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The Governance of EU Justice Reforms
The Role of the EU Justice Scoreboard and Country-Specific Recommendations in Shaping National Judicial Systems- Authors:
- Series:
- Successful Dispute Resolution, Volume 14
- Publisher:
- 11.06.2025
Summary
This book explores how EU soft law tools reshape national justice systems. Combining legal analysis, empirical data, policy critique, and insights from political science and law & economics, it reveals the missing links between EU governance, national policies, and the politics of procedural law. Its groundbreaking, cross-disciplinary approach challenges conventional beliefs and invites readers to rethink how justice reforms are governed in today’s Europe. This critical examination provides a fresh framework for understanding the impact of EU-driven reforms on reshaping domestic procedural laws. Adriani Dori is a legal scholar in civil procedure, EU law, and justice policies, based in Italy and affiliated to Erasmus University Rotterdam.
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Bibliographic data
- Copyright year
- 2025
- Publication date
- 11.06.2025
- ISBN-Print
- 978-3-7560-1569-6
- ISBN-Online
- 978-3-7489-4552-9
- Publisher
- Nomos, Baden-Baden
- Series
- Successful Dispute Resolution
- Volume
- 14
- Language
- English
- Pages
- 625
- Product type
- Book Titles
Table of contents
ChapterPages
- Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 34
- 1. Procedural Law in Context No access
- 2. Towards a Game-Changer in Procedural Legal Science No access
- 3. The Thesis’s Contribution No access
- 1.1 Introductory remarks No access
- 1.2.1 The rule of law and the “Copenhagen dilemma” No access
- 1.2.2.1 The political procedure of Article 7 TEU No access
- 1.2.2.2.1 Limitations No access
- 1.2.2.2.2 The CJEU’s contribution No access
- 1.2.2.3 The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) No access
- 1.2.2.4 Interim conclusions No access
- 1.2.3 Three rule-of-law crises as catalysers for developments No access
- 1.2.4 Towards new rule-of-law protection mechanisms No access
- 1.2.5 The role of the Justice Scoreboard within the rule-of-law debate No access
- 1.3.1 The European Semester No access
- 1.3.2 Timetable and key elements No access
- 1.4.1 The “Justice for Growth” agenda No access
- 1.4.2 Judicial reforms within the context of the EU economic governance No access
- 1.4.3 The role of the Justice Scoreboard in fostering judicial reforms No access
- 1.5 Conclusions No access
- 2.1 Introductory remarks No access
- 2.2.1 Justice reforms and legislative activities No access
- 2.2.2.1 Caseload No access
- 2.2.2.2 Disposition time No access
- 2.2.2.3 Clearance rate No access
- 2.2.2.4 Average length of proceedings (in specific areas of EU law) No access
- 2.2.2.5 Over-time developments No access
- 2.2.3.1.1 Financial parameters for litigants No access
- 2.2.3.1.2 Courts’ communication policies No access
- 2.2.3.1.3 Promotion and use of ADR No access
- 2.2.3.2.1 Human resources No access
- 2.2.3.2.2 Financial resources No access
- 2.2.3.3 Assessment tools No access
- 2.2.3.4 Training No access
- 2.2.3.5 Standards No access
- 2.2.3.6 Over-time developments No access
- 2.2.4.1 Perceived (de facto) judicial independence No access
- 2.2.4.2 Structural (de jure) judicial independence No access
- 2.2.4.3 Over-time developments No access
- 2.3.1.1 Aim No access
- 2.3.1.2 Limitations: The soft-law nature of the Justice Scoreboard No access
- 2.3.2.1 Aim No access
- 2.3.2.2 Limitations No access
- 2.3.3.1 Aim No access
- 2.3.3.2 Limitations: The heterogeneity of national judicial statistics No access
- 2.4 Conclusions No access
- 3.1 Introductory remarks No access
- 3.2.1 The involvement in the creation process No access
- 3.2.2 The tense cooperation with DG Justice No access
- 3.2.3 Data contribution No access
- 3.2.4 Methodology No access
- 3.2.5 Data limitations No access
