Cover of book: Enhancing the Credibility of Resolution
Buy in shop
, to see if you have full access to this publication.
Book Titles No access

Enhancing the Credibility of Resolution

An Analysis of the Impact of Recovery and Resolution Planning and Loss-Absorbing Capital Requirements on the Credibility of Bail-In
Authors:
Publisher:
 2022

Keywords

Bibliographic data

Copyright year
2022
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-7489-0
ISBN-Online
978-3-7489-3280-2
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Language
English
Pages
302
Product type
Book Titles

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access 1 - 16
  2. List of Abbreviations No access 17 - 20
    1. Introductory Remarks No access
    2. Scope and Objective of the Thesis No access
    3. Course of the Thesis No access
      1. Why the Credibility of Resolution is So Important No access
        1. Complexity in Bank Structures No access
        2. Asset Size No access
        3. Legal and Organizational Structures No access
        4. Number of Legal Entities and Distribution of Banking Groups and Activities Across Jurisdictions No access
            1. Institutional Structure: Business Models No access
            2. Results No access
          2. No Adequate Modification Measures Ex Ante No access
          3. Results of Ex Ante Evaluation No access
            1. The Current Framework of Precautionary Recapitalization No access
            2. Application of Precautionary Recapitalization in Italy – Unveiling the Problems No access
            3. Precautionary Recapitalization – Quo Vadis? No access
              1. National Insolvency Proceedings No access
                1. Reducing the Pool of Bail-inable Instruments through Articles 44(2) and 44(3) BRRD No access
                2. Exemption of Senior Debt Holders No access
                3. Bail-inable Instruments in the Cross-Border Context No access
                4. Conclusion No access
              3. External Private Funding Instruments No access
              1. Pre-Funded Funds – DGS and EDIS as Sector-Funded Financing No access
              1. European Stability Mechanism – Direct Recapitalization Instrument No access
          3. Results of Ex Post Evaluation No access
        7. Excursus: Limits to the No-Bailout Policy – The Role of Public Financing No access
          1. Emergency Liquidity Assistance for Solvent Institutions – An Overview No access
          2. The Current Problem No access
        9. Results No access
        1. Credibility Ex Ante: Recovery and Resolution Planning No access
        2. Credibility Ex Post: Loss-Absorbing Capital Requirements No access
    2. Result of Part 2 No access
        1. Remedy for the Lack of Predictability No access
        2. Remedy for Complexity No access
        3. Remedy for Missing Modification Measures No access
          1. Potential Divergences Between Authorities – Cross-Border Coordination No access
          2. Protection of Own Markets, Market Players and Depositors No access
          3. Planning as an Inconvenient Standard Exercise – Adding More Complexity No access
          4. Drawing-up of Plans Takes Place in Times of Stability – Optimism Bias No access
          5. Costliness of Recovery and Resolution Plans No access
          6. Predictability of the Actual Crisis Scenario at Some Future Date No access
          7. Impermanence of Banks’ Structures and the Topicality of Recovery and Resolution Plans No access
            1. Recovery Planning Process – Building Blocks No access
            2. Resolution Planning Process – Building Blocks No access
            3. Evidence from Institutions Undertaking Planning No access
            4. Templates No access
          9. Planning Capacity for Systemic Crises No access
          10. Gateway to Political Influence – Enforceability of Plans No access
          1. Principal-Agent Conflict No access
            1. Unintentionally Incorrect Information No access
            2. Faulty Processing or Valuation of Information No access
            3. Intentionally Incorrect Information No access
            4. Outlook: Determination of MREL Quote No access
            5. Conclusion No access
        3. The Problems with Modification Measures No access
    2. Result of Part 3 No access
        1. Minimum Requirements for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities No access
        2. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity No access
        3. Integrated Approach – Commission Proposal No access
      2. The Potential of LACRs to Enhance Credibility Ex Post Resolution Decision No access
        1. Implementation, Monitoring, and Maintenance Costs No access
        2. Implementation of Integrated LACRs is Complex and Difficult to Understand No access
        3. Eligibility of Instruments – Qualitative Requirements No access
        4. Pricing of LAC Instruments No access
        5. Debt Subordination – New Article 108 BRRD No access
            1. Retail Investors – Households – SMEs No access
            2. Banks and Other Financial Institutions No access
            3. Deduction of Cross-Holdings No access
          2. Risk Transportation from the Banks to the Market – Who Remains? No access
          3. Imposition of Losses on Specific Classes of Creditors Could Give Rise to Adverse Systemic Effects No access
        7. Problem of Certain Banks in Complying with Loss-Absorbing Requirements No access
        8. Scope and Level of Application No access
        9. MREL Guidance – New Article 45e BRRD No access
          1. Denomination – Underlying Uncertainty No access
          2. The Impact of Recovery and Resolution Planning – First Level of Uncertainty No access
          3. Discretion in Setting the Recapitalization Amount – Second Level of Uncertainty No access
          4. Unclear Adjustment Mechanisms – Third Level of Uncertainty No access
        11. The TLAC as an International Standard Being Transposed into National Law No access
        12. Current Shortfall and Transposition No access
    2. Result of Part 4 No access
      1. Is Improvement of Recovery and Resolution Planning Necessary at All? No access
        1. Strengthening and Clarifying the Framework for Cross-Border Cooperation of Supervisory and Resolution Authorities No access
          1. Special Training to Enhance Internal Data Provision No access
          2. Full-Time RRP Employees No access
          3. Development of a Standardized Template for a Single Distributor that Shares Relevant Data with Recipient – Information Intermediary No access
          4. Updating of Institutions' IT Infrastructure No access
          5. Automated Data Submission No access
          6. RegTech as an Antidote to Major Data Management Problems No access
        3. Make Plans Enforceable – Penalize Non-Compliance – Prevent Political Influence No access
        4. Structural Reform of the Banking Sector No access
        5. Open Issues No access
        1. Adoption and Maturation of the Reforms No access
        2. Defining Dependable Eligibility Criteria No access
        3. Enhancing the Pricing of MREL Instruments No access
        4. Solution to the Subordination Problem No access
          1. Disclosure Requirements and Provision of Mandatory Information to Potential Investors No access
          2. Find Resilient and Adequate Holders for Loss-Absorbing Instruments – Buy-Side Monitoring No access
          3. Setting-up Specific Bail-in Bonds No access
          4. What to do with Legacy Holdings – Resolution Planning? No access
        6. Flexibility Needs of Different Business Models No access
        7. O/DSIBs – Scope and Level of Application No access
        8. MREL Guidance No access
          1. Making the Calculation Process More Predictable No access
          2. Making the Calculation Process More Accurate No access
        10. International Transposition of TLAC No access
        11. Shortfall and Transposition No access
    3. Result to Part 5 No access
  8. PART 6 – SUMMARY OF THESES No access 275 - 278
  9. References No access 279 - 302

Bibliography (359)

