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Enhancing the Credibility of Resolution

An Analysis of the Impact of Recovery and Resolution Planning and Loss-Absorbing Capital Requirements on the Credibility of Bail-In
Autor:innen:
Verlag:
 2022

Zusammenfassung

Die Finanzkrise von 2007/08 hatte ihre Ursache in einem Marktversagen, das vor dem Hintergrund inhärenter Fragilität und Komplexität des Bankensystems zu gesamtwirtschaftlich kostspieligen staatlichen Rettungsbemühungen führte. Die daraus resultierende implizite Staatsgarantie wurde von Marktteilnehmern antizipiert und verzerrte Risikobepreisung und Verhalten. Ziel jüngerer europäischer Reformbemühungen war es, diesem unter Too Big To Fail bekannten Phänomen durch finanzielle Beteiligung ebenjener Marktteilnehmer entgegenzuwirken. Ob das neu geschaffene Bail-In-Instrument unter der Richtlinie zur Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten (BRRD) hierzu einen erfolgsversprechenden und glaubhaften Beitrag leistet, untersucht diese Arbeit.

Schlagworte

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Bibliographische Angaben

Copyrightjahr
2022
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-7489-0
ISBN-Online
978-3-7489-3280-2
Verlag
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Sprache
Englisch
Seiten
302
Produkttyp
Monographie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis Kein Zugriff 1 - 16
  2. List of Abbreviations Kein Zugriff 17 - 20
    1. Introductory Remarks Kein Zugriff
    2. Scope and Objective of the Thesis Kein Zugriff
    3. Course of the Thesis Kein Zugriff
      1. Why the Credibility of Resolution is So Important Kein Zugriff
        1. Complexity in Bank Structures Kein Zugriff
        2. Asset Size Kein Zugriff
        3. Legal and Organizational Structures Kein Zugriff
        4. Number of Legal Entities and Distribution of Banking Groups and Activities Across Jurisdictions Kein Zugriff
            1. Institutional Structure: Business Models Kein Zugriff
            2. Results Kein Zugriff
          2. No Adequate Modification Measures Ex Ante Kein Zugriff
          3. Results of Ex Ante Evaluation Kein Zugriff
            1. The Current Framework of Precautionary Recapitalization Kein Zugriff
            2. Application of Precautionary Recapitalization in Italy – Unveiling the Problems Kein Zugriff
            3. Precautionary Recapitalization – Quo Vadis? Kein Zugriff
              1. National Insolvency Proceedings Kein Zugriff
                1. Reducing the Pool of Bail-inable Instruments through Articles 44(2) and 44(3) BRRD Kein Zugriff
                2. Exemption of Senior Debt Holders Kein Zugriff
                3. Bail-inable Instruments in the Cross-Border Context Kein Zugriff
                4. Conclusion Kein Zugriff
              3. External Private Funding Instruments Kein Zugriff
              1. Pre-Funded Funds – DGS and EDIS as Sector-Funded Financing Kein Zugriff
              1. European Stability Mechanism – Direct Recapitalization Instrument Kein Zugriff
          3. Results of Ex Post Evaluation Kein Zugriff
        7. Excursus: Limits to the No-Bailout Policy – The Role of Public Financing Kein Zugriff
          1. Emergency Liquidity Assistance for Solvent Institutions – An Overview Kein Zugriff
          2. The Current Problem Kein Zugriff
        9. Results Kein Zugriff
        1. Credibility Ex Ante: Recovery and Resolution Planning Kein Zugriff
        2. Credibility Ex Post: Loss-Absorbing Capital Requirements Kein Zugriff
    2. Result of Part 2 Kein Zugriff
        1. Remedy for the Lack of Predictability Kein Zugriff
        2. Remedy for Complexity Kein Zugriff
        3. Remedy for Missing Modification Measures Kein Zugriff
          1. Potential Divergences Between Authorities – Cross-Border Coordination Kein Zugriff
          2. Protection of Own Markets, Market Players and Depositors Kein Zugriff
          3. Planning as an Inconvenient Standard Exercise – Adding More Complexity Kein Zugriff
          4. Drawing-up of Plans Takes Place in Times of Stability – Optimism Bias Kein Zugriff
          5. Costliness of Recovery and Resolution Plans Kein Zugriff
          6. Predictability of the Actual Crisis Scenario at Some Future Date Kein Zugriff
          7. Impermanence of Banks’ Structures and the Topicality of Recovery and Resolution Plans Kein Zugriff
            1. Recovery Planning Process – Building Blocks Kein Zugriff
            2. Resolution Planning Process – Building Blocks Kein Zugriff
            3. Evidence from Institutions Undertaking Planning Kein Zugriff
            4. Templates Kein Zugriff
