Afghanistan at Transition

Anthony H. Cordesman

doi:10.5771/9781442240810

Summary

This new study covers the civil and military lessons of the war in Afghanistan as of 2015, the trends at the time of transition, and the risks inherent in the current approach to supporting Afghanistan. The report focuses on the lessons to be learned from the US experience in Afghanistan to date and the problems Afghanistan faces now that most US and allied combat forces have left. The work builds on more than a decade’s worth of reporting and analysis of the Afghan war. It examines the recent trends and problems in Afghan governance, trends in the fighting, progress in the Afghan security forces, and what may be a growing crisis in the Afghan economy. The analysis is supported with extensive metrics on every major military and civil aspect of the war, a detailed analysis of the fighting, and a close examination of the problems resulting from the lack of Afghan political unity, the growing Afghan budget crisis, and critical problems with power brokers and corruption.

Search publication

Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2015
ISBN-Print: 978-1-4422-4080-3
ISBN-Online: 978-1-4422-4081-0
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham
Language: English
Pages: 224
Product type: Book Titles

1. Table of Contents No access
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY No access
1. 1. A QDR That Largely Wrote Off the Region No access
  2. President Obama’s Statement on Afghanistan on May 27, 2014 No access
  3. President Obama’s New Strategy Speech at West Point No access
2. NO CLEARER LEAD FROM NATO No access
3. 1. No Real Future Aid Plans or Afghan Deliverables on Reform No access
  2. The London Conference in December 2014 No access
  3. The Death of the Tokyo Conference Deliverables No access
  4. President Ghani on Reform No access
1. US “STRATEGIC TRIAGE” IS CRITICAL No access
2. THE ISSUE IS NOT RESOURCES, BUT STRATEGIC PRIORITY No access
3. THE COST-BENEFITS OF UPPING THE ANTE No access
1. 1. The Reality of National Versus Local Governance No access
  2. Parallel Governance by ISAF Regional Commands and National Air Donors No access
  3. The US Role in Weak and Failed Afghan Governance No access
2. A DIVIDED, POOR, AND STRUGGLING NATION No access
3. FAILED AND CORRUPT 2014 ELECTIONS THAT DID MORE TO DIVIDE THAN UNITE No access
4. 1. A Deeply Uncertain Compromise at the Top No access
  2. Limited Progress in Signing a Bilateral Security Agreement No access
5. UNCERTAIN AFGHAN LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE: TWO YEARS TOO LATE? No access
6. 1. Corruption and Incompetence No access
  2. Keeping Corruption in Perspective No access
7. 1. The Failure to Win US and Other Outside Domestic Political Support No access
  2. The Combined Threat from Host Country Politics, Governance, and Budgeting No access
1. The President’s “Sell by Date”: Slashing Advisors and Support Regardless of Conditions in Afghanistan No access
2. 1. The US as a Self-Inflicted Threat No access
  2. A Brief and Largely Ineffective US Surge No access
  3. Host Country “Threat” No access
3. Rushing Force Development beyond Afghan and ISAF Capacity No access
4. The Uncertain Threat No access
5. The Uncertain Integrity of ISAF and Department of Defense Reporting on the Growing Security Challenges at the Time of Transition No access
6. The Warnings in UN and SIGAR Casualty Data and Other Reporting No access
7. The Final UN Report on Casualties through the End of 2014 Calls ISAF and Department of Defense Reporting into Even More Serious Question No access
8. Estimating the Growth of Taliban and Other Insurgent Influence and Control No access
9. Mixed Data on Popular Support for the ANSF No access
1. THE QUESTION OF SIZE AND COST No access
2. 1. Grossly Over-classifying Data on Afghan Combat and Police Forces for Political Ends No access
  2. Issuing Meaningless Metrics on ANSF Capability No access
3. AN UNREADY AND CORRUPT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR No access
4. UNCERTAIN PROGRESS IN THE ANA No access
5. FOCUSING ON FORCE GENERATION RATHER THAN COMBAT CAPABILITY No access
6. 1. Designing a Force with Limited Paramilitary Capability No access
  2. A Force in Transition at the Time of Transition No access
  3. Token Paramilitary forces No access
7. THE UNCERTAIN ROLE OF THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE No access
8. OTHER ISAF COMMAND VIEWS IN MID TO LATE 2014 No access
9. LIMITED ADJUSTMENTS TO THE 9,800 CEILING AND THE US COMBAT ROLE No access
10. THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY AND TO DECIDE ON A CONDITIONS-BASED POLICY No access
1. 1. The Uncertain Impact and Future of Aid No access
  2. The Impact of Economics on Governance and Security No access
2. 1. A Population at Economic Risk No access
  2. Demographic Pressure on Afghan Stability No access
  3. Limited Progress in Human Development, and Uncertain Progress in Life Expectancy and Education No access
3. 1. 1. The Risks in Transition No access
    2. Much Depends on Agriculture and Rainfall No access
4. 1. World Bank Assessments of Poverty No access
  2. The IMF Risk Assessment Matrix No access
5. NARCOTICS No access
6. A MAJOR TRADE DEFICIT AND NO MIRACLES FROM A “NEW SILK ROAD” OR MINERAL EXTRACTION No access
7. ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE NEED FOR AID No access
8. DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE CONDITIONS-BASED AID No access
1. AN UNCERTAIN PROCESS OF CHANGE No access
2. STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES No access
3. A RISING TIDE OF INTERNAL VIOLENCE No access
4. A US ALLY THAT HAS ALSO BEEN A “THREAT” No access
5. BRIBERY RATHER THAN TRUE ALLIANCE No access
6. EQUALLY UNCERTAIN AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI RELATIONS No access
7. US TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN MEANS US TRANSITION IN PAKISTAN No access
1. MAKING CENTRAL ASIA A ROUTINE US DIPLOMATIC INTEREST No access
2. UNSTABLE AND UNPLEASANT REGIMES No access
3. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND STRATEGIC LINKAGE: THE REAL SILK ROAD DOESN’T GO THROUGH AFGHANISTAN OR SERVE UN INTERESTS No access
4. MINIMAL STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS No access
1. LIMITING THE US ROLE IN EASING INDIA-PAKISTANI TENSIONS AND THE ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN No access
2. FOCUSING ON THE REAL US STRATEGIC INTEREST No access
3. A GOOD STRATEGIC ALLY DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE A GOOD MILITARY PARTNER No access
4. THE NEED TO FOCUS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF US RELATIONS WITH INDIA No access
X. REGIONAL “THREATS”: IRAN, CHINA, RUSSIA, AND OTHER EXTERNAL POWERS No access Pages 208 - 208
1. IS STRATEGY BY DEFAULT A GOOD STRATEGY? No access
2. 1. The Case for Conditions-Based Involvement No access
  2. The Case Against Conditions-Based Involvement No access
  3. Choosing Between the Options No access