The term “know” is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. The author offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this data including semantic, metaphysical, pragmatic, doxastic as well as more recent psychological accounts. Against this background, he offers a novel psychological account based on the idea that non-epistemic factors affect estimates of probability.
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Bibliographic data
Publication year
2019
Publication date
01.05.2019
ISBN-Print
978-3-465-04397-3
ISBN-Online
978-3-465-14397-0
Publisher
Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main
Series
Studies in Theoretical Philosophy
Volume
9
Language
English
Pages
172
Product type
Book Titles
Table of contents
ChapterPages
Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages I - X
1. Introduction No access Pages 1 - 4
2. Intuitive Data No access Pages 5 - 16
3. Experimental Data No access Pages 17 - 46
4. Insensitivism No access Pages 47 - 58
5. Error-Possibility Effects: Standard Accounts No access Pages 59 - 82
6. Error-Possibility Effects: The Subadditivity Account No access Pages 83 - 102
7. Pragmatic Effects: Standard Accounts No access Pages 103 - 126
8. Pragmatic Effects: The Asymmetric Loss Account No access Pages 127 - 148