  1. ABLV Bank, Voluntary Liquidation of ABLV Bank, AS to Protect the Interests of Clients and Creditors. https://www.ablv.com/en/legal-latest-news/voluntary-liquidation-of-ablv-bank-as-to-protect-the-interests-of-clients-and-creditors. Open Google Scholar
  2. Acharya, V. V. and Yorulmazer, T., ‘Too many to fail – An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies’, Journal of Financial Intermediation 16 (2017), 1–31. Open Google Scholar
  3. Amorello, L. and Huber, S., ‘Recovery Planning: A New Valuable Corporate Governance Framework for Credit Institutions’, Law and Economics Yearly Review 3 (2014), 296–317. Open Google Scholar
  4. Angeloni, I., SRB Conference 2018 – 10 years after the crisis: are banks now resolvable?, SRB Annual Conference (Brussels, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  5. Armour, J., ‘Making Bank Resolution Credible’ in N. Moloney, E. Ferran and J. Payne (eds), Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 453–86. Open Google Scholar
  6. Arner, D., Barberis, J. N. and Buckley, R., ‘FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation’, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 37 (2017), 371–413. Open Google Scholar
  7. Association for Financial Markets in Europe, Resolution aspects of the EU Risk Reduction Measures Package: Recommendation for effective implementation of TLAC, MREL and related reforms (2017). Open Google Scholar
  8. Avgouleas, E. and Goodhart, C., A Critical Evaluation of Bail-ins as Bank Recapitalisation Mechanisms, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper (2014). Open Google Scholar
  9. Avgouleas, E. and Goodhart, C., ‘Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins’, Journal of Financial Regulation 1 (2015), 3–29. Open Google Scholar
  10. Avgouleas, E. and Goodhart, C., ‘An Anatomy of Bank Bail-ins: Why the Eurozone Needs a Fiscal Backstop for the Banking Sector’ in G. B. Navetti, G. Calzolari and A. F. Pozzolo (eds), European Economy: Banks, Regulation, and the Real Sector (Rome: Europeye, 2016), pp. 75–91. Open Google Scholar
  11. Avgouleas, E., Goodhart, C. and Schoenmaker, D., ‘Bank Resolution Plans as a catalyst for global financial reform’, Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013), 210–8. Open Google Scholar
  12. Ayadi, R. and Ferri, G., "Total Assets" versus "Risk Weighted Assets": does it matter for MREL requirements?, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  13. Ayadi, R. and Groen, W. P. de, ‘Banks' Business Models in Europe’ in T. Beck and B. Casu (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), pp. 81–102. Open Google Scholar
  14. Ayadi, R., Groen, W. P. de, Sassi, I., Mathlouthi, W., Rey, H. and Aubry, O., Banking Business Models Monitor 2015 Europe (Montréal: International Research Centre on Cooperative Finance, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  15. Ba, H., ‘The systemic causes of financial crises in the long nineteenth century’, Business and Politics 20 (2018), 208–38. Open Google Scholar
  16. BaFin, Übersicht über die Haftungskaskade im Rahmen der Bankenabwicklung. https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Merkblatt/BA/mb_haftungskaskade_bankenabwicklung.html. Open Google Scholar
  17. BaFin, Rundschreiben 10/2017 (BA) in der Fassung vom 14.09.2018 – Bankaufsichtliche Anforderungen an die IT (BAIT), BaFin Rundschreiben (2018). Open Google Scholar
  18. Bagehot, W., Lombard Street: A description of the money market, Wiley investment classics (New York: Wiley, 1999). Open Google Scholar
  19. Baglioni, A. and Esposito, M., Modigliani-Miller Doesn't Hold in a "Bailinable" World: A New Capital Structure to Reduce the Banks' Funding Cost, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Working Paper n. 52 (2016). Open Google Scholar
  20. Balz, B., SRB Conference 2018 – 10 years after the crisis: are banks now resolvable?, SRB Annual Conference (Brussels, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  21. Banca D'Italia, Informazioni sulla soluzione della crisi di Veneto Banca S.p.A. e Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. (2017). Open Google Scholar
  22. Banca D'Italia, La ricapitalizzazione precauzionale di MPS: domande e risposte (2017). Open Google Scholar
  23. Bank for International Settlements, Annual Economic Report 2018 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  24. Bank of England, The Bank of England's approach to setting a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Statement of Policy (2018). Open Google Scholar
  25. Barbagallo, C., Interventi – Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena: Senato della Repubblica – Camera dei Deputati, Commissione Parlamentare di inchiesta sul sistema bancario e finanziario (2017). Open Google Scholar
  26. Barker, A. and Sanderson, R., ‘Brussels and Rome seal rescue deal for Monte dei Paschi: Investor bail-in and deep restructuring agreed for Italy's oldest bank’, Financial Times, 01 June 2017. Open Google Scholar
  27. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems (2010). Open Google Scholar
  28. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Global systemically important banks: Updated assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement: Updated assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement, July 2013 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Open Google Scholar
  29. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programm (RCAP) – Analysis of risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book (2013). Open Google Scholar
  30. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirement (2014). Open Google Scholar
  31. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The G-SIB assessment methodology: Score calculation (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, 2014). Open Google Scholar
  32. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report on risk-weighted assets for counterparty credit risk (CCR), Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RECAP) (2015). Open Google Scholar
  33. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Analysis of risk weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RECAP) (2016). Open Google Scholar
  34. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms (2017). Open Google Scholar
  35. Bauer, E., Mrusek, F., Metka, K. and Schöll, M., Complexity kills – How European banking models have to change in a complex world, Results from zeb’s European Banking Study 2015 (2015). Open Google Scholar
  36. Benczur, P., Cannas, G., Cariboni, J., Di Girolamo, F., Maccaferri, S. and Petracco Giudici, M., ‘Evaluating the effectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell to bail-out?’, Journal of Financial Stability 33 (2017), 207–23. Open Google Scholar
  37. Berger, B., Hüttl, P. and Merler, S., "Total Assets" versus "Risk Weighted Assets": does it matter for MREL requirements, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  38. Berthonnet, I. and Delclite, T., ‘Pareto-Optimality or Pareto-Efficiency: Same Concept, Different Names? An Analysis Over a Century of Economic Literature’, Research in the history of economic thought and methodology 32.2014 (2014), 129–45. Open Google Scholar
  39. Binder, J.-H., ‘Institutionalisierte Krisenbewältigung bei Kreditinstituten: Ausländische Gestaltungsvorbilder und mögliche Konsequenzen für die Weiterentwicklung des deutschen Aufsichtsrechts’, Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft (2009), 19–32. Open Google Scholar
  40. Binder, J.-H., ‘To ring-fence or not, and how?: Strategic questions for post-crisis banking reform in Europe’, SSRN Electronic Journal (2014). Open Google Scholar
  41. Binder, J.-H., ‘Gleichung mit (zu?) vielen Unbekannten: Nachhaltige Bankenstrukturen durch Sanierungs- und Abwicklungsplanung?’, Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft 27 (2015), 153–65. Open Google Scholar
  42. Binder, J.-H., ‘Cross‐border coordination of bank resolution in the EU: All problems resolved?’, European Company and Financial Review 13 (2016), 575–98. Open Google Scholar
  43. Binder, J.-H., ‘Resolution Planning and Structural Bank Reform within the Banking Union’ in J. E. Castañeda, D. G. Mayes and G. E. Wood (eds), European Banking Union: Prospects and challenges (Routledge, 2016), pp. 129–56. Open Google Scholar
  44. Binder, J.-H., ‘Resolution: Concepts, Requirements, and Tools’ in J.-H. Binder and D. Singh (eds), Bank Resolution: The European Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 25–59. Open Google Scholar
  45. Binder, J.-H., ‘Proportionality at the Resolution Stage: Calibration of Resolution Measures and the Public Interest Test: he Principle of Proportionality and Its Applicability in EU Banking Regulation’, SSRN Electronic Journal (2017). Open Google Scholar
  46. Binder, J.-H., ‘Systemkrisenbewältigung durch Bankenabwicklung? Aktuelle Bemerkungen zu unrealistischen Erwartungen’, Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft 29 (2017), 57–71. Open Google Scholar
  47. Binder J.-H., Wunderkind is Walking? The Resolution of Banco Popular as a First Test for the Single Resolution Mechanism. https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/06/wunderkind-walking-resolution-banco-popular-first-test-single. Open Google Scholar
  48. Binder, J.-H., ‘The Relevance of the Resolution Tools Within the SRM’, European Banking Institute Working Paper Series (2018). Open Google Scholar
  49. Binder, J.-H. and Gortsos, C. V. (eds), The European Banking Union: A compendium (München, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck; Hart; Nomos, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  50. Binder, J.-H., Krimminger, M., Nieto, M. J. and Singh, D., ‘The Choice between Judicial and Administrative Sanctioned Procedures to Manage Liquidation of Banks: A Transatlantic Perspective’, SSRN Electronic Journal (2018). Open Google Scholar
  51. Binder, J.-H. and Singh, D. (eds), Bank Resolution: The European Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  52. Black, L., Correa, R., Huang, X. and Zhou, H., ‘The systemic risk of European banks during the financial and sovereign debt crises’, Journal of Banking & Finance 63 (2016), 107–25. Open Google Scholar
  53. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Agencies provide feedback on second round resolution plans of "First-Wave" filers (2014). Open Google Scholar
  54. Bolton, P. and Oehmke, M., ‘Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks’, Columbia Business School Research Paper (2018). Open Google Scholar
  55. Bonfatti, S., ‘Crisi bancarie in Italia 2015–2017’, Rivista di Diritto Bancario (2018). Open Google Scholar
  56. Bookstaber, R., A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2007). Open Google Scholar
  57. Brown, C. and Dinc, S., ‘Too Many to Fail? Evidence of Regulatory Forebearance when the Banking Sector is Weak’, Review of Financial Studies 24 (2011), 1378–405. Open Google Scholar
  58. Brunnermeier, M. K., ‘Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007 – 2008’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives: a Journal of the American Economic Association 23 (2009), 77–100. Open Google Scholar
  59. Bruyckere, V. de, Gerhardt, M., Schepens, G. and Vander Vennet, R., ‘Bank/sovereign risk spillovers in the European debt crisis’, Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013), 4793–809. Open Google Scholar
