Liberal Legitimacy

Dr. Fabian Wenner

doi:10.5771/9783748909637

Summary

The justification of political power is a prerequisite for its legitimacy. The book systematizes the manifestations of this liberal intuition and, with reference to John Rawls, develops the idea of generating legitimacy through public justification. On the one hand, it defends political liberalism as a theory of legitimacy suitable for pluralistic societies that helps to realize the normative potentials inherent in democratic institutions. On the other hand, it explores its boundaries, arguing that public justification does not address all citizens equally: the defenders of liberal legitimacy must be aware of the limited scope of their justificatory resources.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2020
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-6867-7
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7489-0963-7
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series: Fundamenta Juridica
Volume: 73
Language: English
Pages: 223
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 10
1. 1. The liberal perspective on legitimacy No access
  2. The challenge of pluralism and public justification No access
  3. Legitimacy as public justification in Rawls’s work No access
2. The structure of the book No access
1. 1. 1. 1.1.1 The political system No access
    2. 1.1.2 The means of the political system No access
  2. 1.2 Concepts and conceptions of legitimacy No access
  3. 1. 1.3.1 Weber’s belief-based conception of legitimacy No access
    2. 1.3.2 Beetham’s hybrid conception of legitimacy No access
  4. 1. 1.4.1 Legitimacy and the resolution of political disagreements No access
    2. 1.4.2 Legitimacy, the justification of coercion, and obligation No access
    3. 1.4.3 The standards of legitimacy No access
  5. 1.5 Conclusion of the chapter No access
2. 1. 2.1 Two ideas of consent No access
  2. 2.2 Voluntarist accounts and their shortcomings No access
  3. 1. 2.3.1 The point of contractualist theories No access
    2. 2.3.2 The normative role of reasons in contractualist theories No access
    3. 2.3.3 The example of Kant’s contractualism No access
  4. 1. 2.4.1 From philosophical to public justification No access
    2. 2.4.2 The challenge of legitimacy as public justification No access
  5. 2.5 Conclusion of the chapter No access
1. 1. 3.1 The nature of justification and reflective equilibrium No access
  2. 1. 3.2.1 The contractualist device of the original position No access
    2. 1. 3.2.2.1 Society as a system of fair cooperation No access
      2. 3.2.2.2 The two moral powers as the basis of freedom and equality No access
    3. 3.2.3 The original position as a device of representation No access
    4. 3.2.4 The argument from the original position No access
  3. 1. 3.3.1 The application of the principles of justice No access
    2. 3.3.2 Justice, legitimacy, and obligation No access
  4. 1. 3.4.1 Stability for the right reasons No access
    2. 3.4.2 The normative role of stability in Theory No access
    3. 3.4.3 The idea of a well-ordered society No access
    4. 3.4.4 The argument for convergence on justice as fairness No access
  5. 3.5 Conclusion of the chapter No access
2. 1. 4.1 Reasonable disagreement and the burdens of judgment No access
  2. 4.2 Reasonable disagreement and the fundamentals of Theory No access
  3. 4.3 The problems with reasonable disagreement and pluralism No access
  4. 4.4 Conclusion of the chapter No access
3. 1. 1. 5.1.1 The three features of a political conception No access
    2. 5.1.2 The content of public political culture and the process of justification No access
    3. 5.1.3 Reasonable conceptions of justice and generic liberalism No access
    4. 1. 5.1.4.1 The role of PL’s argument for a liberal conception of justice No access
      2. 5.1.4.2 The normative foundation of PL’s argument for a liberal conception of justice No access
  2. 1. 5.2.1 The epistemic components of reasonableness No access
    2. 1. 5.2.2.1 The idea of reasonable citizens No access
      2. 5.2.2.2 Impermissible conceptions of the good and comprehensive doctrines No access
    3. 5.2.3 Unreasonable citizens and public justification No access
    4. 5.2.4 The rights of unreasonable citizens No access
    5. 5.2.5 Vagueness and the limits of reasonable disagreement No access
  3. 1. 5.3.1 The idea of overlapping consensus No access
    2. 5.3.2 The road to an overlapping consensus No access
    3. 5.3.3 Reasonable comprehensive doctrines and overlapping consensus No access
    4. 5.3.4 Legitimacy and overlapping consensus No access
  4. 1. 5.4.1 The constitutional framework and legitimacy No access
    2. 1. 5.4.2.1 The idea of public reason No access
      2. 5.4.2.2 Range of application No access
    3. 1. 5.4.3.1 Public reason as a normative notion (not primarily epistemic) No access
      2. 5.4.3.2 Public reason and dependence on comprehensive doctrines No access
      3. 5.4.3.3 The historical contingency of public reason No access
      4. 5.4.3.4 The indeterminacy of public reason No access
      5. 5.4.3.5 Public reason, neutrality, and public justification No access
      6. 5.4.3.6 Political liberalism and unrealistic views of the political No access
  5. 5.5 Conclusion of the chapter No access
4. 1. 6.1 The duties of citizens who reject political liberalism No access
  2. 6.2 The normative authority of partially illegitimate legislation No access
  3. 6.3 The political and philosophical status of political liberalism No access
  4. 6.4 Conclusion of the chapter No access
Conclusion No access Pages 208 - 212
Bibliography No access Pages 213 - 223