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Monograph No access

Die neue Marktinfrastruktur im OTC Derivatehandel

Eine Untersuchung im Lichte der institutionellen Wechselwirkung von Recht und Finanzwesen mit Bezügen zum deutschen, englischen und U.S.-amerikanischen Recht
Authors:
Publisher:
 2019

Bibliographic data

Edition
1/2019
Copyright Year
2019
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-6244-6
ISBN-Online
978-3-7489-0357-4
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series
Gesamtes Recht der Unternehmen und Finanzen
Volume
5
Language
German
Pages
276
Product Type
Monograph

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access 1 - 12
  2. Abkürzungsverzeichnis No access 13 - 22
  3. Hintergrund und Fragestellung der Untersuchung No access 23 - 26
      1. I. Der klassische Neoliberalismus und das moderne Finanzsystem No access
      2. II. Die Finanzialisierung der Wirtschaft und ihre Folgen für die Regulierung des Finanzsystems No access
        1. 1. Unternehmenskrise der Metallgesellschaft AG No access
        2. 2. Das Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)-Debakel No access
        1. 1. Der Zusammenbruch von Bear Stearns No access
        2. 2. Der Untergang von Lehman Brothers No access
        3. 3. Die Schieflage der American International Group (AIG) No access
    3. C. Zwischenfazit und weitergehende Überlegungen No access
      1. I. Die Effizienzmarkthypothese und ihre Grenzen No access
      2. II. Finanzmärkte unter den Begrenzungen der beschränkten Liquidität und unvollkommenen Voraussicht No access
      1. I. Revision der Law and Finance School No access
        1. 1. Liquidität und „survival constraint“ No access
        2. 2. Die hierarchische Struktur des Finanzsystems No access
        3. 3. Transformation der Zentralbank vom lender of last resort zum dealer of last resort No access
        4. 4. Zwischenfazit No access
        1. 1. Finanzmärkte als regelgebundene Systeme No access
        2. 2. Recht als eine Quelle der Instabilität des Finanzsystems (Das Law-Finance Paradox) No access
          1. a) Elastizität des Rechts als Antithese zur Rechtsqualität No access
          2. b) Macht als Ordnungspotenz im Finanzsystem No access
      4. IV. Zwischenfazit und anknüpfende Fragestellungen No access
        1. 1. Regulierendes und konstituierendes Recht im Finanzsektor No access
          1. a) Das Schattenbankensystem No access
          2. b) Ausgewählte Instrumente des Schattenbankensystems: Repo, ABCP und MMMF No access
          3. c) Beitrag zur Finanzkrise No access
        3. 3. Zwischenfazit No access
            1. aa) Markteffizienz durch Industriestandards No access
            2. bb) Markteffizienz durch Forderungsnetting No access
            3. cc) Risiken durch den Einsatz von walk-away Klauseln No access
            4. dd) Die Standardisierung des wechselseitigen Austauschs von Sicherheiten No access
            5. ee) Die Beziehung von ISDAs „soft law“ und staatlichem Recht No access
          2. b) Politische Ökonomie und konzeptionelle Einordnung No access
        2. 2. Zwischenfazit No access
        1. 1. Skizzierung der Entstehungsgeschichte No access
        2. 2. Die Entwicklung spekulativer Derivatekontrakte außerhalb gerichtlicher Durchsetzbarkeit No access
          1. a) USA und Vereinigtes Königreich No access
            1. aa) Optionen No access
            2. bb) Forwards No access
            3. cc) Swaps No access
            4. dd) Credit Default Swaps No access
          1. a) Informationsasymmetrien No access
          2. b) Systemische Risiken No access
        2. 2. Chancen No access
        3. 3. Einordnung No access
        1. 1. Sicherheitsleistung und Rechtsrisiko im Markt No access
        2. 2. Private Regulierung von unvollständigen Verträgen im Finanzsystem No access
      4. IV. Zwischenfazit No access
        1. 1. Entwicklung und Grundgedanke No access
        2. 2. Die Verpflichtung zum Gegenparteiclearing im Anschluss an die vergangene Finanzkrise No access
        1. 1. Vertragsnovation No access
        2. 2. Sicherheitenstellung und Margining No access
        3. 3. Multilaterales Vertragsnetting No access
        4. 4. Übertragung von Derivatepositionen No access
        5. 5. Maßnahmen zur Stabilisierung der zentralen Gegenpartei und damit einhergehende Risiken No access
        6. 6. Interoperabilität No access
        7. 7. Chancen und Risiken im Zusammenhang mit der Funktionsweise des zentralen Gegenparteiclearings No access
        1. 1. Die zentrale Gegenpartei als wesentliche Einrichtung und Netzwerkindustrie No access
        2. 2. Skalen- und Netzwerkeffekte im zentralen Gegenparteiclearing No access
        3. 3. Die natürliche Monopoleigenschaft der zentralen Gegenpartei No access
    3. C. Zwischenfazit No access
          1. a) Problemstellung No access
          2. b) Marktordnung kraft Systemhierarchie No access
          3. c) Marktordnung kraft Marktverhalten No access
          1. a) Risiken durch die Konzentration von Macht No access
          2. b) Risiken durch Marktverhalten No access
          3. c) Bedenken bei der Vornahme von Markteingriffen No access
        1. 1. Bankenspezifische Risiken im zentralen Gegenparteiclearing No access
        2. 2. Recht und Finanzwesen in der Wechselwirkung No access
      3. III. Zwischenfazit No access
        1. 1. Die Entfaltung des Sichteinlagensystems als Quelle der Fragilität des modernen Bankwesens No access
        2. 2. Ausweitung der staatlichen Stützung im Zuge der Entwicklung des marktbasierten Finanzwesens No access
        3. 3. Sichtbarkeit der instrumentellen und institutionellen Hierarchie in der Krise No access
      2. II. Die Grundverantwortung des Staates für die Wahrung der Funktionsfähigkeit des Finanzsystems No access
        1. 1. Die Wirtschaftsverfassung No access
        2. 2. Vertragsfreiheit und Haftungsprinzip No access
        3. 3. Ordoliberale Leitgedanken in der heutigen Finanzwelt No access
      4. IV. Zwischenfazit No access
      1. I. Problemaufriss No access
          1. a) In den USA No access
          2. b) In Deutschland No access
        2. 2. Flexibilität im modernen Finanzsystem No access
        1. 1. Vermögenstransfer in der Systemhierarchie No access
        2. 2. Marktdisziplin als regulatorisches Instrument No access
          1. a) „Systemrelevantes“ Eigentum No access
          2. b) Vertragshandeln im Finanzsektor No access
      4. IV. Recht zwischen Marktdynamik und Marktordnung No access
          1. a) Skizzierung eines PPP-Modells für das OTC Derivateclearing No access
          2. b) Überlegungen zur Bepreisung eines adäquaten Liquiditätszinses No access
        2. 2. Marktaustritt einer erfolglosen zentralen Gegenpartei im PPP-Modell No access
      2. II. Chancen und Risiken der modifizierten Marktinfrastruktur No access
    1. A. Zusammenfassung No access
    2. B. Ausblick No access
  9. Literaturverzeichnis No access 247 - 276

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