  60. Buckley, R. P., Avgouleas, E. and Arner, D. W., ‘Three Major Financial Crises: What Have We Learned’ in D. Arner, D. Busch, E. Avgouleas and S. Schwarcz (eds), Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: Ten Years After the Great Crash (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019). Open Google Scholar
  61. Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. and Die Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft, Stellungnahme zum Vorschlag der Kommission für Änderungen der BRRD/CRR im Zusammenhang mit MREL/TLAC Vorgaben (2017). Open Google Scholar
  62. Bundesverband Öffentlicher Banken Deutschlands, VÖB, e.V., Aktuelle Positionen zur Banken- und Finanzmarktregulierung, 2. Quartal 2018. Open Google Scholar
  63. Busch, D., ‘Governance of the Single Resolution Mechanism’ in D. Busch and G. Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2015), part III, ch. 9. Open Google Scholar
  64. Busch, D., van Rijn, M. and Louisse, M., ‘How Single is the Single Resolution Mechanism?’, European Business Law Review (2019). Open Google Scholar
  65. Cai, J., Eidam, F., Saunders, A. and Steffen, S., ‘Syndication, interconnectedness, and systemic risk’, Journal of Financial Stability 34 (2018), 105–20. Open Google Scholar
  66. Camera dei deputati ed il Senato della Repubblica, Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 25 giugno 2017, n. 99, recante disposizioni urgenti per la liquidazione coatta amministrativa di Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. e di Veneto Banca S.p.A. (17G00133) (GU Serie Generale n.184 del 08–08–2017). Open Google Scholar
  67. Carlson, M. A. and Rose, J. D., ‘Can a Bank Run Be Stopped? Government Guarantees and the Run on Continental Illinois’, Finance and Economics Discussion Series (2016), 1–44. Open Google Scholar
  68. Carmassi, J., Gros, D. and Micossi, S., ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Cures’, Journal of Common Market Studies 47 (2009), 977–96. Open Google Scholar
  69. Carmassi, J. and Herring, R., ‘Corporate Structures, Transparency and Resolvability of Global Systemically Important Banks’, Wharton School Working Papers (2014). Open Google Scholar
  70. Carmassi, J. and Herring, R., ‘The Cross-Border Challenge in Resolving Global Systemically Important Banks’ in K. E. Scott, T. H. Jackson and J. B. Taylor (eds), Making failure feasible: How bankruptcy reform can end "too big to fail", Hoover Institution Press publication (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2015), pp. 249–75. Open Google Scholar
  71. Carmassi, J. and Herring, R., ‘The Corporate Complexity of Global Systemically Important Banks’, Journal of Financial Services Research 49 (2016), 175–201. Open Google Scholar
  72. Carstens, A., Post-crisis bank resolution: what are the main challenges now?: Concluding remarks by Mr Agustín Carstens, General Manager of the BIS, at the 8th FSI-IADI conference on "Bank resolution, crisis management and deposit insurance", Basel, 2 February 2018, FSI-IADI conference on "Bank resolution, crisis management and deposit insurance" (2018). Open Google Scholar
  73. Cavelaars, P., Haan, J. de, Hilbers, P. and Stellinga, B., Key Challenges for Financial Supervision after the Crisis (2013). Open Google Scholar
  74. Cetorelli, N. and Goldberg, L., ‘Measures of Global Bank Complexity’, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (2014), 107–26. Open Google Scholar
  75. Champsaur, A., ‘Stressed tests’, International Financial Law Review 35 (2016), 43–4. Open Google Scholar
  76. Chen Chen, H., ‘The Recovery Framework in the BRRD and its Effectiveness’, International Company and Commercial Law Review 10 (2015), 26. Open Google Scholar
  77. Cichy, P., Buchmüller and Igl, ‘§ 15 Sanierungs- und Abwicklungsplanung’ in J.-H. Binder, A. Glos and J. Riepe (eds), Handbuch Bankenaufsicht (Köln: RWS, 2017). Open Google Scholar
  78. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1075 of 23 March 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the content of recovery plans, resolution plans and group resolution plans, the minimum criteria that the competent authority is to assess as regards recovery plans and group recovery plans, the conditions for group financial support, the requirements for independent valuers, the contractual recognition of write-down and conversion powers, the procedures and contents of notification requirements and of notice of suspension and the operational functioning of the resolution colleges OJ L 184, 8.7.2016, p. 1–71 (2016). Open Google Scholar
  79. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1450 of 23.05.2016 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the criteria relating to the methodology for setting the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities OJ L 237, 3.9.2016, p. 1–9. Open Google Scholar
  80. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/860 of 4 February 2016 specifying further the circumstances where exclusion from the application of write-down or conversion powers is necessary under Article 44(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ L 144, 1.6.2016, p. 11–20. Open Google Scholar
  81. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1066 of 17 June 2016 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to procedures, standard forms and templates for the provision of information for the purpose of resolution plans for credit institutions and investment firms pursuant to Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ L 181, 6.7.2016, p. 1–38. Open Google Scholar
  82. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/962 of 16 June 2016 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to the uniform formats, templates and definitions for the identification and transmission of information by competent authorities and resolution authorities to the European Banking Authority according to Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ L 160, 17.6.2016, p. 35–49. Open Google Scholar
  83. Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis ('Banking Communication'), 2013/C 216/01 (2013). Open Google Scholar
  84. Conac, P.-H., Subordinated debt and self-placement: Mis-selling of financial products, Study requested by the ECON Committee (Brussels: European Parliament). Open Google Scholar
  85. Coppola, F., ‘Italy's Latest Bank Bailout Has Created A Two-Speed Eurozone’, Forbes, 26 June 2017. Open Google Scholar
  86. Coppola, F., ‘Why The U.S. Treasury Killed A Latvian Bank’, Forbes, 28 February 2018. Open Google Scholar
  87. Council of the EU, Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Finland. Open Google Scholar
  88. Council of the EU, ESM Direct Bank Recapitalisation Instrument – Main Features of the Operational Framework and Way Forward (2013). Open Google Scholar
  89. Council of the European Union, Presidency Progress Report on Work in the AHWP on strengthening the Banking Union 9819/1/18 REV 1 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  90. Court, J., Parent, A. and Portilla, A., Letter to the FSB regarding call for public feedback on Monitoring the Technical Implementation of the FSB Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Standard (2018). Open Google Scholar
  91. Credit Suisse AG, Monitoring the Technical Implementation of the FSB Total Loss-absorbing Capacity Standard Call for public feedback dated June 6, 2018 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  92. Crotty, J., ‘Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment of the 'new financial architecture'’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (2009), 563–80. Open Google Scholar
  93. Cunliffe, J., ‘Ending Too-Big-to-Fail: How Best to Deal with Failed Large Banks’ in G. B. Navetti, G. Calzolari and A. F. Pozzolo (eds), European Economy: Banks, Regulation, and the Real Sector (Rome: Europeye, 2016), pp. 59–74. Open Google Scholar
  94. Dam, L. and Koetter, M., ‘Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany’, Review of Financial Studies 25 (2012), 2343–80. Open Google Scholar
  95. Deslandes, J. and Magnus, M., Banking Union: Towards new arrangements to finance banks under resolution?, Briefing of the European Parliament (2018). Open Google Scholar
  96. Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bank response to the European Banking Authority's consultation paper of the Draft ITS on the provision of information for the purpose of resolution plans under Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU (2017). Open Google Scholar
  97. Deutsche Bundesbank, Richtlinien zur Kreditdatenstatistik (AnaCredit), 3rd edn. (2018). Open Google Scholar
  98. Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag zu dem Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Änderung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 806/2014 im Hinblick auf die Schaffung eines europäischen Einlagenversicherungssystems KOM(2015) 586 endg; Ratsdok. 14649/15 – Drucksache 19/2525 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  99. Dewatripont, M., ‘European banking: Bailout, bail-in and state aid control’, International Journal of Industrial Organization 34 (2014), 37–43. Open Google Scholar
  100. Dimova, S., Resolution Planning: Too Complex to Work or Cornerstone of a Stable Financial Architecture?: The Perspective of Regulators, SAFE/BaFin Conference (House of Finance, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  101. Directive (EU) 2017/2399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy, OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, p. 96–101: Insolvency Hierarchy Directive (2017). Open Google Scholar
  102. Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149–178. Open Google Scholar
  103. Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directive 2011/24/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190–348. Open Google Scholar
  104. Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU Text with EEA relevance OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349–496. Open Google Scholar
  105. Dohmen, C., Finanzwirtschaft: Wie alles zusammenhängt, Zeitbilder, 1. Aufl. (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2014). Open Google Scholar
  106. Dombret, A., Auf dem Weg zu mehr Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Regulierung? Vorschlag für eine Small Banking Box, Vortrag bei der Strategietagung des Rheinischen Sparkassen- und Giroverbands (RSGV) (Bonn, 2017). Open Google Scholar
  107. Donato, L., Rotondi, Z. and Scognamiglio, A., ‘From the Rescue of Banks to the Single Resolution Mechanism: Institutional and Empirical Analysis’, SSRN Electronic Journal (2017). Open Google Scholar
  108. Draghi, M. to J. Almunia, 30 July 2013, ‘Banking Communication – treatment of subordinated debt in precautionary recapitalisation’, Letter. Open Google Scholar
  109. Dübel, H.-J., The capital structure of banks and practice of bank restructuring: Eight case studies on current bank restructurings in Europe; final report, CFS working paper series (2013), No. 2013,04. Open Google Scholar
  110. Dübel, H.-J., Creditor Participation in Banking Crisis in the Eurozone – A Corner Turned?: Empirical analysis of current bank liability management and restructuring policies with conclusions for the European bank restructuring and resolution framework, Study commissioned by Bundestagsfranktion Bündnis90/ Die Grünen (Berlin, 2013). Open Google Scholar