          9. Planning Capacity for Systemic Crises Kein Zugriff
          10. Gateway to Political Influence – Enforceability of Plans Kein Zugriff
          1. Principal-Agent Conflict Kein Zugriff
            1. Unintentionally Incorrect Information Kein Zugriff
            2. Faulty Processing or Valuation of Information Kein Zugriff
            3. Intentionally Incorrect Information Kein Zugriff
            4. Outlook: Determination of MREL Quote Kein Zugriff
            5. Conclusion Kein Zugriff
        3. The Problems with Modification Measures Kein Zugriff
    2. Result of Part 3 Kein Zugriff
        1. Minimum Requirements for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities Kein Zugriff
        2. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity Kein Zugriff
        3. Integrated Approach – Commission Proposal Kein Zugriff
      2. The Potential of LACRs to Enhance Credibility Ex Post Resolution Decision Kein Zugriff
        1. Implementation, Monitoring, and Maintenance Costs Kein Zugriff
        2. Implementation of Integrated LACRs is Complex and Difficult to Understand Kein Zugriff
        3. Eligibility of Instruments – Qualitative Requirements Kein Zugriff
        4. Pricing of LAC Instruments Kein Zugriff
        5. Debt Subordination – New Article 108 BRRD Kein Zugriff
            1. Retail Investors – Households – SMEs Kein Zugriff
            2. Banks and Other Financial Institutions Kein Zugriff
            3. Deduction of Cross-Holdings Kein Zugriff
          2. Risk Transportation from the Banks to the Market – Who Remains? Kein Zugriff
          3. Imposition of Losses on Specific Classes of Creditors Could Give Rise to Adverse Systemic Effects Kein Zugriff
        7. Problem of Certain Banks in Complying with Loss-Absorbing Requirements Kein Zugriff
        8. Scope and Level of Application Kein Zugriff
        9. MREL Guidance – New Article 45e BRRD Kein Zugriff
          1. Denomination – Underlying Uncertainty Kein Zugriff
          2. The Impact of Recovery and Resolution Planning – First Level of Uncertainty Kein Zugriff
          3. Discretion in Setting the Recapitalization Amount – Second Level of Uncertainty Kein Zugriff
          4. Unclear Adjustment Mechanisms – Third Level of Uncertainty Kein Zugriff
        11. The TLAC as an International Standard Being Transposed into National Law Kein Zugriff
        12. Current Shortfall and Transposition Kein Zugriff
    2. Result of Part 4 Kein Zugriff
      1. Is Improvement of Recovery and Resolution Planning Necessary at All? Kein Zugriff
        1. Strengthening and Clarifying the Framework for Cross-Border Cooperation of Supervisory and Resolution Authorities Kein Zugriff
          1. Special Training to Enhance Internal Data Provision Kein Zugriff
          2. Full-Time RRP Employees Kein Zugriff
          3. Development of a Standardized Template for a Single Distributor that Shares Relevant Data with Recipient – Information Intermediary Kein Zugriff
          4. Updating of Institutions' IT Infrastructure Kein Zugriff
          5. Automated Data Submission Kein Zugriff
          6. RegTech as an Antidote to Major Data Management Problems Kein Zugriff
        3. Make Plans Enforceable – Penalize Non-Compliance – Prevent Political Influence Kein Zugriff
        4. Structural Reform of the Banking Sector Kein Zugriff
        5. Open Issues Kein Zugriff
        1. Adoption and Maturation of the Reforms Kein Zugriff
        2. Defining Dependable Eligibility Criteria Kein Zugriff
        3. Enhancing the Pricing of MREL Instruments Kein Zugriff
        4. Solution to the Subordination Problem Kein Zugriff
          1. Disclosure Requirements and Provision of Mandatory Information to Potential Investors Kein Zugriff
          2. Find Resilient and Adequate Holders for Loss-Absorbing Instruments – Buy-Side Monitoring Kein Zugriff
          3. Setting-up Specific Bail-in Bonds Kein Zugriff
          4. What to do with Legacy Holdings – Resolution Planning? Kein Zugriff
        6. Flexibility Needs of Different Business Models Kein Zugriff
        7. O/DSIBs – Scope and Level of Application Kein Zugriff
        8. MREL Guidance Kein Zugriff
          1. Making the Calculation Process More Predictable Kein Zugriff
          2. Making the Calculation Process More Accurate Kein Zugriff
        10. International Transposition of TLAC Kein Zugriff
        11. Shortfall and Transposition Kein Zugriff
    3. Result to Part 5 Kein Zugriff
  8. PART 6 – SUMMARY OF THESES Kein Zugriff 275 - 278
  9. References Kein Zugriff 279 - 302

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