Law´s Claim to Correctness

Dr. Maria Claudia Quimbayo Duarte

doi:10.5771/9783748909675

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Erscheinungsjahr: 2020
Erscheinungsdatum: 19.11.2020
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-6871-4
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7489-0967-5
Verlag: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Reihe: Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie
Band: 78
Sprache: Englisch
Seiten: 136
Produkttyp: Monographie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis Kein Zugriff Seiten 1 - 14
1. 1. Claim to correctness Kein Zugriff
2. 2. The classifying and the qualifying connection Kein Zugriff
3. 3. First order and second order correctness Kein Zugriff
1. 1. 1. 1. (i) Kelsen’s relative connection between law and morality Kein Zugriff
      2. (ii) The claim to correctness and the purity thesis Kein Zugriff
      3. (ii) The Theory of Legal Hierarchy (Stufenbaulehre) Kein Zugriff
    2. B. The interpretation theory Kein Zugriff
  2. 1. 1. (i) The Purity Thesis and the Legal Hierarchy Thesis (Stufenbaulehre) Kein Zugriff
      2. (ii) The interpretation theory Kein Zugriff
  3. 1. My reasoning for this goes as follows: Kein Zugriff
    2. The last question is this: do law-applying organs raise a claim to correctness according to Kelsen? Kein Zugriff
2. 1. 2.1. THE NEGATIVE SIDE. THE ENTERPRISE CONCEPT THESIS: NO CLAIM TO AUTHORITY. Kein Zugriff
  2. 1. (i) Classifying and Qualifying Connections Kein Zugriff
    2. (ii) Interpretation Kein Zugriff
3. 1. 1. 1. Radbruch presents the foregoing in a summarized way as follows: Kein Zugriff
    2. 1. (i) Reality and Sense Kein Zugriff
      2. a) Justice Kein Zugriff
        b) Legal Certainty Kein Zugriff
        c) Purposiveness Kein Zugriff
  2. 1. 1. (i) Classifying Connections Kein Zugriff
      2. (ii) Qualifying Connections. Kein Zugriff
  3. 3.3. RADBRUCH’s LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AFTER 1945 Kein Zugriff
1. 1. 1.1. THE CONTENT OBJECTION Kein Zugriff
  2. 1.2. ALEXY’s REPLY Kein Zugriff
  3. 1.3. SOME ADDITIONAL POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION Kein Zugriff
2. 1. 2.1. THE NO CLAIM THESIS Kein Zugriff
  2. 2.2. ALEXY’s REPLY Kein Zugriff
3. 1. 3.1. THE EXISTENCE OBJECTION Kein Zugriff
  2. 3.2. ALEXY’s REPLY Kein Zugriff
4. 1. 1. A. The Classifying and the Qualifying Connection Kein Zugriff
    2. B. The Performative Contradiction Kein Zugriff
  2. 1. A. The Classifying and the Qualifying Connection Kein Zugriff
    2. B. Performative Contradiction: A Conceptual Defect Argument Kein Zugriff
  3. 4.3. MORAL RELATIVISM Kein Zugriff
  4. 4.4. ALEXY’s REPLY. Kein Zugriff
  5. 4.5. THE LAST TWO ARGUMENTS: CIRCULARITY AND THE KIND OF CONNECTION ESTABLISHED BY THE CLAIM TO CORRECTNESS Kein Zugriff
  6. 4.6. ALEXY’s REPLY Kein Zugriff
1. 1. Hans Kelsen:The Claim to Truth and the Claim to Authority Kein Zugriff
2. 2. Lon Fuller:A Double Moral Correctness Validity Criterion Kein Zugriff
3. 3. Gustav Radbruch:The Claim to Justice and the Radbruch Formula Kein Zugriff
4. 4. Joseph Raz:A Claim but Not a Claim to Moral Correctness Kein Zugriff
5. 5. Neil MacCormick:The Institutional Claim to Correctness Kein Zugriff
6. 6. John Finnis:The Claim to Moral Correctness and Central Cases Kein Zugriff
7. 7. Eugenio Bulygin:The Contingent Claim to Correctness Kein Zugriff
Final Conclusion Kein Zugriff Seiten 132 - 132
Bibliography Kein Zugriff Seiten 133 - 136

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Law´s Claim to Correctness

Publikation durchsuchen

Bibliographische Angaben

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Literaturverzeichnis (66 Einträge)

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