Self-Preferencing in Online Search: under Article 6(5) DMA

RA Prof. Dr. Thomas Höppner LL.M. (Dundee)

doi:10.5771/9783748944942

Zusammenfassung

Das Buch zielt darauf ab, ein grundlegendes Verständnis des Verbots der Selbstbegünstigung durch digitale Gatekeeper zu schaffen, wie es in Artikel 6 Absatz 5 des Gesetzes über digitale Märkte (DMA) festgelegt ist. Es erläutert die aktuellen Bedenken und bietet gleichzeitig Anleitungen für eine effektive Einhaltung. Bislang wurde den komplizierten Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Online-Suchmaschinen und anderen digitalen Diensten wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Dieses Buch versucht, diese Landschaft zu erhellen, indem es insbesondere die Grenzen zwischen Online-Suchmaschinen, Online-Vermittlungsdiensten und Online-Informationsdiensten aufzeigt, die von den designierten Gatekeepern bei der Gestaltung ihrer Systeme im Hinblick auf die Einhaltung des DMA berücksichtigt werden müssen. Artikel 6 Absatz 5 DMA zielt auf "Plattform-Umhüllungsstrategien" ab, die sich nachteilig auf Verbraucher und Unternehmen auswirken. Im Kern geht es dabei um die Präsentation oder das direkte Angebot (d. h. die Einbettung) von verschiedenen Diensten auf den Ergebnisseiten einer Online-Suchmaschine. Solche Praktiken sind nur dann zulässig, wenn Drittanbietern eines ähnlichen Dienstes die gleiche Gelegenheit zur Präsentation oder zum Angebot gegeben wird. Die Gleichwertigkeit setzt voraus, dass keine Ungleichgewichte bei den Rechten oder Pflichten bestehen und dem eingebetteten Erstanbieterdienst des Gatekeepers, seiner Online-Suchmaschine oder einem anderen zentralen Plattformdienst kein unverhältnismäßiger Vorteil eingeräumt wird. Das Buch entwirft genaue rechtliche Leitlinien für die Einhaltung dieser Verpflichtungen.

Schlagworte

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Auflage: 1/2024
Copyrightjahr: 2024
ISBN-Print: 978-3-7560-1831-4
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7489-4494-2
Verlag: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Sprache: Englisch
Seiten: 218
Produkttyp: Monographie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten

