Afghanistan at Transition

Anthony H. Cordesman

doi:10.5771/9781442240810

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Copyrightjahr: 2015
ISBN-Print: 978-1-4422-4080-3
ISBN-Online: 978-1-4422-4081-0
Verlag: Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham
Sprache: Englisch
Seiten: 224
Produkttyp: Monographie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten

1. Table of Contents Kein Zugriff
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Kein Zugriff
1. 1. A QDR That Largely Wrote Off the Region Kein Zugriff
  2. President Obama’s Statement on Afghanistan on May 27, 2014 Kein Zugriff
  3. President Obama’s New Strategy Speech at West Point Kein Zugriff
2. NO CLEARER LEAD FROM NATO Kein Zugriff
3. 1. No Real Future Aid Plans or Afghan Deliverables on Reform Kein Zugriff
  2. The London Conference in December 2014 Kein Zugriff
  3. The Death of the Tokyo Conference Deliverables Kein Zugriff
  4. President Ghani on Reform Kein Zugriff
1. US “STRATEGIC TRIAGE” IS CRITICAL Kein Zugriff
2. THE ISSUE IS NOT RESOURCES, BUT STRATEGIC PRIORITY Kein Zugriff
3. THE COST-BENEFITS OF UPPING THE ANTE Kein Zugriff
1. 1. The Reality of National Versus Local Governance Kein Zugriff
  2. Parallel Governance by ISAF Regional Commands and National Air Donors Kein Zugriff
  3. The US Role in Weak and Failed Afghan Governance Kein Zugriff
2. A DIVIDED, POOR, AND STRUGGLING NATION Kein Zugriff
3. FAILED AND CORRUPT 2014 ELECTIONS THAT DID MORE TO DIVIDE THAN UNITE Kein Zugriff
4. 1. A Deeply Uncertain Compromise at the Top Kein Zugriff
  2. Limited Progress in Signing a Bilateral Security Agreement Kein Zugriff
5. UNCERTAIN AFGHAN LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE: TWO YEARS TOO LATE? Kein Zugriff
6. 1. Corruption and Incompetence Kein Zugriff
  2. Keeping Corruption in Perspective Kein Zugriff
7. 1. The Failure to Win US and Other Outside Domestic Political Support Kein Zugriff
  2. The Combined Threat from Host Country Politics, Governance, and Budgeting Kein Zugriff
1. The President’s “Sell by Date”: Slashing Advisors and Support Regardless of Conditions in Afghanistan Kein Zugriff
2. 1. The US as a Self-Inflicted Threat Kein Zugriff
  2. A Brief and Largely Ineffective US Surge Kein Zugriff
  3. Host Country “Threat” Kein Zugriff
3. Rushing Force Development beyond Afghan and ISAF Capacity Kein Zugriff
4. The Uncertain Threat Kein Zugriff
5. The Uncertain Integrity of ISAF and Department of Defense Reporting on the Growing Security Challenges at the Time of Transition Kein Zugriff
6. The Warnings in UN and SIGAR Casualty Data and Other Reporting Kein Zugriff
7. The Final UN Report on Casualties through the End of 2014 Calls ISAF and Department of Defense Reporting into Even More Serious Question Kein Zugriff
8. Estimating the Growth of Taliban and Other Insurgent Influence and Control Kein Zugriff
9. Mixed Data on Popular Support for the ANSF Kein Zugriff
1. THE QUESTION OF SIZE AND COST Kein Zugriff
2. 1. Grossly Over-classifying Data on Afghan Combat and Police Forces for Political Ends Kein Zugriff
  2. Issuing Meaningless Metrics on ANSF Capability Kein Zugriff
3. AN UNREADY AND CORRUPT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR Kein Zugriff
4. UNCERTAIN PROGRESS IN THE ANA Kein Zugriff
5. FOCUSING ON FORCE GENERATION RATHER THAN COMBAT CAPABILITY Kein Zugriff
6. 1. Designing a Force with Limited Paramilitary Capability Kein Zugriff
  2. A Force in Transition at the Time of Transition Kein Zugriff
  3. Token Paramilitary forces Kein Zugriff
7. THE UNCERTAIN ROLE OF THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE Kein Zugriff
8. OTHER ISAF COMMAND VIEWS IN MID TO LATE 2014 Kein Zugriff
9. LIMITED ADJUSTMENTS TO THE 9,800 CEILING AND THE US COMBAT ROLE Kein Zugriff
10. THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY AND TO DECIDE ON A CONDITIONS-BASED POLICY Kein Zugriff
1. 1. The Uncertain Impact and Future of Aid Kein Zugriff
  2. The Impact of Economics on Governance and Security Kein Zugriff
2. 1. A Population at Economic Risk Kein Zugriff
  2. Demographic Pressure on Afghan Stability Kein Zugriff
  3. Limited Progress in Human Development, and Uncertain Progress in Life Expectancy and Education Kein Zugriff
3. 1. 1. The Risks in Transition Kein Zugriff
    2. Much Depends on Agriculture and Rainfall Kein Zugriff
4. 1. World Bank Assessments of Poverty Kein Zugriff
  2. The IMF Risk Assessment Matrix Kein Zugriff
5. NARCOTICS Kein Zugriff
6. A MAJOR TRADE DEFICIT AND NO MIRACLES FROM A “NEW SILK ROAD” OR MINERAL EXTRACTION Kein Zugriff
7. ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE NEED FOR AID Kein Zugriff
8. DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE CONDITIONS-BASED AID Kein Zugriff
1. AN UNCERTAIN PROCESS OF CHANGE Kein Zugriff
2. STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES Kein Zugriff
3. A RISING TIDE OF INTERNAL VIOLENCE Kein Zugriff
4. A US ALLY THAT HAS ALSO BEEN A “THREAT” Kein Zugriff
5. BRIBERY RATHER THAN TRUE ALLIANCE Kein Zugriff
6. EQUALLY UNCERTAIN AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI RELATIONS Kein Zugriff
7. US TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN MEANS US TRANSITION IN PAKISTAN Kein Zugriff
1. MAKING CENTRAL ASIA A ROUTINE US DIPLOMATIC INTEREST Kein Zugriff
2. UNSTABLE AND UNPLEASANT REGIMES Kein Zugriff
3. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND STRATEGIC LINKAGE: THE REAL SILK ROAD DOESN’T GO THROUGH AFGHANISTAN OR SERVE UN INTERESTS Kein Zugriff
4. MINIMAL STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS Kein Zugriff
1. LIMITING THE US ROLE IN EASING INDIA-PAKISTANI TENSIONS AND THE ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN Kein Zugriff
2. FOCUSING ON THE REAL US STRATEGIC INTEREST Kein Zugriff
3. A GOOD STRATEGIC ALLY DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE A GOOD MILITARY PARTNER Kein Zugriff
4. THE NEED TO FOCUS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF US RELATIONS WITH INDIA Kein Zugriff
X. REGIONAL “THREATS”: IRAN, CHINA, RUSSIA, AND OTHER EXTERNAL POWERS Kein Zugriff Seiten 208 - 208
1. IS STRATEGY BY DEFAULT A GOOD STRATEGY? Kein Zugriff
2. 1. The Case for Conditions-Based Involvement Kein Zugriff
  2. The Case Against Conditions-Based Involvement Kein Zugriff
  3. Choosing Between the Options Kein Zugriff

Afghanistan at Transition

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Bibliographische Angaben

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