  111. EBA, Consultation Paper for Draft Implementing Standards on the provision of information for the purpose of resolution plans under Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU EBA/CP/2017/15. Open Google Scholar
  112. EBA, Guidelines on the range of scenarios to be used in recovery plans EBA/GL/2014/06 (2014). Open Google Scholar
  113. EBA, Guidelines on the types of tests, review or exercises that may lead to support measures under Article 32(d)(iii) of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: EBA/GL/2014/09 (2014). Open Google Scholar
  114. EBA, EBA Final Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the content of resolution plans and the assessment of resolvability EBA/RTS/2014/15 (2014). Open Google Scholar
  115. EBA, Guidelines on the specification of measures to reduce or remove impediments to resolvability and the circumstances in which each measure may be applied under Directive 2014/59/EU (2014). Open Google Scholar
  116. EBA, Final Report – Draft implementing technical standards on procedures, forms and templates for the provision of information for resolution plans under Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council EBA/ITS/2015/06 (2015). Open Google Scholar
  117. EBA, Guidelines specifying the conditions for group financial support under Article 23 of Directive 2014/59/EU (2015). Open Google Scholar
  118. EBA, 2016 EU-Wide Stress Test Results (2016). Open Google Scholar
  119. EBA, List of OSIIs notified to the EBA (2017). Open Google Scholar
  120. EBA, Quantitative Update of the EBA MREL Report: December 2016 Data (2017). Open Google Scholar
  121. EBA, Draft final report – Draft Implementing Standards on the provision of information for the purpose of resolution plans under Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU EBA/ITS/2018/02 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  122. EBA, EBA Report on the Functioning of Resolution Colleges in 2017, Resolution Colleges Annual Report (2018). Open Google Scholar
  123. EBA and ESMA, Statement of the EBA and ESMA on the treatment of retail holdings of debt financial instruments subject to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (2018). Open Google Scholar
  124. EBA final draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the content of recovery plans under Article 5(10) of Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms: EBA/RTS/2014/11 (2014). Open Google Scholar
  125. Ebner, A., ‘The Financial Stability Aspects of the EU-wide Stress Test’, Journal of Financial Regulation 4 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  126. Engelbach, S. and Friedrich, T., ‘Die Umsetzung der BRRD in Deutschland: WM 2015 Heft 14, 662’, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (2015), 662–71. Open Google Scholar
  127. Enria, A., SRB Conference 2018 – 10 years after the crisis: are banks now resolvable?, SRB Annual Conference (Brussels, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  128. Ervin, W., SRB Conference 2018 – 10 years after the crisis: are banks now resolvable?, SRB Annual Conference (Brussels, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  129. ESM Board of Governors, Resolution of the Meeting of 8 December 2014: Establishment of the instrument for the direct recapitalisation of institutions (2014). Open Google Scholar
  130. European, Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338–436. Open Google Scholar
  131. European Banking Federation, EBF response to EBA Consultation on Draft ITS on the provision of information for the purpose of resolution plans under Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU (2017). Open Google Scholar
  132. European Banking Federation, Facts and Figures – Banking in Europe 2018 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  133. European Central Bank, ECB determined ABLV Bank was failing or likely to fail, Press Release. Open Google Scholar
  134. European Central Bank, Economic Bulletin Issue 6/2015. Open Google Scholar
  135. European Central Bank, 'Failing or Likely to Fail' Assessment of Banco Popular Espanol. Open Google Scholar
  136. European Central Bank, Consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem as at 20 April 2012 (2012). Open Google Scholar
  137. European Central Bank, Annual Report 2012 (2013). Open Google Scholar
  138. European Central Bank, Communication on Emergency Liquidity Assistance, Press Release (2015). Open Google Scholar
  139. European Central Bank, List of supervised entities – cut-off date for significance decisions: 1 April 2017 (2017). Open Google Scholar
  140. European Central Bank, Agreement on emergency liquidity assistance (2017). Open Google Scholar
  141. European Central Bank, Report on financial structures (2017). Open Google Scholar
  142. European Central Bank, List of supervised entities – cut-off date for significance decisions: 1 July 2018 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  143. European Commission, Annex IV to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Commission Work Programm 2018 – An agenda for a more united, stronger and more democratic Europe, COM(2017) 650 final. Open Google Scholar
  144. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – A Roadmap towards a Banking Union COM(2012) 510 final. Open Google Scholar
  145. European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the committee of the Regions on completing the Banking Union COM(2017) 592 final. Open Google Scholar
  146. European Commission, Completing the Banking Union by 2018, Fact Sheet. Open Google Scholar
  147. European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms; – Directive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms; – Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms; – Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund SWD(2016) 377 final, Commission Staff Working Document. Open Google Scholar
  148. European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard 2017: Aid in the context of the financial and economic crisis. Open Google Scholar
  149. European Commission, The effects of temporary State aid rules adopted in the context of the financial and economic crisis, SEC(2011) 1126 final, Commission Staff Working Paper (2011). Open Google Scholar
  150. European Commission, Banking Union – restoring financial stability in the Eurozone, Press Release/Memo (2014). Open Google Scholar
  151. European Commission, State Aid SA.43364 (2015/N) – Greece – Amendment of the restructuring plan approved in 2014 and granting of new aid to Piraeus Bank (2015). Open Google Scholar
  152. European Commission, State Aid SA.43365 (2015/N) – Greece – Amendment of the restructuring plan approved in 2014 and granting of new aid to National Bank of Greece C(2015) 8930 final (2015). Open Google Scholar
  153. European Commission, Capital requirements (CRR/CRD IV) and resolution framework (BRRD/SRM) amendments, Fact Sheet – Frequently Asked Questions (2016). Open Google Scholar
  154. European Commission, EU Banking Reform: Strong banks to support growth and restore confidence, Press Release (2016). Open Google Scholar
  155. European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union COM(2017) 291 of 31 May 2017 (2017). Open Google Scholar
  156. European Commission, State aid: How the EU rules apply to banks with a capital shortfall – Factsheet (2017). Open Google Scholar
  157. European Commission, Commission sets out Roadmap for deepening Europe's Economic and Monetary Union, Press Release (2017). Open Google Scholar
  158. European Parliament, Emergency Liquidity Assistance – moving away from "constructive ambiguity"?, Briefing of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  159. European Parliament, Ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy, Briefing of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  160. European Parliament, Global Systemically Important Banks in Europe, Briefing of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  161. European Parliament, Amending the bank resolution framework – BRRD and SRMR, Briefing of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  162. European Parliament, Banking Reform Package – Impact Assessment (SWD(2016)377) of five European Commission proposals amending EU banking legislation, Briefing of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  163. European Stability Mechanism, Guideline on Financial Assistance for the Direct Recapitalisation of Institutions (2014). Open Google Scholar
  164. Faia, E., Hackethal, A., Haliassos, M. and Langenbucher, K. (eds), Financial Regulation: A Transatlantic Perspective (Cambridge, United Kingdom, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Open Google Scholar
  165. Farhi, E. and Tirole, J., ‘Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops’, The Review of Economic Studies 85 (2018), 1781–823. Open Google Scholar
  166. Farnè, M. and Vouldis, A., Business models of the banks in the euro area, ECB Working Paper (2017). Open Google Scholar
  167. Federico, G., ‘Crisi delle banche venete ad "aiuti di Stato"’, Questione Giustizia (2017), 212–20. Open Google Scholar
  168. Financial Stability Board, Structural Banking Reforms: Cross-border consistencies and global financial stability implications: Report to G20 Leaders for the November 2014 Summit (2014). Open Google Scholar
  169. Financial Stability Board, Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution: Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet (2015). Open Google Scholar
  170. Financial Stability Board, Guiding Principles on the Internal Total Loss-absorbing Capacity of G-SIBs ('Internal TLAC') (2017). Open Google Scholar
  171. Financial Stability Board, Thematic peer review on bank resolution planning (2018). Open Google Scholar
  172. Financial Stability Board, Monitoring the Technical Implementation of the FSB Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Standard – Call for public feedback (2018). Open Google Scholar
  173. Fisher, P., ‘Practical issues for the lender of last resort’ in European Central Bank (ed), ECB Legal Conference 2015: From monetary union to banking union, on the way to capital markets union: new opportunities for European integration, 1–2 September 2015 (Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank, 2015), pp. 86–9. Open Google Scholar
  174. Flinders, K., ‘Big banks' legacy IT systems could kill them’, computerweekly.com. Open Google Scholar
  175. Franke, G., Krahnen, J. P. and Lüpke, T. von, Effective Resolution of Banks: Problems and Solutions, White Paper Series (2014). Open Google Scholar
  176. Frignani, R., ‘Choc a Civitavecchia – Salvabanche, il pensionato morto’, Corriere Della Sera, 10 December 2015. Open Google Scholar
  177. Gandrud, C. and Hallerberg, M., How not to create zombie banks: lessons for Italy from Japan, Bruegel Policy Contributions. Open Google Scholar
  178. García, J. and Rocamora, M., How prepared are European banks to comply with MREL?: The importance of the subordination requirement, BBVA Research. Open Google Scholar
  179. Gardella, A., ‘Bail-in and the Financing of the SRM’ in D. Busch and G. Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2015), part III, ch. 11. Open Google Scholar
