
Monographie Open Access Vollzugriff
Deceptive Conducts before the Patent Office
Challenges for Patent Law and Competition Law- Autor:innen:
- Reihe:
- Munich Intellectual Property Law Center - MIPLC Studies, Band 37
- Verlag:
- 2019
Zusammenfassung
Publikation durchsuchen
Bibliographische Angaben
- Copyrightjahr
- 2019
- ISBN-Print
- 978-3-8487-6134-0
- ISBN-Online
- 978-3-7489-0257-7
- Verlag
- Nomos, Baden-Baden
- Reihe
- Munich Intellectual Property Law Center - MIPLC Studies
- Band
- 37
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Seiten
- 335
- Produkttyp
- Monographie
Inhaltsverzeichnis
KapitelSeiten
- Titelei/InhaltsverzeichnisSeiten 1 - 24 Download Kapitel (PDF)
- 1. The Underlying Problem
- 2. Deceptive Behaviour in Patent Procedures and Available Remedies under Patent Law
- 3. The Patenting Procedure under the Spotlight of Competition Law. Yet another Angle for the IP v Competition Law Debate
- 4. Scope and Structure of this Work
- 1. General Framework
- A. Examination Process: an Ex Parte Procedure
- I. Description
- II. Claims
- III. Other Formal Requirements. Inventors and Priority
- I. Formal and Substantive Examination, Publication and Office Actions
- II. Amendments
- III. Divisional Applications and Unity of Invention
- IV. Grant, Publication and National Validation
- V. Third Party Observations
- I. Post-Grant Amendments, Ex Parte Reexamination and Supplemental Examination
- II. Third Party Intervention after Grant. Oppositions, Post-Grant Reviews and Inter-Partes Reviews
- a. SPCs in the EU
- b. Patent Term Extensions in the US
- IV. Patent Linkage and the Orange Book
- E. Alternative Procedures. PCT, Patent Prosecution Highway and the Use of Results from other Patent Offices
- F. The Role of Patent Agents
- A. The Origin of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine. A Stroll down Memory Lane
- B. The Development of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine and the Duty of Candour
- I. Intent
- II. Materiality
- III. Burden of Proof and the ‘Sliding Scale’
- I. Failure to Disclose the Prior Public Use of an Invention
- II. Failure to Cite Known Relevant Prior Art
- III. Submission of False Information
- IV. Other conducts
- E. Disciplinary and Criminal Sanctions
- I. Rule 42(1)(b) EPC as a Duty of Disclosure?
- II. The Duty of Disclosure in the Travaux Préparatoires
- III. Rule 141 EPC and the Limited Duty of Disclosure
- IV. The impact of AstraZeneca
- I. Germany
- II. United Kingdom
- III. Disciplinary and Criminal Sanctions
- I. Defining the Scope of the Obligation
- II. Practical Value
- III. Interest of Applicants Themselves to have All Prior Art Considered
- IV. Duty of Advocacy
- I. Evaluation of the inequitable conduct doctrine in the US
- II. Would it be advisable for European courts to implement a similar doctrine?
- 1. Goals of Competition Law
- A. Essential Pillars of the Competition Legal Framework
- i. Product and Geographical Markets. The Hypothetical Monopolist Test
- ii. Demand and Supply Substitution
- iii. Product and Technology Markets
- iv. Competition without markets. From Innovation Markets to Competition in Innovation
- i. Indirect Methods of Establishing Market Power. Market Shares, Entry Barriers and other Indicia
- ii. Is Market Definition Always Necessary? Direct Methods of Establishing Market Power
- a. Types of Anticompetitive Conducts: Exclusionary and Exploitative Behaviours
- b. The Importance of Timing: Dominance as a Prerequisite under EU Law. Differences with US’ Monopolisation and Attempt to Monopolise
- c. Causation: The Relationship between Market Power, Anticompetitive Conduct and Anticompetitive Effects
- d. The Role of Intent
- C. The Particular Case of § 5 FTC Act
- I. Social and Economic Functions of the Patent System
- II. Patents and Market Power
- III. Reciprocal Goals but Conflicting Means
- a. Evolution of the Interrelation between Antitrust and Intellectual Property
- b. Antitrust Immunity and the Noerr Doctrine
- c. The Patent Misuse Doctrine
- a. Existence v Exercise Dichotomy
- b. The Specific Subject-Matter Standard
- c. Current Stage of the Debate
- d. Is there a Petitioning Immunity Doctrine in Europe?
- a. The Walker Process decision
- b. The Walker Process Legacy
- c. The Handgards or ‘Bad Faith Litigation’ Antitrust Claim
- II. Orange Book Cases
- a. Market Definition and its Dominance
- b. The First Abuse
- c. The Second Abuse
- II. AstraZeneca’s Aftermath: Cases in EU Member States
- 3. Closing Remarks and Open Questions
- 1. Introduction
- I. Sanctions under Other Areas of Law
- II. Sham as an Antitrust Injury in US Case Law
- III. Vexatious Litigation in the EU
- I. Antitrust Injury
- a. Objective Baselessness or ‘Legal Inviability’
- b. Intent or ‘Economic Inviability’
- III. Individual vs Patterns of Anticompetitive Litigation
- IV. Litigation as part of a Broader Pattern of Conduct
- C. Wrapping-up: A Simple Genus-Species Relationship?
- I. The General Question under US Law
- II. The General Question under EU Law
- III. Can a Deceptive Conduct before the Patent Office be analysed as an Illegitimate Inducement of Government Action?
- I. Materiality and Causal Connection
- II. Conceptualisation of the Misconduct
- III. Ministerial Acts and Discretion of the Patent Office
- a. Exclusionary Effects of Improperly Granted Patents
- b. Scope of and Entitlement to the Patent
- c. Consumer Harm and Objective Justifications
- a. The Case under § 2 Sherman Act. Monopolisation and Attempt to Monopolise
- b. The Case under art 102 TFEU. Market Dominance as a Pre-requisite
- I. The Case under US Law and Walker Process’ Enforcement Requirement
- a. A case for Article 102(a) TFEU or duty to license?
- b. ‘Single and Continuous’ Abuses
- c. Ownership or Enforcement as Separate Exclusionary Abuses?
- A. The Scenario under US Law. A Strict Duty of Candour and the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine
- B. The Scenario under EU Law
- I. Extent of Patent Applicant’s Duties
- II. Legal Consequences of the Deceitful Conduct
- I. The Scenario in the US: Walker Process and its Progeny
- II. The Scenario in the EU: AstraZeneca
- B. Sham or Vexatious Litigation Distinguished
- I. The General Framework in the US and in the EU
- a. Causal Link
- b. Conceptualisation of the Misconduct
- c. Discretion of the Patent Office
- d. Anticompetitive Effects
- e. Market Power
- III. Ownership or Enforcement of Fraudulently Obtained Patents
- BibliographySeiten 319 - 335 Download Kapitel (PDF)
Literaturverzeichnis (308 Einträge)
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