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Zur politischen Ökonomie kommunaler Unternehmen

Wirtschaftliche Betätigung zwischen Daseinsvorsorge und politischen Interessen
Authors:
Publisher:
 28.04.2022

Keywords

Bibliographic data

Copyright year
2022
Publication date
28.04.2022
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-8892-7
ISBN-Online
978-3-7489-2947-5
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series
Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik
Volume
26
Language
German
Pages
237
Product type
Book Titles

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access 1 - 18
    1. 1.1 Motivation No access
    2. 1.2 Aufbau der Arbeit No access
    1. 2.1 Einordnung in das föderale System No access
          1. Eigenbetrieb No access
          2. Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts No access
          3. Zweckverband (z.B. § 13 GKZ BW; § 11 GKG LSA) No access
          1. GmbH No access
          2. AG No access
        3. 2.2.1.3 Fazit Rechtsformwahl und kommunaler Einfluss No access
      2. 2.2.2 Branchen No access
      3. 2.2.3 Eignerstatus No access
      1. 2.3.1 Was legitimiert öffentliche Unternehmen? No access
      2. 2.3.2 Umfrage zur Bürgermeinung öffentlicher Unternehmen No access
        1. 2.3.3.1 Literaturübersicht No access
          1. Ökonomische Überlegungen – H1 No access
          2. Daseinsvorsorge – H2 No access
          3. Ideologie – H3 No access
          4. Vertrauen in Politiker – H4 No access
          5. Soziale Verantwortung – H5 No access
          6. Eigennutz – H6 No access
          1. 2.3.3.3.1 Datenstruktur No access
          2. 2.3.3.3.2 Ergebnisse No access
      4. 2.3.4 Zwischenfazit No access
    1. 3.1 Das Schema des institutionalisierten Prinzipal-Agenten-Problems No access
    2. 3.2 Politiker – Geschäftsführung kommunaler Unternehmen No access
        1. 3.3.1.1 Theorie No access
        2. 3.3.1.2 Status Quo der empirischen Literatur No access
          1. Common Pool No access
          2. War of attrition No access
          3. Veto-Spieler No access
        2. 3.3.2.2 Status Quo der empirischen Literatur No access
        1. 3.3.3.1 Theorie No access
        2. 3.3.3.2 Status Quo der empirischen Literatur No access
      4. 3.3.4 Hypothesen No access
      5. 3.3.5 Behavioral political economy – eine verhaltensökonomische Perspektive auf die Beziehung zwischen Bürger und Politiker No access
      1. 4.1.1 Beschreibung der Datenquellen und ihrer Aufbereitung No access
      2. 4.1.2 Investitionstätigkeit: Maß und Deskriptives No access
      3. 4.1.3 Wahlzyklen: Maß und Deskriptives No access
      4. 4.1.4 Interessenfragmentierung: Maß und Deskriptives No access
      5. 4.1.5 Ideologie: Maß und Deskriptives No access
      6. 4.1.6 Weitere Einflussfaktoren und Kontrollvariablen No access
    2. 4.2 Untersuchung politischer Variablen in Panelregressionen No access
      1. 4.3.1 Methodisches Vorgehen No access
        1. 4.3.2.1 Generelle Einflüsse von Wahljahren No access
        2. 4.3.2.2 Brancheneffekte No access
      3. 4.3.3 Diskussion: Politische Konjunkturzyklen No access
      1. 4.4.1 Methodisches Vorgehen No access
        1. 4.4.2.1 Generelle Einflüsse der Interessenfragmentierung No access
        2. 4.4.2.2 Weitere fixe Effekte Varianten No access
        3. 4.4.2.3 Nichtlinearitäten No access
        4. 4.4.2.4 Brancheneffekte No access
        5. 4.4.2.5 Interessenfragmentierung im Wahlzyklus No access
        6. 4.4.2.6 Robustheitstest No access
      3. 4.4.3 Diskussion: Interessenfragmentierung No access
      1. 4.5.1 Methodisches Vorgehen No access
        1. 4.5.2.1 Anteile und Mehrheiten im OLS No access
        2. 4.5.2.2 Regression-Discontinuity-Design No access
        3. 4.5.2.3 Interaktionseffekte No access
        4. 4.5.2.4 Brancheneffekte No access
        5. 4.5.2.5 Bürgermeisterideologien No access
      3. 4.5.3 Diskussion Parteiideologien No access
    1. 5.1 Einordnung der Ergebnisse No access
    2. 5.2 Ableitung von Implikationen No access
    3. 5.3 Fazit No access
    1. Anhang 1: Ergebnisse der Regressionen zur Erklärung von Privatisierung und Instrumentalfunktion (OLS-Schätzungen) No access
    2. Anhang 2: Literaturübersicht über empirische Studien zu Interessenfragmentierung in politischen Gremien No access
    3. Anhang 3: Ergebnisse zu den Regressionen zum ENP differenziert nach Branchen No access
    4. Anhang 4: Robustheitsuntersuchung zu potenziellen Messfehlern des ENP No access
    5. Anhang 5: Ergebnisse zu den Regressionen linker Anteile im Gemeinderat differenziert nach Branchen No access
    6. Anhang 6: Ergebnisse zu den Regressionen linker Mehrheiten im Gemeinderat differenziert nach Branchen No access
  8. 7. Literaturverzeichnis No access 225 - 237

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