  180. Geithner, T., Stress test: Reflections on financial crises, First paperback edition (New York: Broadway Books, 2014). Open Google Scholar
  181. Geithner, T., Are We Safer? The Case for Strengthening the Bagehot Arsenal, Per Jacobsson Lectures (2016). Open Google Scholar
  182. German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Economic Report 2014/2015: The Long Road to More Financial Stability in Germany and Europa (2015). Open Google Scholar
  183. Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung – Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Abschirmung von Risiken und zur Planung der Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten und Finanzgruppen, Drucksache 17/12601 vom 04. 03. 2013. Open Google Scholar
  184. Gleeson, S. and Guynn, R., Bank Resolution and Crisis Management: Law and Practice, First edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  185. Göhner, M. M., Bail-in oder Bail-out?: Bankeninsolvenzen aus wirtschaftspolitischer Perspektive, Wirtschaftspolitische Forschungsarbeiten der Universität zu Köln (Baden-Baden: Tectum Verlag, 2018), Band 63. Open Google Scholar
  186. Gordon, J. N. and Ringe, W.-G., Bank Resolution in Europe: the Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform, ECGI Law Working Paper (2015). Open Google Scholar
  187. Gortsos, C. V., The Impact of the Current Fiscal Crisis in the Euro Area on the Greek Banking System and the Measures Adopted to Safeguard its Stability: An Institutional, Supervisory and Regulatory Perspective (2016). Open Google Scholar
  188. Gortsos, C. V., A Poisonous (?) Mix: Bail-Out of Credit Institutions Combined with Bail-In of Their Liabilities Under the BRRD – The Use of 'Government Financial Stabilisation Tools' (2016). Open Google Scholar
  189. Götz, M. G., Krahnen, J. P. and Tröger, T. H., ‘Taking Bail-in Seriously – The Looming Risks for Banking Policy in the Rescue of Monte Paschi di Siena’, SAFE Policy Letter No. 54 (2017). Open Google Scholar
  190. Götz, M. R., Haselmann, R., Krahnen, J. P. and Steffen, S., Did emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of the ECB delay the bankruptcy of Greek banks?, SAFE Policy Letter (2015). Open Google Scholar
  191. Götz, M. R., Krahnen, J. P. and Tröger, T. H., ‘Testfall Monte dei Paschi, Frankfurter Allgemeine v. 3.2.2017’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2017), 19. Open Google Scholar
  192. Götz, M. R. and Tröger, T. H., Should the marketing of subordinated debt be restricted/different in one way or the other?: What to do in the case of mis-selling?, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  193. Groen, W. P. de, "Total Assets" versus "Risk Weighted Assets": does it matter for MREL requirements?, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  194. Groen, W. P. de, The different legal and operational structures of banking groups in the euro area, and their impact on banks' resolvability, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  195. Groen, W. P. de, Cash outflows in crisis scenarios: Do liquidity requirements and reporting obligations give the Single Resolution Fund sufficient time to react?, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2018). Open Google Scholar
  196. Groen, W. P. de and Gros, D., Estimating the bridge financing needs of the Single Resolution Fund: How expensive is it to resolve a bank?, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (Brussels, 2015). Open Google Scholar
  197. Grünewald, S., ‘Legal challenges of bail-in’ in European Central Bank (ed), ECB Legal Conference 2017: shaping a new legal order for Europe: A tale of crises and opportunities: 4–5 September 2017 (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Zentralbank, 2017), pp. 287–310. Open Google Scholar
  198. Haas, R., ‘Recent Trends in Cross-Border Banking’ in T. Beck and B. Casu (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), pp. 475–97. Open Google Scholar
  199. Hadjiemmanuil, C., ‘Bank stakeholders' mandatory contribution to resolution financing: principles and ambiguities of bail-in’ in European Central Bank (ed), ECB Legal Conference 2015: From monetary union to banking union, on the way to capital markets union: new opportunities for European integration, 1–2 September 2015 (Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank, 2015), pp. 225–49. Open Google Scholar
  200. Hadjiemmanuil, C., ‘Bank Resolution Financing in the Banking Union’ in J.-H. Binder and D. Singh (eds), Bank Resolution: The European Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 177–210. Open Google Scholar
  201. Hadjiemmanuil, C., ‘Limits on State-Funded Bailouts in the EU Bank Resolution Regime’ in G. B. Navetti, G. Calzolari and A. F. Pozzolo (eds), European Economy: Banks, Regulation, and the Real Sector (Rome: Europeye, 2016), pp. 91–117. Open Google Scholar
  202. Hadjiemmanuil, C., Reflections on the Concept of Proportionality & Its Implications for Banking Regulation, Conference on ‘Fostering a Diversified Banking Market through Proportionality: An Academic Review' (Brussels, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  203. Haldane, A. G., Rethinking the Financial Network (Financial Student Association, Amsterdam, 2009). Open Google Scholar
  204. Handelsblatt, ‘Bankenrettung kostet Steuerzahler bis zu 17 Milliarden Euro’, Handelsblatt, 25 June 2017. Open Google Scholar
  205. Helleiner, E., ‘Understanding the 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International Political Economy’, Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2011), 67–87. Open Google Scholar
  206. Hellwig, M., Yes Virginia, There is a European Banking Union! But It May Not Make Your Wishes Come True (2014). Open Google Scholar
  207. Hellwig, M., "Total Assets" versus "Risk Weighted Assets": does it matter for MREL requirements?, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  208. Herring, R. and Carmassi, J., ‘Complexity and Systemic Risk: What's Changed Since the Crisis?’ in A. N. Berger (ed), The Oxford handbook of banking, 2. ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015). Open Google Scholar
  209. Herring, R. and Carmassi, J., ‘The Corporate Structure of International Financial Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Safety and Soundness’ in A. N. Berger (ed), The Oxford handbook of banking, 2. ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015), p. 195. Open Google Scholar
  210. Herring, R. and Santomero, A., ‘The Corporate Structure of Financial Conglomerates’ in M. H. Kosters and A. H. Meltzer (eds), International Competitiveness in Financial Services: A Special Issue of the Journal of Financial Services Research (Dordrecht, s.l.: Springer Netherlands, 1991). Open Google Scholar
  211. Herrmann, S. and Heinke, U., ‘Kernbanksysteme müssen moderner werden’, SpringerProfessional, 05 April 2017. Open Google Scholar
  212. Hett, F. and Schmidt, A., Bank Rescues and Bailout Expectations: The Erosion of Market Discipline During the Financial Crisis, Safe Working Paper Series (2016). Open Google Scholar
  213. Hoenig, T. M., Credibility of the 2013 Living Wills Submitted by First Wave Filers (2014). Open Google Scholar
  214. Honohan, P., Management and Resolution of Banking Crises: Lessons from Recent European Experience, Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief (2017). Open Google Scholar
  215. Huertas, T. F., ‘A Resolvable Bank’ in K. E. Scott, T. H. Jackson and J. B. Taylor (eds), Making failure feasible: How bankruptcy reform can end "too big to fail", Hoover Institution Press publication (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2015), pp. 129–74. Open Google Scholar
  216. Hüpkes, E., ‘Lines of defense against systemic crises: Resolution.’ in G. Caprio and P. Bacchetta (eds), Handbook of safeguarding global financial stability: Political, social, cultural, and economic theories and models (London, Waltham, MA: Academic Press, 2013). Open Google Scholar
  217. Hüpkes, E., Resolution: overcoming credibility gaps, EFDI International Conference 2016 (Vilnius, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  218. Hüser, A.-C., Hałaj, G., Kok, C., Perales, C. and van der Kraaij, A., ‘The systemic implications of bail-in: A multi-layered network approach’, Journal of Financial Stability 38 (2018), 81–97. Open Google Scholar
  219. Institute of International Finance, RegTech in Financial Services: Technology Solutions for Compliance and Reporting (2016). Open Google Scholar
  220. International Monetary Fund, 2014 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report; Press Release; and Statement by the Executive Director, IMF Country Report No. 14/198 (2014). Open Google Scholar
  221. International Monetary Fund, 2016 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Euro Area, IMF Country Report No. 16/219 (2016). Open Google Scholar
  222. Irrera, A., ‘Banks scramble to fix old systems as IT 'cowboys' ride into sunset’, Reuters, 10 April 2017. Open Google Scholar
  223. Jahn, U., Schmitt, C. and Geier, B. M. (eds), Bankensanierung und -abwicklung: Handbuch, 1. Auflage (München: C.H. Beck, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  224. James, H., Keynote speech – Lehman in a Broader Perspective, Lehman – 10 Years After (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  225. Japanese Bankers Association, Comments on the document: Monitoring the Technical Implementation of the FSB Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Standard – Call for public feedback, issued by the Financial Stability Board (2018). Open Google Scholar
  226. Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H., ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), 305–60. Open Google Scholar
  227. Kapur, E., ‘The Next Lehman Bankruptcy’ in K. E. Scott, T. H. Jackson and J. B. Taylor (eds), Making failure feasible: How bankruptcy reform can end "too big to fail", Hoover Institution Press publication (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2015), pp. 175–241. Open Google Scholar
  228. Karamichailidou, G. and Mayes, D. G., ‘Plausible recovery and resolution plans for cross-border financial institutions’ in J. E. Castañeda, D. G. Mayes and G. E. Wood (eds), European Banking Union: Prospects and challenges (Routledge, 2016), pp. 38–66. Open Google Scholar
  229. Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2014). Open Google Scholar
  230. King, M. A., The And of Alchemy: Money, banking and the future of the global economy, First edition (London: Little Brown, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  231. Kleftouri, N., ‘European Union Bank Resolution Framework: can the objective of financial stability ensure consistency in resolution authorities’ decisions?’, Journal of the Academy of European Law – ERA Forum 18 (2017), 263–79. Open Google Scholar
  232. Knips, S. E., Bankenanleihen in Deutschland: Neue Preferred Senior Anleihen vor dem Start, Helaba Volkswirtschaft/Research Credit Special (2018). Open Google Scholar
  233. König, E., SRB Conference 2018 – 10 years after the crisis: are banks now resolvable?, SRB Annual Conference (Brussels, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  234. Krahnen, J. P., Banking Failures: Consolidation is Better than Rescue: Bailing out ailing banks distorts competition, SAFE Policy Blog (2017). Open Google Scholar