- 3.2.6 Added value No access
- 3.2.7.1 The political dimension No access
- 3.2.7.2 The lack of neutrality No access
- 3.2.7.3 The political use of the CEPEJ findings No access
- 3.3.1 Involvement No access
- 3.3.2 Data contribution No access
- 3.3.3 Methodology No access
- 3.3.4 Data limitations No access
- 3.3.5 Added value No access
- 3.4.1 Involvement No access
- 3.4.2 Operation No access
- 3.4.3 Data contribution No access
- 3.4.4 Methodology No access
- 3.4.5 Data limitations No access
- 3.4.6 Added value No access
- 3.5.1 Background information No access
- 3.5.2 Involvement No access
- 3.5.3 Data contribution No access
- 3.5.4 Methodology No access
- 3.5.5.1 The importance of the appearance of independence No access
- 3.5.5.2 The formation of perceptions No access
- 3.5.5.3 The importance of comparisons No access
- 3.5.5.4 Understanding and using the data No access
- 3.5.6 Added value No access
- 3.5.7.1 The reasons behind the politicisation of the Scoreboard data No access
- 3.5.7.2 Perceived judicial independence in domestic and EU politics No access
- 3.5.7.3 Perceived judicial independence and the monopoly of State’s judicial services No access
- 3.6.1.1 Eurostat No access
- 3.6.1.2 The “Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing” No access
- 3.6.1.3 Others No access
- 3.6.2.1 The Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) No access
- 3.6.2.2 The Doing Business Report No access
- 3.6.2.3 Field studies No access
- 3.7 Main trends in the data providers No access
- 3.8 Conclusions No access
- 4.1 Introductory remarks No access
- 4.2.1 Before the first Scoreboard publication No access
- 4.2.2.1 The resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary No access
- 4.2.2.2 The annual report on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU for 2012 No access
- 4.2.2.3 The resolution of 4 February 2014 on the EU Justice Scoreboard – civil and administrative justice in the Member States No access
- 4.2.2.4 The resolution of 12 March 2014 on evaluation of justice in relation to criminal justice and the rule of law No access
- 4.2.2.5 MEPs Parliamentary Questions (PQs) No access
- 4.2.2.6 Interim conclusions No access
- 4.2.3 The shift in the Commission’s narrative of 2014 No access
- 4.2.4.1 The situation in Hungary No access
- 4.2.4.2 The situation in Poland No access
- 4.2.4.3 The situation in Bulgaria and Romania No access
- 4.2.4.4 Interim conclusions No access
- 4.2.5.1 The Commission’s judicial and political actions against Poland No access
- 4.2.5.2 The CJEU’s involvement via the preliminary reference procedure No access
- 4.2.5.3 The Scoreboard’s contribution No access
- 4.2.6 The European Parliament’s resolution of 29 May 2018 No access
- 4.2.7 The post-2018 Scoreboard formation and the road ahead No access
- 4.3.1 Legislative activities No access
- 4.3.2 The lack of contextualisation of efficiency trends No access
- 4.3.3 Judicial and economic efficiency No access
- 4.3.4 The input of judicial systems as a question of quality No access
- 4.3.5 The prices for accessing national judicial markets: between efficiency and rule-of-law protection No access
- 4.3.6 Indexing, scoring and ranking in selected areas No access
- 4.3.7 Measuring judicial independence and capturing drifts to illiberalism No access
- 4.3.8 Missing links No access
- 4.4 Conclusions No access
- 5.1 Introductory remarks No access
- 5.2.1 The Scoreboard input for the rule of law No access
- 5.2.2 The Scoreboard input for instigating judicial reforms No access
- 5.2.3 The subtle Europeanisation of judicial policies within and outside of the European AFSJ No access
- 5.2.4 The (de-)politicisation and proceduralisation of the Scoreboard findings No access
- 5.3 What can be measured? No access
- 5.4.1 Timetable No access
- 5.4.2 The Country Reports No access
- 5.4.3 The assessment of national justice systems in the Country Reports No access
- 5.4.4 The production of Justice-CSRs No access
