
Ring-Fencing in Europe
The EU's Bank Structural Reform and a Legal Comparative Look at National Legislation in Europe's Three Financial Capitals- Autor:innen:
- Reihe:
- Studien zum Bank-, Börsen- und Kapitalmarktrecht, Band 75
- Verlag:
- 2019
Zusammenfassung
Bankenstrukturreformen, die eine Trennung von Investment- und Retailbanking vorsehen und die zusammenfassend als „Ring-Fencing“ bezeichnet werden können, werden seit der Finanzkrise kontrovers diskutiert. Die Arbeit befasst sich mit den rechtlichen Entwicklungen in der Europäischen Union sowie mit Regelungen im Vereinigten Königreich, Deutschland und der Schweiz.
Die Arbeit trägt zur Abgrenzung und der Systematik von Ring-Fencing-Regelungen bei und zeichnet ein umfassendes Bild der gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen sowie möglicher Perspektiven auf Ebene des Unionsrechts. Darüber hinaus untersucht sie strukturelle Unterschiede zwischen bestehenden nationalen Regelungen an Europas drei wichtigsten Finanzplätzen und geht dabei insbesondere auf die einzigartigen aber bisher international wenig beachteten Schweizerischen Ring-Fencing-Bestrebungen ein.
Die Arbeit wurde unter anderem mit dem Österreichischen Preis für Insolvenzrecht ausgezeichnet.
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Bibliographische Angaben
- Copyrightjahr
- 2019
- ISBN-Print
- 978-3-8487-6229-3
- ISBN-Online
- 978-3-7489-0345-1
- Verlag
- Nomos, Baden-Baden
- Reihe
- Studien zum Bank-, Börsen- und Kapitalmarktrecht
- Band
- 75
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Seiten
- 342
- Produkttyp
- Monographie
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Titelei/InhaltsverzeichnisSeiten 1 - 22 Download Kapitel (PDF)
- List of AbbreviationsSeiten 23 - 24 Download Kapitel (PDF)
- I. Overview
- II. Current State of Scientific Research
- III. Research Problem
- IV. Research Questions
- A. Part I
- B. Part II
- C. The Concept of Ring-Fencing II
- VI. Methodology
- 1. “The entire range of financial services”
- 2. Universal banking after ring-fencing
- b. Dominance
- a. Benefits
- 1. Access to the safety net: explicit and implicit subsidies
- 2. Risk-taking, trading risks, culture and complexity
- a. Environment
- b. Relationship-based banking
- c. Market-based banking
- a. Proprietary trading
- b. Market making
- a. Bigger banks
- b. Complexity and interconnectedness
- c. Post-crisis response
- A. Bailouts
- B. Bailout decision and too-big-to-fail
- C. Implicit subsidies
- D. Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)
- E. Bank Size and TBTF
- A. Structural reform as an umbrella term
- B. Ring-fencing as a structural reform: the concept of ring-fencing
- 1. Reasons for the adoption of the Glass-Steagall Act
- 2. Full separation
- 3. Criticism and impact of the Glass-Steagall Act
- b. Differences between ring-fencing and full separation
- 1. Section 619 Dodd-Frank Act
- 2. Activities ban
- 3. Criticism
- b. Differences between ring-fencing and the activities ban
- A. The basic rationale of ring-fencing
- a. Resolvability
- b. Subsidies and moral hazard
- c. Complexity and size
- d. Culture and competition
- C. Differences to recovery and resolution
- A. Underlying assumption
- a. The defensive method
- b. The containment method
- A. Origins of the term “ring-fencing”
- a. From public utility companies to securitisations
- b. Results
- a. Jurisdiction-oriented ring-fencing
- b. Activities-oriented ring-fencing
- c. Establishing a definition
- VIII. Results
- A. Mandate and structure
- a. Outline
- b. Costs and benefits
- a. Outline
- b. Costs and benefits
- c. Final proposal
- a. Reception by stakeholders
- b. Criticism of the Liikanen Report
- c. Characterisation and method of ring-fencing
- a. Importance of a harmonized approach
- b. Structure
- B. Scope of the draft regulation
- a. Prohibitions
- b. Discussion
- a. Trading activities
- b. Review of trading activities
- c. Separation procedure
- a. Activities restrictions
- b. Subgroups
- c. Exercise of power
- d. Designation
