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Monographie Kein Zugriff

Bond Debt Governance

A Comparative Analysis of Different Solutions to Financial Distress of Corporate Bond Debtors
Autor:innen:
Verlag:
 21.11.2018

Zusammenfassung

Unternehmensanleihen sind Fluch und Segen zugleich. Für solvente Schuldner eröffnet sich die Chance, eine Vielzahl potentieller Investoren mit einem leicht handelbaren und flexiblen Investitionsangebot anzusprechen. In einer finanziell prekären Situation bereiten Informations-, Koordinations- und Kooperationsprobleme einen fruchtbaren Nährboden für opportunistische Strategien. Der Vergleich von Restrukturierungs- und Insolvenzverfahren zu privaten und vertraglichen Institutionen zeigt auf, wie sich Mehrwerte insbesondere in den vor- und außerinsolvenzlichen privaten Verfahren schaffen lassen. Dazu werden Restrukturierungs-, Insolvenzverfahren, Anleihebedingungen, Institutionen der Gläubigerorganisation, Einschränkungen der freien Vertragsgestaltung (wie etwa das Abstimmungsverbot in den USA) genauso kritisch diskutiert wie mögliche Umgehungsstrategien. Der Fokus liegt auf dem US-amerikanischen und englischem Recht, ergänzt durch eine kurze Analyse des deutschen Rechts.