Titelei/InhaltsverzeichnisSeiten 1 - 14 Download Kapitel (PDF)
Download Kapitel (PDF)
1. I. Principles for identifying a distinct First-Party Service that shall not be favoured
2. II. Principles for identifying a Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged
3. III. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service
Download Kapitel (PDF)
1. 1. 1. Equal treatment: The DMA’s central obligation
  2. 1. a. Addressing gatekeeper’s conflicts of interest
    2. b. Addressing platform envelopment strategies
    3. c. Covering any form of self-preferencing in online search
  3. 3. Gatekeeper’s choice: (i) disintegrate own service, or (ii) integrate third parties equally without conferring an advantage upon the gatekeeper
  4. 4. The relevant criteria for compliance
2. 1. 1. a. Annex D(2): integrated services with different purposes or falling within different categories of CPS are always distinct
    2. 1. aa) Consequences for designated CPS
      2. bb) Application to other gatekeeper services
  2. 1. a. Irrelevance of the current design of search engines
    2. b. Definition in the DMA
    3. c. Qualification in the case law of the Court of Justice
  3. 1. 1. aa) The economic concept of platform envelopment
      2. bb) Platform envelopment pursuant to the DMA
      3. cc) Legal consequence: ‘Distinct services’ despite common components
    2. b. Services found to be distinct from an OSE
  4. 1. a. OSE vs non-search related services
    2. b. OSE vs search-related content
    3. c. OSE vs (generative AI) answering services
    4. 1. aa) OSE and OIS cannot form a single service
      2. (1) Definition of an OIS
        i. End users’ perspective
        ii. Business users’ perspective
        iii. Relevant factors
        (3) Crawling of websites vs direct contracts with business users
      3. (1) Google Search became market leader by limiting itself to an OSE
        (2) Limits of Google’s OSE in facilitating transactions
        (3) Google’s specialised search technology to facilitate transactions
      4. dd) Google’s OISs as distinct services – findings in Google Search (Shopping)
    5. e. OSE vs non-OIS specialised search services
    6. f. Borderline between OSE and OIS/verticals in case of overlapping elements
  5. 1. a. The concept of embedding as developed in Google Search (Shopping)
    2. b. Concept of embedding in Article 6(5) DMA
    3. 1. aa) Relevance of access points to use a service
      2. bb) Different access points to use Google Search
      3. cc) Different access points to use Alphabet’s OIS/Verticals
      4. dd) Conclusion: specialised results in OSE serve as access point to OIS/Vertical
    4. d. Clarification in the Commission’s designation decision
3. 1. 1. Similar service
  2. 2. Service of a third party
  3. 3. Protection of each third party providing a similar service
4. 1. 1. a. 15 years of Google Search (Shopping) proceeding clarified the abuse
    2. b. Competition law remedies failed
    3. c. Growing calls for structural remedies
    4. d. DMA’s ban on self-preferencing as political compromise
  2. 1. a. Differentiated treatment as relevant conduct
    2. 1. aa) Definition: relative prominence
      2. (1) Any information returned, including a service directly offered
        (2) In response to, and related to a search query
        (3) Including real-time interface adjustments
      3. cc) Results in any interface of any access point of the OSE
    3. c. Crawling and indexing
    4. d. Other treatments having an equivalent effect
  3. 1. a. Equal treatment vs no self-preferencing
    2. 1. (1) Better ranking of results leading to a service
        (2) Partial embedding of a service
        (3) Entire embedding of a service
      2. bb) Difference partial / entire embedding
      3. (1) Groups of results specialised in a certain topic
        (2) Considered or used by certain end users as a distinct service
      4. dd) Further examples of relevant advantages
    3. 1. aa) General framework
      2. (1) Relevant opportunities relating to search prominence
        (2) Equivalence of prominence
      3. (1) Article 13(6) DMA
        (2) Dark patterns
        (3) Degradation of conditions or quality of the OSE
      4. (1) Article 6(5) sentence 2 DMA: “fairness” of “such ranking”
        (2) Inability to fully capture benefits of own innovation and efforts
        (3) Inability to compete for the full service
        (4) Inability of all similar third parties to compete
        (5) Improper conditions for third parties
        (6) Improper pricing
      5. (1) Conferral of advantage upon OSE or other CPS
        (2) Relevant advantages
        (3) Disproportionality of the advantage conferred
    4. 1. aa) Ranking concerns of dissimilar third parties
      2. (1) OSEs’ side-by-side display of complementary services
        (2) Neutrality as competitive factor for OSEs
      3. (1) Harms of self-preferencing for direct suppliers
        (2) (No) disadvantages for direct suppliers from competition amongst indirect suppliers
        (3) Gatekeeper’s incentives to turn direct suppliers against rival indirect suppliers
      4. (1) Article 6(5) sentence 1 and sentence 2 DMA: relation for “non-discrimination”
        (2) Article 6(12) DMA and its relationship to Article 6(5) DMA
        (3) Subjective rights of dissimilar third parties
      5. ee) Consequences for compliance
  4. 1. a. Framework: DMA compliance by design
    2. b. Gatekeeper needs to bear the costs of compliance with Article 6(5) DMA
    3. c. Constraints to achieve equal opportunities justify no self-preferencing
    4. 1. aa) Google’s arguments regarding technical constraints
      2. bb) Rejection of objective justification by Commission and General Court
    5. d) No objective justification criterion in Article 6(5) DMA
5. V. Consequences where no fair equivalent can be found
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1. I. Safe harbour
2. 1. 1. Identifying a distinct service of a gatekeeper that shall not be favoured
  2. 2. Identifying a similar Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged
  3. 3. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service
List of referencesSeiten 213 - 216 Download Kapitel (PDF)
IndexSeiten 217 - 218 Download Kapitel (PDF)

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Self-Preferencing in Online Search