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Semantic Pluralism
- Authors:
- Series:
- Studies in Theoretical Philosophy, Volume 8
- Publisher:
- 01.11.2018
Summary
What is the content of a sentence in context? At most one proposition, says the standard view of propositionalism accepted in much of semantics. A set of propositions, says the hitherto little-explored view of semantic pluralism. The aim of this book is to motivate, develop and defend semantic pluralism. To achieve this aim, the book puts forward two arguments against semantic propositionalism. It spells out two versions of semantic pluralism: flexible pluralism, which takes many expressions to be context-sensitive, and strong pluralism, which denies that context-sensitivity is widespread. And it shows how pluralist theories can reply to several objections that have been lodged against non-propositional semantic theories.
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Bibliographic data
- Publication year
- 2019
- Publication date
- 01.11.2018
- ISBN-Print
- 978-3-465-04348-5
- ISBN-Online
- 978-3-465-14348-2
- Publisher
- Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main
- Series
- Studies in Theoretical Philosophy
- Volume
- 8
- Language
- English
- Pages
- 162
- Product type
- Book Titles
Table of contents
ChapterPages
- Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages I - X
- 1. Introduction No access Pages 1 - 6
- 2.1 The aims of semantic theorising No access
- 2.2 Methods and explanations in semantics No access
- 2.3 Four kinds of semantic theories No access
- 3.1 The argument from unspecific contexts No access
- 3.2 The argument from explanatory value No access
- 3.3 Objections and replies No access
- 4.1 Flexible Pluralism No access
- 4.2 Strong Pluralism No access
- 4.3 Pluralist semantics No access
- 4.4 Pluralism from a Gricean model of communication No access
- 4.5 Pluralism and what is said No access
- 5.1. The instability objection No access
- 5.2 The objection from truth-value judgements No access
- 5.3 The objection from validity judgements No access
- 5.4 The objection from belief No access
- 5.5 The objection from literality judgements No access
- 6. Outlook No access Pages 149 - 154
- Bibliography No access Pages 155 - 162




