What does truthfulness mean and what role does it play in our moral actions? The author undertakes a fundamental revision and further development of discourse ethics in the sense of Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel. The core idea hereof is the solid redefinition of the concept of truthfulness, which in classical theories of discourse ethics has hitherto been misconceived as a claim to validity and has remained marginal as such. In contrast to this, the author develops the thesis that truthfulness—understood as orientation toward the ethical goods of the uncircumventible discourse—constitutes the moral core of human action. She argues that this discursive moral criterion remains valid even when discourse fails in practice or is no longer justifiable. This title is also available as open access.
II.1 Entfaltung des interindividuell-interaktiv erhobenen Angemessenheitsanspruches als Geltungsanspruch des "dritten Weltbezuges"
II.2 Sinnkonstitution qua subjektiver Betroffenheit – der Angemessenheitsanspruch als universaler Geltungsanspruch aus transzendentalpragmatischer Sicht
II.3 Gattungsethische Güter
II.4 Gegenseitige Perspektivenübernahme versus praktischer Diskurs