- e. Exemption for the United Kingdom
- a. Characterisation
- b. Implications
- c. Reception and criticism
- d. Method of ring-fencing
- A. Introduction
- a. Tiers
- b. Negative scope
- a. Mandatory separation
- 1. First step: prohibition of proprietary trading
- 2. Second step: exemptions
- 3. Third step: identification procedure
- c. Results
- a. Assessment of other trading activities
- b. Results
- a. Corporate structure
- b. Activity-restrictions
- c. Exemption for the United Kingdom
- a. Negotiating manifest
- b. Watered down
- c. Method of ring-fencing
- d. Influence of Germany and France
- A. European Parliament
- B. Withdrawal
- a. Starting position
- b. Legislative options
- 1. BRRD
- 2. SRMR
- 3. Results
- V. Results and Outlook
- a. Importance of the financial centre
- b. Number of banks their nature
- c. HSBC, Barclays, RBS, Standard Chartered
- a. Importance of the financial centre
- b. Number of banks and their nature
- c. Deutsche Bank
- a. Importance of the financial centre
- b. Number of banks and their nature
- c. UBS and Credit Suisse
- a. Importance of the financial centre
- b. Number of banks and their nature
- c. G-SIBs
- A. United Kingdom
- B. Germany
- a. Decision against structural reforms
- i. Emergency plan
- ii. Organisational measures to improve general resolvability
- 2. Subsidiarity principle
- 3. TBTF evaluation
- 1. Banking Act and Banking Ordinance
- 2. Finma emergency plan assessment
- 1. National focus
- 2. Composition
- 1. Primary, secondary legislation, guidance
- 2. Principle of legality
- 3. Transparency
- c. Chronology
- d. Influence
- e. Invasiveness
- a. Personal scope
- b. Threshold and exemptions
- c. Affected banks
- a. Personal scope
- b. Threshold
- c. Affected banks
- a. Personal scope
- b. Threshold and exemptions
- c. Affected banks
- a. Focus of the scope
- b. Personal scope
- 1. Clear cut thresholds?
- 2. Consolidated basis
- 3. Setting the threshold
- d. Other exemptions
- e. Affected G-SIBs
- f. Relation to expert commission recommendations
- 1. Core activities
- 2. Core services
- 3. Excluded activities and prohibitions
- 1. Excluded activities
- 2. Prohibitions
- c. Summary
- d. Affected banks
- 1. Excluded activities
- 2. Exceptions
- 1. Explicit activity restrictions for the financial trading institution
- i. First starting point: Financial service institution
- ii. Deliberate decision or editorial error
- iii. Second starting point: Objectives of the Act
- iv. Limitations
- 3. Conclusio
- c. Summary
- d. Affected banks
- i. Caveat
- ii. Mere planning?
- iii. Three options?
- 2. Systemically important functions
- b. Non-ring-fenced bodies
- 1. UBS
- 2. Credit Suisse
- 3. Conclusio
- d. Summary
- a. Activities within the ring-fence
- 1. Basis of the exclusion
- 2. Activities
- 3. Exceptions
- 1. Ring-fencing
- 2. Method of ring-fencing
- d. Flexibility
- e. Relation to expert commission recommendations
- a. Capital and liquidity
- b. Governance
- c. Intragroup transactions and exposures
- d. Distributions
- e. Continuity of services
- 1. Proper business organisation
- 2. Regulatory requirements of the German Banking Act
- b. Capital and liquidity
- c. Governance
- d. Intragroup transactions and exposures
- e. Distributions
- f. Continuity of services
- 1. Emergency plan assessment
- 2. Resolvability incentives
- 3. Relation between emergency plan and resolvability incentives
- b. Capital and liquidity
- c. Governance
- d. Intragroup transactions and exposures
- e. Distributions
- f. Continuity of services
- 1. Capital and liquidity
- 2. Governance
- 3. Intragroup transactions and exposures
- 4. Distributions
- 5. Continuity of services
- 1. Character
- i. Generally unnoticed
- ii. Special features of the Swiss approach
- iii. Considerable fence
- 3. Ring-fencing
- 4. Practical relevance
- 5. Switzerland as a role model for the EU?
- A. United Kingdom
- B. Germany
- C. Switzerland
- D. Results
- VII. Results and Outlook
- OutlookSeiten 306 - 308 Download Kapitel (PDF)
- List of SourcesSeiten 309 - 342 Download Kapitel (PDF)