- 5.4.5 The monitoring instruments to measure the CSRs’ implementation progress No access
- 5.5 Conclusions No access
- 6.1 Introductory remarks No access
- 6.2.1 Country-Specific Recommendations No access
- 6.2.2 Country Reports No access
- 6.2.3 Secondary sources No access
- 6.2.4 Interim conclusions No access
- 6.3 The legal basis and non-binding (?) character of CSRs No access
- 6.4 The policy directions of CSRs No access
- 6.5 The phrasing of CSRs No access
- 6.6.1 The Commission’s narrative No access
- 6.6.2 Questioning the official narrative No access
- 6.6.3 Interim conclusions No access
- 6.7 The inner structure of CSRs No access
- 6.8.1 The Commission’s distinction between reform actions and reform outcomes No access
- 6.8.2 The Commission’s qualitative measurements No access
- 6.8.3 The Commission’s standard aggregated method No access
- 6.8.4 The problems of data aggregation No access
- 6.8.5 The inefficiencies of the implemented changes No access
- 6.8.6 Interim conclusions No access
- 6.9 The Effectiveness of CSRs No access
- 6.10 Conclusions No access
- 7.1 Introductory remarks No access
- 7.2 The cross-sectoral linkages of Justice-CSRs No access
- 7.3.1.1 Type A Justice-CSRs No access
- 7.3.1.2 Type B Justice-CSRs No access
- 7.3.1.3 Type C Justice-CSRs No access
- 7.3.2 Using the subject matter as a criterion No access
- 7.3.2 Quantifying recommendations: A granular approach and its implications No access
- 7.3.4 Interim conclusions: CSRs addressing Justice in a narrow and broad sense No access
- 7.4.1 The “addressees” of Justice-CSRs No access
- 7.4.2 The “monitored” Member States No access
- 7.4.3 Reporting challenges and playing with numbers No access
- 7.4.4 Interim conclusions No access
- 7.5.1 Justice-CSRs for “addressees” No access
- 7.5.2 Justice-CSRs for the “monitored” Member States No access
- 7.5.3 Interim conclusions No access
- 7.6 Questioning the Commission’s narrative No access
- 7.7 Conclusions No access
- 8.1 Introductory remarks No access
- 8.2 The legal basis of Justice-CSRs No access
- 8.3 The subject matters of Justice-CSRs No access
- 8.4.1 General data No access
- 8.4.2 Distribution by country and subject matter No access
- 8.4.3.1.1 EMU membership No access
- 8.4.3.1.2 EU 15 membership No access
- 8.4.3.2.1 The Justice Scoreboard’s unsuitability to test correlations No access
- 8.4.3.2.2 The length for enforcing contracts No access
- 8.4.3.2.3 Violations of Article 6 ECHR No access
- 8.4.3.3 Economic factors No access
- 8.5.1 Understanding and measuring effectiveness of Justice-CSRs No access
- 8.5.2 General data No access
- 8.5.3 The accuracy of the Commission’s assessment No access
- 8.5.4 Implementation by legal basis No access
- 8.5.5.1 EMU membership No access
- 8.5.5.2 EU 15 membership No access
- 8.5.6 Implementation by subject matter No access
- 8.5.7.1 Implementation progress No access
- 8.5.7.2 Implementation points and rate No access
- 8.5.7.3 Implementation by country and legal basis No access
- 8.5.7.4 Implementation by budget spending for the judiciary No access
- 8.5.8 The naming-and-shaming effect No access
- 8.6 Conclusions No access
- 9.1 Introductory remarks No access
- 9.2 Why do Justice-CSRs neglect some subject matters? No access
- 9.3 How badly should countries perform to receive a Justice-CSR? No access
- 9.4 Recommendations and state sovereignty: How intrusive are Justice-CSRs? No access
- 9.5 The low-profile approach behind recommendations: Justice-CSRs under the radar No access
- 9.6.1 Tackling issues of judicial independence through Justice-CSRs No access
- 9.6.2 Improving Justice after accession: CSRs and new EU members No access
- 9.6.3 The example of Hungary No access
- 9.6.4 The example of Poland No access
- 9.6.5 The use of Justice-CSRs as a policy tool: Main takeaways No access
- 9.7 Conclusions No access
- Summary Conclusions No access Pages 551 - 558
- Bibliography No access Pages 559 - 625