  235. Krahnen, J. P. and Moretti, L., ‘Bail-In Clauses’ in E. Faia, A. Hackethal, M. Haliassos and K. Langenbucher (eds), Financial Regulation: A Transatlantic Perspective (Cambridge, United Kingdom, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Open Google Scholar
  236. Laboureix, D., SRB MREL Policy, SRM-EBF Boardroom Dialogue (Brussels, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  237. Laboureix, D., SRB Conference 2018 – 10 years after the crisis: are banks now resolvable?, SRB Annual Conference (Brussels, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  238. Laboureix, D. and Decroocq, V., ‘Enhancing the Capacity to Apply a Bail-in Through the MREL Setting’ in G. B. Navetti, G. Calzolari and A. F. Pozzolo (eds), European Economy: Banks, Regulation, and the Real Sector (Rome: Europeye, 2016), pp. 117–30. Open Google Scholar
  239. Laeven, L., Ratnovski, L. and Tong, H., Bank Size and Systemic Risk (2014). Open Google Scholar
  240. Laeven, L. and Valencia, F., IMF Working Paper – Systemic Banking Crises Revisited, IMF Working Paper (2018). Open Google Scholar
  241. Langenbucher, K., Tröger, T. H., Milione, L., Roth, A., Kolassa, D., Honnefelder, S., Krischel, A. K., Lemos Peixoto, S. d., Lindemann, C., Maier, R., van Es, I. and Silvestri, R., EU Mapping 2017: systematic overview on economic and financial legislation: Study for the ECON Committee (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017). Open Google Scholar
  242. Lannoo, K., Pursuing Multiple Objectives with the Banking Reform Package: Who can still follow?, CEPS Commentary (Brussels, 2017). Open Google Scholar
  243. Lannoo, K., Uneven progress in implementing cross-border bank resolution in the EU (2017). Open Google Scholar
  244. Lastra, R., Ayadi, R., Olivares-Caminal, R. and Russo, C., The different legal and operational structures of banking groups in the euro area, and their impact on banks' resolvability, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  245. Lehmann, M., ‘Bail-in and Private International Law: How to Make Bank Resolution Measures Effective Across Borders’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 66 (2017), 107–42. Open Google Scholar
  246. Levitin, A. J., ‘In Defense of Bailouts’, Georgetown Law Journal 99 (2011), 435–514. Open Google Scholar
  247. Liikanen, E., High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector – Final Report (2012). Open Google Scholar
  248. Lippe, P., Putnis, J., Katz, D. M. and Hurst, I., How smart resolution planning can help banks improve transparency, increase profitability and reduce risk (2015). Open Google Scholar
  249. Littmann, S., Welp, A. and Welp, C., ‘Computersysteme der Banken veraltet – Opa sitzt im Serverraum’, Wirtschaftswoche, 19 April 2017. Open Google Scholar
  250. Liu, X., ‘Some Comments on Central Banks' Lender of Last Resort Function in the Post-Crisis World’ in European Central Bank (ed), ECB Legal Conference 2015: From monetary union to banking union, on the way to capital markets union: new opportunities for European integration, 1–2 September 2015 (Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank, 2015), pp. 90–7. Open Google Scholar
  251. Manns, J., ‘Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach’, Florida Law Review 63 (2013), 1350–405. Open Google Scholar
  252. Maragopoulos, N. G., Minimum Requirements for own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL): A Comprehensive Analysis of the New Prudential Requirement for Credit Institutions, ECEFIL Working Paper Series (2016). Open Google Scholar
  253. Mayes, D. G., ‘Top-down restructuring of markets and institutions: The Nordic banking crises’, Journal of Banking Regulation 18 (2017), 213–32. Open Google Scholar
  254. Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Financial Supervisory Authorities, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union on Cross-Border Financial Stability. Open Google Scholar
  255. Mendicino, C., Nikolov, K. and Suarez, J., Equity Versus Bail-In Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective, CEPR Discussion Paper (2017). Open Google Scholar
  256. Merler, S., Comfortably numb: ESM direct recapitalization, bruegel Blog Post (2014). Open Google Scholar
  257. Merler, S., ‘Bank liquidation in the European Union: clarification needed’, Bruegel Policy Contributions Issue no. 1 (2017). Open Google Scholar
  258. Merler, S., Critical functions and public interest in banking services: Need for clarification?, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  259. Merrouche, O. and Nier, E., What Caused the Global Financial Crisis? – Evidence on the Drivers of Financial Imbalances 1999–2007, IMF Working Paper (2010). Open Google Scholar
  260. Mersch, Y., The limits of central bank financing in resolution, IMFS Distinguished Lecture Series (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  261. Mesnard, B., Loss absorbing capacity in the Banking Union: TLAC implementation and MREL review, Briefing of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  262. Mesnard, B., "Bail-ins" in recent banking resolution and State aid cases, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  263. Mesnard, B. and Katopodi, C., Hearing with Mrs Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board, Briefing of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  264. Mesnard, B., Magnus, M. and Margerit, A., The precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Briefing of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  265. Mesnard, B., Margerit, A. and Magnus, M., Precautionary recapitalisations under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: conditionality and case practice, Briefing of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  266. Mesnard, B., Margerit, A. and Magnus, M., The orderly liquidation of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, Briefing of the European Parliament (2017). Open Google Scholar
  267. Micossi, S., Bruzzone, G. and Cassella, M., ‘Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to promote a stronger EU financial system’, CEPS Special Report No. 136 (2016). Open Google Scholar
  268. Munoz, D. R., ‘Bank resolution and insolvency ranking and priorities’ in European Central Bank (ed), ECB Legal Conference 2017: shaping a new legal order for Europe: A tale of crises and opportunities: 4–5 September 2017 (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Zentralbank, 2017), pp. 256–86. Open Google Scholar
  269. Navetti, G. B., Calzolari, G. and Pozzolo, A. F., ‘Bail-in, up to a point’ in G. B. Navetti, G. Calzolari and A. F. Pozzolo (eds), European Economy: Banks, Regulation, and the Real Sector (Rome: Europeye, 2016), pp. 9–33. Open Google Scholar
  270. Niskanen, W. A., Bureaucracy and representative government (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971). Open Google Scholar
  271. Oldfather J., Gissler S. and Ruffino D., Bank Complexity: Is Size Everything? https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2016/bank-complexity-is-size-everything-20160715.html. Open Google Scholar
  272. Onaran, Y., ‘Zombie Banks’, Bloomberg, 11 July 2017. Open Google Scholar
  273. Pagano, M., ‘Lessons from the European financial crisis’ in E. Faia, A. Hackethal, M. Haliassos and K. Langenbucher (eds), Financial Regulation: A Transatlantic Perspective (Cambridge, United Kingdom, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 23–48. Open Google Scholar
  274. Papanikolaou, N. I., ‘To be bailed out or to be left to fail? A dynamic competing risks hazard analysis’, Journal of Financial Stability 34 (2018), 61–85. Open Google Scholar
  275. Perrow, C., The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). Open Google Scholar
  276. Petrella, G., ‘The Interplay Between Banks and Markets: Supervisory Stress Test Results and Investor Reactions’ in T. Beck and B. Casu (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), pp. 409–47. Open Google Scholar
  277. Philipp, W., ‘Systemänderung: Amputiertes Aktienrecht für Banken – Das Sanierungs- und Abwicklungsgesetz (SAG)’, Die Aktiengesellschaft (2015), 77–82. Open Google Scholar
  278. Philippon, T. and Salord, A., Bail-ins and bank resolution in Europe: A progress report, Geneva reports on the world economy Special report (Geneva, London: ICMB International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies; CEPR, 2017), vol. 4. Open Google Scholar
  279. Plenderleith, I., Review of the Bank of England's Provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance in 2008–09: Presented to the Court of the Bank of England (2012). Open Google Scholar
  280. Posner, E. A. and Casey, A., ‘A Framework for Bailout Regulation’, Notre Dame Law Review 91 (2015), 479–536. Open Google Scholar
  281. Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Note to the Council; Subject: Banking package – General approach (2018). Open Google Scholar
  282. PricewaterhouseCoopers, MREL, TLAC and Banking Resolution. Open Google Scholar
  283. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU on loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 98/26/EC, Directive 2002/47/EC, Directive 2012/30/EU, Directive 2011/35/EU, Directive 2005/56/EC, Directive 2004/25/EC and Directive 2007/36/EC – Presidency compromise (2018). Open Google Scholar
  284. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU on loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 98/26/EC, Directive 2002/47/EC, Directive 2012/30/EU, Directive 2011/35/EU, Directive 2005/56/EC, Directive 2004/25/EC and Directive 2007/36/EC, COM(2016) 852 final (2016). Open Google Scholar
  285. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010: BRRD Proposal (2012). Open Google Scholar
  286. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy, COM(2016) 853 final. Open Google Scholar
  287. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme COM/2015/0586 final – 2015/0270 (COD). Open Google Scholar
  288. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 – Presidency compromise (2018). Open Google Scholar
  289. Rasmussen, R. K. and Skeel, D. A., ‘Governmental Intervention in an Economic Crisis’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 19 (2016), 7–48. Open Google Scholar
  290. Regulation (EU) 2016/867 of the European Central Bank of 18 May 2016 on the collection of granular credit and credit risk data (ECB/2016/13), OJ L 144, 1.6.2016, p. 44–98. Open Google Scholar
  291. Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 5–14 (2013). Open Google Scholar
  292. Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12–47: EBA Regulation (2010). Open Google Scholar
  293. Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1–337. Open Google Scholar
  294. Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1–90. Open Google Scholar
  295. Resti, A., Should the marketing of subordinated debt be restricted in one way or the other? What to do in the case of mis-selling?, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (Brussels, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  296. Restoy, F., Bail-in in the new bank resolution framework: is there an issue with the middle class?, IADI-ERC International Conference: "Resolution and deposit guarantee schemes in Europe: incomplete processes and uncertain outcomes" (Naples, 2018). Open Google Scholar
