional choice No access Pages 117 - 119
  Authors:
3. Implications for economic research No access Pages 119 - 120
  Authors:
References No access Pages 121 - 134
Authors:
Appendix No access Pages 135 - 166
Authors: