The term “know” is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. The author offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this data including semantic, metaphysical, pragmatic, doxastic as well as more recent psychological accounts. Against this background, he offers a novel psychological account based on the idea that non-epistemic factors affect estimates of probability.
Schlagworte
Publikation durchsuchen
Bibliographische Angaben
Copyrightjahr
2019
ISBN-Print
978-3-465-04397-3
ISBN-Online
978-3-465-14397-0
Verlag
Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main
Reihe
Studies in Theoretical Philosophy
Band
9
Sprache
Englisch
Seiten
172
Produkttyp
Monographie
Inhaltsverzeichnis
KapitelSeiten
Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis Kein Zugriff Seiten I - X
1. Introduction Kein Zugriff Seiten 1 - 4
2. Intuitive Data Kein Zugriff Seiten 5 - 16
3. Experimental Data Kein Zugriff Seiten 17 - 46
4. Insensitivism Kein Zugriff Seiten 47 - 58
5. Error-Possibility Effects: Standard Accounts Kein Zugriff Seiten 59 - 82
6. Error-Possibility Effects: The Subadditivity Account Kein Zugriff Seiten 83 - 102
7. Pragmatic Effects: Standard Accounts Kein Zugriff Seiten 103 - 126
8. Pragmatic Effects: The Asymmetric Loss Account Kein Zugriff Seiten 127 - 148
