Shareholder Empowerment: Three Institutional Innovations to Awaken the Sleeping Giant

Dr. Michael Zurkinden

doi:10.5771/9783845225586

Summary

Wie können Aktionäre eine aktivere Rolle in Aktiengesellschaften spielen? Welche institutionellen Arrangements können diesen schlafenden Riesen wecken und seine Kräfte in eine positive Richtung lenken? Dieses Buch untersucht drei Delegations-Arrangements, die zur Stärkung der Aktionäre beitragen können: der Verwaltungs- resp. Aufsichtsrat, die Pensionskassen und der Handel mit Aktienstimmrechten. Es zeigt auf, dass Kontroll- und Stimmrechte grundsätzlich am besten über Wettbewerbsprozesse delegiert werden. Die Einflussnahme der Aktionäre wird verbessert, wenn Verwaltungsratswahlen in der Form von Kampfwahlen abgehalten und die freie Pensionskassenwahl zugelassen werden. Als weniger vorteilhaft hingegen erweist sich der freie Handel mit Aktienstimmrechten.

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Bibliographic data

Edition: 1/2010
Copyright Year: 2010
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8329-5851-0
ISBN-Online: 978-3-8452-2558-6
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series: Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie
Volume: 8
Language: English
Pages: 158
Product Type: Monograph

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 2 - 9
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Abbreviations No access Pages 10 - 10
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Introduction No access Pages 11 - 17
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1. Introduction No access Pages 18 - 19
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2. 1. Agency problems in firms and corporate governance No access Pages 19 - 22
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  2. Agency problems in democracies and public governance No access Pages 22 - 24
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3. 1. Contested director elections No access Pages 24 - 26
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  2. The current practice of electing directors No access Pages 26 - 30
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  3. Corporate governance reform No access Pages 30 - 32
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4. 1. The shortcomings of traditional solutions No access Pages 32 - 39
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  2. Public choice problems No access Pages 39 - 46
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  3. Intermediaries and agency chains No access Pages 46 - 49
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5. Conclusions No access Pages 49 - 51
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1. Introduction No access Pages 52 - 53
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2. 1. The agency problem and corporate governance No access Pages 53 - 56
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  2. Three investment strategies No access Pages 56 - 60
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3. 1. The rise of institutional ownership No access Pages 60 - 62
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  2. Institutional activism in theory No access Pages 62 - 63
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  3. Institutional activism in practice No access Pages 63 - 65
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  4. A critique of institutional activism No access Pages 65 - 66
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4. 1. Traditional arguments No access Pages 66 - 68
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  2. The free choice hypothesis No access Pages 68 - 70
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  3. Possible caveats No access Pages 70 - 77
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5. 1. The universal ownership hypothesis No access Pages 77 - 79
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  2. A critique of the universal ownership hypothesis No access Pages 79 - 80
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  3. The interrelationship between universal ownership and free choice of pension funds No access Pages 80 - 83
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6. Conclusions No access Pages 83 - 84
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1. Introduction No access Pages 85 - 87
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2. 1. One share – one vote No access Pages 87 - 89
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  2. Vote buying as a blessing No access Pages 89 - 92
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  3. Vote buying as a curse No access Pages 92 - 94
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  4. Regulatory responses No access Pages 94 - 95
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3. 1. Reciprocal and non-reciprocal vote buying No access Pages 95 - 97
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  2. The prisoner’s dilemma in the case of reciprocal vote buying No access Pages 97 - 99
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  3. The prisoner’s dilemma in the case of non-reciprocal vote buying No access Pages 99 - 101
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  4. Possible ways out of the prisoner’s dilemma No access Pages 101 - 102
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  5. The role of the profit source No access Pages 102 - 107
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4. 1. Indexation No access Pages 107 - 109
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  2. Expressive voting No access Pages 109 - 113
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  3. The motivation crowding effect No access Pages 113 - 116
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  4. Endogenous incentive effects No access Pages 116 - 118
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5. Conclusions No access Pages 118 - 119
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Overall Summary and Conclusions No access Pages 120 - 132
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References No access Pages 133 - 142
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Proxy Voting No access Pages 143 - 153
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Securities Lending No access Pages 154 - 155
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Expressive Voting No access Pages 156 - 158
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