  297. Richard van Tilborgh, Managing Information and Data Requests for Recovery & Resolution, European Recovery and Resolution Plan Summit (Frankfurt am Main, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  298. Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Für eine zukunftsorientierte Wirtschaftspolitik, Jahresgutachten (Wiesbaden, 2017), 54.2017/18. Open Google Scholar
  299. Schäfer, A., Schnabel, I. and Di Weder Mauro, B., ‘Bail-in expectations for European banks: Actions speak louder than words’, CEPR Discussion Paper DP11061 (2016). Open Google Scholar
  300. Schelo, S., Bank recovery and resolution, International banking and finance law series (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law Internat, 2015), vol. 26. Open Google Scholar
  301. Schelo, S. and Steck, A., ‘Das Trennbankengesetz: Prävention durch Bankentestamente und Risikoabschirmung’, Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft (2013), 227–43. Open Google Scholar
  302. Schiele, C., Ankert, J. and Kleinow, J., Small Banking Box – mehr Proportionalität in der Bankenaufsicht für mittelständische Institute: Aktuelle Diskussion über Erleichterungen in der Regulierung mittelständischer Institute (2017). Open Google Scholar
  303. Schillig, M. A., ‘The (Il-)Legitimacy of the EU Post-Crisis Bailout System’, King's College London Law School Research Paper 2018 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  304. Schoenmaker, D., ‘A fiscal backstop to the banking system’ in M. Haentjens and B. Wessels (eds), Research Handbook on Crisis Management in the Banking Sector (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), pp. 42–54. Open Google Scholar
  305. Schoenmaker, D., ‘The Banking Union: An Overview and Open Issues’ in T. Beck and B. Casu (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), pp. 451–74. Open Google Scholar
  306. Schoenmaker, D., The different legal and operational structures of banking groups in the euro area, and their impact on banks' resolvability, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2016). Open Google Scholar
  307. Schoenmaker, D., Véron, N., Gehrig, T. P., Messori, M., Leite, A. P., Sapir, A., Steffen, S., Tibi, P., Vegara Figueras, D., Vries, C. G. d. and Xafa, M. (eds), European banking supervision: The first eighteen months, Blueprint series (Brussels, Belgium: Bruegel, 2016). Open Google Scholar
  308. Sciorilli Borrelli S., Q and A with Andrea Enria of European Banking Authority. https://www.politico.eu/pro/q-and-a-with-andrea-enria-of-european-banking-authority/. Open Google Scholar
  309. Scott, K. E., Jackson, T. H. and Taylor, J. B. (eds), Making failure feasible: How bankruptcy reform can end "too big to fail", Hoover Institution Press publication (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2015), no. 662. Open Google Scholar
  310. Serière, V. de, ‘Recovery and Resolution Plans of Banks in the Context of the BRRD and the SRM: Some Fundamental Issues’ in D. Busch and G. Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2015), part III, ch. 10. Open Google Scholar
  311. Serière, V. de and Milione, L., ‘De-Politicizing Bail-in’, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 34, Issue 2 (2019), pp. 71 et seq. Open Google Scholar
  312. Singh, D., ‘Recovery and Resolution Planning: Reconfiguring Financial Regulation and Supervision’ in J.-H. Binder and D. Singh (eds), Bank Resolution: The European Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 1–24. Open Google Scholar
  313. Single Resolution Board, Guidance to the Completion of the SRB's Liability Data Template for 2016. Open Google Scholar
  314. Single Resolution Board, Banco Popular Group Resolution Plan (2016). Open Google Scholar
  315. Single Resolution Board, Data collection for resolution planning and the determination of the Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) (2016). Open Google Scholar
  316. Single Resolution Board, The Single Resolution Mechanism – Introduction to Resolution Planning (2016). Open Google Scholar
  317. Single Resolution Board, Decision of the Single Resolution Board concerning the adoption of a resolution scheme in respect of Banco Popular Espanol, S.A.: Executive Session (2017). Open Google Scholar
  318. Single Resolution Board, Decision of the Single Resolution Board concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. (2017). Open Google Scholar
  319. Single Resolution Board, Decision of the Single Resolution Board concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A. (2017). Open Google Scholar
  320. Single Resolution Board, Guidance on the 2018 Liability Data Report (2017). Open Google Scholar
  321. Single Resolution Board, Minimum Requirements for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) – SRB Policy for 2017 and Next Steps (2017). Open Google Scholar
  322. Single Resolution Board, Ex-ante publicity notice – negotiated procurement procedure: Call for Tender for the Provision of Access to Financial Data through a Data Vendor (2018). Open Google Scholar
  323. Single Resolution Board, Guidance on the 2019 Liability Data Report (2018). Open Google Scholar
  324. Single Rulebook Q&A, Question ID: 2015_1779. Open Google Scholar
  325. Single Rulebook Q&A, Question ID: 2016_2951. Open Google Scholar
  326. Sirletti S. and Weber A., Italy Commits $19 Billion for Veneto Banks in Biggest Rescue. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-25/italy-mobilizes-up-to-19-billion-to-keep-veneto-banks-afloat. Open Google Scholar
  327. Sjöberg, G., ‘Banking Special Resolution Regimes as a Governance Tool’ in W.-G. Ringe and P. M. Huber (eds), Legal challenges in the global financial crisis: Bail-outs, the euro and regulation, Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law (Oxford: Hart, 2014), pp. 187–96. Open Google Scholar
  328. Sommer, J. H., ‘Why Bail-In? And How!’, Economic Policy Review 20 (2014), 207–228. Open Google Scholar
  329. Stern, G. H. and Feldman, R. J., Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009). Open Google Scholar
  330. Stiefmüller, C. M., European Parliament ECON Public Hearing on the new banking legislation package, European Parliament’s ECON Committee Public Hearing (Brussels, 2017). Open Google Scholar
  331. Stiefmüller, C. M., Ten Years After – The 2017 Banking Package: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, Finance Watch Policy Brief (2017). Open Google Scholar
  332. Stiefmüller, C. M., Ten Years After: Back to Business as Usual: The Pit and the Pendulum – Post-Crisis Financial Regulation in Europe, Finance Watch Report (2018). Open Google Scholar
  333. The Economist, ‘What would Bagehot do?: Should central banks act as buyers of last resort?’, The Economist, 16 August 2007. Open Google Scholar
  334. Thole, C., ‘Bank Crisis Management and Resolution: Core features of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’, SSRN Electronic Journal 2014. Open Google Scholar
  335. Tim Skeet to Thomas Jorgensen (ECB), 20 December 2016, ‘Bail-in Working Group of the AMIC -International Capital Markets Association (ICMA)’, Letter. Open Google Scholar
  336. Triantafyllakis, I., ‘Italienische Banken: Wenn nicht alle Wege zum Bail-in führen’, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (2016), 2248–55. Open Google Scholar
  337. Tröger, T. H., ‘Effective Supervision of Transnational Financial Institutions’, Texas International Law Journal 48 (2012), 177–221. Open Google Scholar
  338. Tröger, T. H., ‘Regulatory Influence on Market Conditions in the Banking Union: the Cases of Macro-Prudential Instruments and the Bail-in Tool’, European Business Organization Law Review 16 (2015), 575–93. Open Google Scholar
  339. Tröger, T. H., ‘Too complex to work: A critical assessment of the bail-in tool under the European bank recovery and resolution regime’, SAFE Working Paper No. 179 (2017). Open Google Scholar
  340. Tröger, T. H., ‘Why MREL won't help much: Minimum requirements for bail-in capital as insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank resolution framework’, SAFE Working Paper no. 180 (2018). Open Google Scholar
  341. Tröger, T. H., ‘Optimal Bail-In Tools – Observations From A European Perspective’ in D. Arner, D. Busch, E. Avgouleas and S. Schwarcz (eds), Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: Ten Years After the Great Crash (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019). Open Google Scholar
  342. van Roosebeke, B., The ESM's Direct Recapitalisation of Banks: Looking Forward in Backstop-Questions (2014). Open Google Scholar
  343. Véron, N., Precautionary recapitalisation: time for a review?, In-Depth Analysis for the Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (Brussels, 2017). Open Google Scholar
  344. Vollmer, U. and Wiese, H., ‘Minimum capital requirements, bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking’, Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013), 487–97. Open Google Scholar
  345. Vovolinis, D., ‘The European Stability Mechanism Direct Recapitalisation Instrument: An Element for a Complete European Banking Union’, ECEFIL Working Paper Series (2015). Open Google Scholar
  346. Walter, J. R., ‘The 3–6–3 rule: An urban myth?’, Economic quarterly 92 (2006), 51–78. Open Google Scholar
  347. Weber, A., ‘Monte Paschi Bailout Plan Has Some ECB Supervisors Grumbling’, Bloomberg. Open Google Scholar
  348. Weber, A. and Speciale, A., ‘ECB Weighs Emergency Cash Injections to Smooth Bank Rescues’, Bloomberg, 09 April 2018. Open Google Scholar
  349. Weber, R. F., ‘Structural regulation as antidote to complexity capture’, American business law journal: the official publication of the American Business Law Association 49 (2012), 643–738. Open Google Scholar
  350. Weiß, G. N.F., Bostandzic, D. and Neumann, S., ‘What factors drive systemic risk during international financial crises?’, Journal of Banking & Finance 41 (2014), 78–96. Open Google Scholar
  351. Wiggins, R., Tente, N. and Metrick, A., European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution – Dexia Group, Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2014–5D-V1 (2015). Open Google Scholar
  352. Wiggins, R., Tente, N. and Metrick, A., European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution – Fortis Group, Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2014–5D-V1 (2015). Open Google Scholar
  353. Wihlborg, G., Bail-ins – Issues of Credibility and Contagion, SUERF Policy Note (2017). Open Google Scholar
  354. Wojcik, K.-P., ‘Bail-in in the Banking Union’, Common Market Law Review 53 (2016), 91–138. Open Google Scholar
  355. World Bank Group, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD (Vienna, 2017). Open Google Scholar
  356. World Bank Group, Financial Sector Advisory Center (FinSAC), Bank Resolution and "Bail-In" in the EU: Selected Case Studies Pre and Post BRRD (2016). Open Google Scholar
  357. Xiouros, C., Handling of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance of Laiki Bank in the Bailout Package of Cyprus (2013). Open Google Scholar
  358. Yiatrou, M., Bank Resolution Credibility and Economic Implications, ADEMU Working Paper Series (2016). Open Google Scholar
  359. Zhou, J., Rutledge, V., Bossu, W., Dobler, M. and Jassaud, N., From bail-out to bail-in: Mandatory debt restructuring of systemic financial institutions, IMF staff discussion note (Washington, DC: Internat. Monetary Fund, 2012), 2012/3. Open Google Scholar