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Bibliographische Angaben

Erscheinungsjahr
2018
Erscheinungsdatum
21.11.2018
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-5017-7
ISBN-Online
978-3-8452-9267-0
Verlag
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Reihe
Schriften zur Restrukturierung
Band
11
Sprache
Englisch
Seiten
322
Produkttyp
Monographie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis Kein Zugriff 1 - 14
    1. 1. The Problem Kein Zugriff
    2. 2. The Methodology Kein Zugriff
    3. 3. The Comparative Project Kein Zugriff
    4. 4. Goals and Structure Kein Zugriff
    1. 1. Positive and Normative Questions Kein Zugriff
    2. 2. Common v Civil Law Methodology Kein Zugriff
    3. 3. ‘Law in the Books’ and ‘Law in Reality’ Kein Zugriff
    4. 4. Comparative Law Kein Zugriff
    5. 5. Institutional Change Kein Zugriff
    6. 6. The Economic Methodological Approach Kein Zugriff
    7. 7. The Philosophical Legitimation of Rules Kein Zugriff
    1. 1. Defining the Character of Rules Kein Zugriff
      1. 2.1 Competition, Coordination, and Information in Rule-Making Kein Zugriff
      2. 2.2 Legitimatisation and Enforceability of Rules Kein Zugriff
      3. 2.3 Transaction Costs Kein Zugriff
      1. 3.1 ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law’ Kein Zugriff
      2. 3.2 ‘Hare and Tortoise’ Kein Zugriff
      3. 3.3 Institutional Competition and Learning Process Kein Zugriff
      4. 3.4 The Hybrid Character of Rules Kein Zugriff
    1. 1. The Economic Account Kein Zugriff
    2. 2. A Fair and/or Just Redistribution Agenda? Kein Zugriff
    3. 3. Win-Win-Situation Kein Zugriff
    4. 4. The Bond Creditors’ Calculation Kein Zugriff
    5. 5. The Debtor’s Calculation Kein Zugriff
    6. 6. Others Parties’ Calculation Kein Zugriff
      1. 1.1 The Common Pool Problem Kein Zugriff
      2. 1.2 Collective Action Problems: Coordination and Information Kein Zugriff
      3. 1.3 Heterogeneity of Bondholders and Strategic Games Kein Zugriff
      4. 1.4 Debtors’ and Directors’ Opportunistic Behaviour Kein Zugriff
      5. 1.5 Coalition Building Kein Zugriff
      6. 1.6 Direct and Indirect Costs of Financial Distress Kein Zugriff
      1. 2.1 Ex Ante Reflections of Ex Post Results Kein Zugriff
      2. 2.2 Individual Action, Monitoring, Apathy, and Herds Kein Zugriff
      3. 2.3 Debtors’/Directors’ Misbehaviour Kein Zugriff
      1. 3.1 Trigger Mechanism and Entry Requirements Kein Zugriff
      2. 3.2 Carrot and Stick: Incentives for the Debtor Kein Zugriff
      3. 3.3 Coordination: Acting like a Single Creditor Kein Zugriff
    1. 1. Extra-Legal Circumstances and Lending Structure Kein Zugriff
      1. 2.1 Schemes of Arrangements Kein Zugriff
      2. 2.2 Company Voluntary Arrangements Kein Zugriff
      3. 2.3 Administration? Kein Zugriff
      1. 3.1 The Prospect of a Second Chance for the Captain? Kein Zugriff
      2. 3.2 The Threat of a Stick for Misbehaviour? Kein Zugriff
      3. 3.3 A First Mover Advantage for Creditors – A Reason to Run? Kein Zugriff
      1. 1.1 The Traditional Image Kein Zugriff
      2. 1.2 New Challenges Kein Zugriff
      1. 2.1 A Jump Start for a Turn-Around Kein Zugriff
      2. 2.2 The Restructuring Plan Kein Zugriff
      1. 3.1 Debtor’s Calculation: Idea and Reality of a ‘Second Chance’ Kein Zugriff
      2. 3.2 Creditors’ Calculation in US Bankruptcy Kein Zugriff
    1. 1. Manifold Roles for Corporate Bond Covenants Kein Zugriff
      1. 2.1 Affirmative v Negative Covenants Kein Zugriff
      2. 2.2 Financial v Non-Financial Covenants Kein Zugriff
      3. 2.3 Maintenance v Incurrence Covenants Kein Zugriff
    3. 3. Overview of Financial Ratios in Covenant Design Kein Zugriff
      1. 4.1 Legal Options: Acceleration, Put, Adjustment, or Waiver Kein Zugriff
      2. 4.2 Procedural Pre-requisites Kein Zugriff
      3. 4.3 Re-negotiation in the Shadow of the Legal Options Kein Zugriff
      1. 5.1 Financial Maintenance Covenants Kein Zugriff
      2. 5.2 Debt Covenants Kein Zugriff
      3. 5.3 Negative Pledge and Anti-Layer Covenants Kein Zugriff
      4. 5.4 Cross-Default and Cross-Acceleration Covenants Kein Zugriff
      5. 5.5 Sale-lease-back Covenants Kein Zugriff
      6. 5.6 Investment Covenants Kein Zugriff
      7. 5.7 Asset Sale Covenants Kein Zugriff
      8. 5.8 Parent-Control Covenants Kein Zugriff
      9. 5.9 Change-of-Control Covenants Kein Zugriff
      10. 5.10 Merger Covenants Kein Zugriff
      11. 5.11 Restrictions on Dividends and Payments-Covenants Kein Zugriff
      12. 5.12 Affiliated Transaction Covenants Kein Zugriff
      13. 5.13 Information Covenants Kein Zugriff
      14. 5.14 Material Adverse Change Clauses Kein Zugriff
      15. 5.15 Creditor Control Covenants Kein Zugriff
      1. 1.1 The Role of a Trustee Kein Zugriff
      2. 1.2 The Trustee in English Law Kein Zugriff
      3. 1.3 The Trustee in US Law Kein Zugriff
      4. 1.4 No Action Provisions Kein Zugriff
    2. 2. Bondholder Committee: The Debtor’s Bargaining Partner Kein Zugriff
    3. 3. Individual Creditor’s Role Kein Zugriff
    1. 1. Payment-Terms and No-Payment Terms Kein Zugriff
      1. 2.1 The United Kingdom: Contract Kein Zugriff
        1. 2.2.1 Investigating the Rationale of Sec 316(b) TIA Kein Zugriff
        2. 2.2.2 Testing the Rationale of Sec 316(b) TIA Kein Zugriff
      1. 3.1 As Time Changes, the Bond Contract May Have to Change Kein Zugriff
      2. 3.2 The Voting Procedure: Quorum and Threshold Kein Zugriff
      3. 3.3 Disqualification Kein Zugriff
    4. 4. The Plan Kein Zugriff
    1. 1. The Exit Consent Technique Kein Zugriff
      1. 2.1 The World of Katz v Oak Industries Kein Zugriff
      2. 2.2 Russian Roulette, the S.D.N.Y., and the Second Circuit Kein Zugriff
      3. 2.3 Discussion of the Precedent Cases Kein Zugriff
        1. 2.4.1 Lessons from Shareholder Voting Kein Zugriff
        2. 2.4.2 The Concept of the Market-Price Test Kein Zugriff
      1. 3.1 The Irish Bank Case Kein Zugriff
      2. 3.2 Exit Consent in the UK: No Need for a Second Best Strategy Kein Zugriff
    4. 4. The Consent Payment Technique Kein Zugriff
      1. 5.1 The Status Quo Kein Zugriff
      2. 5.2 The Efficient Standard Kein Zugriff
    1. 1. Time to Make Up a Balance Kein Zugriff
      1. 2.1 Interplay between Public and Private Ordering in Harmony Kein Zugriff
      2. 2.2 First Story: Ex Ante Oriented Lending and Restructuring Kein Zugriff
      3. 2.3 Second Story: New Challenges and the Free Market Response Kein Zugriff
      4. 2.4 Proposals for Reform Kein Zugriff
      1. 3.1 Disharmony between Public and Private Ordering Kein Zugriff
      2. 3.2 The Shining Star of Rescue in Insolvency under Pressure Kein Zugriff
      3. 3.3 The Tragedy of Overregulation Kein Zugriff
      4. 3.4 Proposals for Reform Kein Zugriff
    4. 4. Outlook Kein Zugriff
    1. 1. An Application of the Model Kein Zugriff
    2. 2. Extra-Legal Circumstances and Lending Structure Kein Zugriff
      1. 3.1 The Reformed Administration Procedure Kein Zugriff
      2. 3.2 The Restructuring Plan Kein Zugriff
      3. 3.3 Ex Ante Reflections of the Public Ordering Option Kein Zugriff
      1. 4.1 Corset and Free Choice Kein Zugriff
      2. 4.2 Information, Coordination, and Fence Kein Zugriff
      3. 4.3 The Vote on the Plan Kein Zugriff
      4. 4.4 Circumvention Strategies Kein Zugriff
    5. 5. Review and Outlook Kein Zugriff
    1. Publications with Author Reference Kein Zugriff
    2. Other Publications Kein Zugriff
  16. Table of Cases Kein Zugriff 319 - 322

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