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Law´s Claim to Correctness

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 19.11.2020

Summary

The book describes the main concepts of the correctness thesis. The second part presents a reconstruction of the claim to correctness in some classical legal theories. For instance, it explains the thesis that we can find two different references to claims in Kelsen´s theory, therefore allusions to a kind of classifying and qualifying connections. About Fuller one can find the idea that he introduces not only a procedural moral claim but also a substantive one. With respect to Radbruch, the book holds the idea that the correctness thesis can be found in his theory since 1932. The third part considers some main objections against the claim to correctness especially that proposed by Joseph Raz and John Finnis among others.

Bibliographic data

Publication year
2020
Publication date
19.11.2020
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-6871-4
ISBN-Online
978-3-7489-0967-5
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series
Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie
Volume
78
Language
English
Pages
136
Product type
Book Titles

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access 1 - 14
    1. 1. Claim to correctness No access
    2. 2. The classifying and the qualifying connection No access
    3. 3. First order and second order correctness No access
          1. (i) Kelsen’s relative connection between law and morality No access
          2. (ii) The claim to correctness and the purity thesis No access
          3. (ii) The Theory of Legal Hierarchy (Stufenbaulehre) No access
        2. B. The interpretation theory No access
          1. (i) The Purity Thesis and the Legal Hierarchy Thesis (Stufenbaulehre) No access
          2. (ii) The interpretation theory No access
        1. My reasoning for this goes as follows: No access
        2. The last question is this: do law-applying organs raise a claim to correctness according to Kelsen? No access
      1. 2.1. THE NEGATIVE SIDE. THE ENTERPRISE CONCEPT THESIS: NO CLAIM TO AUTHORITY. No access
        1. (i) Classifying and Qualifying Connections No access
        2. (ii) Interpretation No access
          1. Radbruch presents the foregoing in a summarized way as follows: No access
          1. (i) Reality and Sense No access
            1. a) Justice No access
            2. b) Legal Certainty No access
            3. c) Purposiveness No access
          1. (i) Classifying Connections No access
          2. (ii) Qualifying Connections. No access
      3. 3.3. RADBRUCH’s LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AFTER 1945 No access
      1. 1.1. THE CONTENT OBJECTION No access
      2. 1.2. ALEXY’s REPLY No access
      3. 1.3. SOME ADDITIONAL POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION No access
      1. 2.1. THE NO CLAIM THESIS No access
      2. 2.2. ALEXY’s REPLY No access
      1. 3.1. THE EXISTENCE OBJECTION No access
      2. 3.2. ALEXY’s REPLY No access
        1. A. The Classifying and the Qualifying Connection No access
        2. B. The Performative Contradiction No access
        1. A. The Classifying and the Qualifying Connection No access
        2. B. Performative Contradiction: A Conceptual Defect Argument No access
      3. 4.3. MORAL RELATIVISM No access
      4. 4.4. ALEXY’s REPLY. No access
      5. 4.5. THE LAST TWO ARGUMENTS: CIRCULARITY AND THE KIND OF CONNECTION ESTABLISHED BY THE CLAIM TO CORRECTNESS No access
      6. 4.6. ALEXY’s REPLY No access
    1. 1. Hans Kelsen:The Claim to Truth and the Claim to Authority No access
    2. 2. Lon Fuller:A Double Moral Correctness Validity Criterion No access
    3. 3. Gustav Radbruch:The Claim to Justice and the Radbruch Formula No access
    4. 4. Joseph Raz:A Claim but Not a Claim to Moral Correctness No access
    5. 5. Neil MacCormick:The Institutional Claim to Correctness No access
    6. 6. John Finnis:The Claim to Moral Correctness and Central Cases No access
    7. 7. Eugenio Bulygin:The Contingent Claim to Correctness No access
  6. Final Conclusion No access 132 - 132
  7. Bibliography No access 133 - 136

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