Similar publications

from the topics "European Law & International Law & Comparative Law", "Commercial Law & Business Law & Corporate Law"
Cover of book: Unbeabsichtigte Normenkonflikte zwischen EU-Recht und nationalem Recht
Book Titles No access
Yannis Ockernahl
Unbeabsichtigte Normenkonflikte zwischen EU-Recht und nationalem Recht
Cover of book: Der forderungslose Anfechtungsgegner
Book Titles No access
Paul Goes
Der forderungslose Anfechtungsgegner
Cover of book: Wie fördert die EU Menschenrechte in Drittstaaten?
Book Titles No access
Dennis Traudt
Wie fördert die EU Menschenrechte in Drittstaaten?
Cover of book: Future-Proofing in Public Law
Edited Book No access
Nicole Koblenz LL.M., Nicholas Otto, Gernot Sydow
Future-Proofing in Public Law

Notice

This work is protected by copyright and may only be used in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Use and License Agreement. Any use of the work beyond this is expressly prohibited and will be prosecuted.

Give feedback

We welcome your feedback on content and features. Your message helps us to continuously improve our service.

Rating
Attach images
or drag and drop
PNG or JPG (max. 3 MB)

Login

Forgotten your password?
Login via Open Athens
Don't have an account yet?
Register now

Cite publication

Download: RIS BibTex