Executive Compensation

Dr. Friedrich Kley

doi:10.5771/9783845284286

Summary

The empirical analyses of data from large German public companies that are presented in this book show that the introduction of long-term orientated remuneration components for corporate executives increases their willingness to invest in riskier investment portfolios, at least in the short term. The study furthermore demonstrates that a payment model which emphasises equity-based remuneration elements is not sufficient to increase executives' long-term orientation. The results of the study’s final analysis show that payment of executives in large German public companies has become more consistent across the board in recent years.

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Bibliographic data

Publication year: 2017
Publication date: 23.06.2017
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-4119-9
ISBN-Online: 978-3-8452-8428-6
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series: Controlling und Management
Volume: 18
Language: English
Pages: 144
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 18
1. 1.1 Background and motivation No access
2. 1.2 Research overview and positioning of essays No access
3. 1.3 Structure, key findings, and contribution No access
1. Abstract No access
2. 2.1 Introduction No access
3. 1. 2.2.1 Long-term incentive programs (LTIPs) No access
  2. 1. Theoretical framework No access
    2. Empirical evidence No access
  3. 1. 2.2.3.1 LTIP adoption and investment intensity No access
    2. 2.2.3.2 LTIP adoption and investment policy No access
4. 1. 2.3.1 Data No access
  2. 1. Dependent variable No access
    2. Independent variable No access
    3. Controls No access
  3. 2.3.3 Analyses No access
5. 1. 2.4.1 Descriptive statistics No access
  2. 2.4.2 Hypotheses tests No access
  3. 2.4.3 Robustness tests No access
  4. 2.4.4 Discussion No access
6. 2.5 Concluding remarks No access
7. 2.6 Appendix No access
8. 2.7 References No access
1. Abstract No access
2. 3.1 Introduction No access
3. 1. 3.2.1 Long-term-oriented compensation structure No access
  2. 1. 3.2.2.1 Managerial long-term incentives and temporal orientation No access
    2. 3.2.2.2 Managerial long-term incentives and investment intensity No access
4. 1. 3.3.1 Data No access
  2. 1. Dependent variables No access
    2. Independent variables No access
    3. Controls No access
  3. 3.3.3 Analyses No access
5. 1. 3.4.1 Descriptive statistics No access
  2. 3.4.2 Hypotheses tests No access
  3. 3.4.3 Robustness tests No access
  4. 3.4.4 Discussion No access
6. 3.5 Concluding remarks No access
7. 3.6 Appendix No access
8. 3.7 References No access
1. Abstract No access
2. 4.1 Introduction No access
3. 1. 4.2.1 Overview on convergence No access
  2. 1. Theoretical framework No access
    2. Empirical evidence on beta-convergence No access
    3. Introduction of hypotheses No access
  3. 1. Theoretical framework No access
    2. Empirical evidence on sigma-convergence No access
    3. Introduction of hypotheses No access
4. 1. 4.3.1 Data No access
  2. 1. 1. Dependent variable No access
      2. Independent variable No access
      3. Controls No access
    2. 4.3.2.2 Sigma-convergence No access
  3. 4.3.3 Analyses No access
5. 1. 4.4.1 Descriptive statistics No access
  2. 4.4.2 Hypotheses tests No access
  3. 4.4.3 Robustness tests No access
  4. 4.4.4 Discussion No access
6. 4.5 Concluding remarks No access
7. 4.6 Appendix No access
8. 4.7 References No access
5 Conclusion No access Pages 139 - 140
References (introduction and conclusion) No access Pages 141 - 144