Im Shop erwerben
, um zu prüfen, ob Sie einen Vollzugriff auf diese Publikation haben.
Monographie Kein Zugriff

Normative Argumente in EU-Vertragsverhandlungen

Das bessere Argument als Verhandlungsressource?
Autor:innen:
Verlag:
 2014

Zusammenfassung

Welche Strategien werden in internationalen Verhandlungen von Staaten verwendet und welche Strategien verhelfen tatsächlich zu Verhandlungserfolg? Anknüpfend an die so genannte „arguing-versus-bargaining“ - Debatte im Forschungsfeld der Internationalen Beziehungen wird in diesem Buch mittels einer quantitativen Analyse untersucht, welche Bedeutung das „bessere Argument“ als Verhandlungsressource hat. Dazu wird die Verwendung und Wirkung normativer Argumente in drei EU-Vertragsverhandlungen (Vertrag von Amsterdam, Vertrag von Nizza, Verfassungskonvent) analysiert. Zur Messung des Argumentationsverhaltens wird ein neuartiges Verfahren der automatisierten Textanalyse entwickelt, das erlaubt, Argumentationsmuster in einer Vielzahl von Dokumenten zu identifizieren. Durch die so generierten Daten zeigt diese Arbeit, unter welchen Bedingungen EU-Mitgliedstaaten normative Argumente verwenden und unter welchen Bedingungen Argumente tatsächlich zu Verhandlungserfolg führen.

Publikation durchsuchen

Bibliographische Angaben

Copyrightjahr
2014
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-0507-8
ISBN-Online
978-3-8452-4797-7
Verlag
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Reihe
Internationale Beziehungen
Band
22
Sprache
Deutsch
Seiten
272
Produkttyp
Monographie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis Kein Zugriff 1 - 6
  2. Inhaltsverzeichnis Kein Zugriff 7 - 10
  3. Tabellenverzeichnis Kein Zugriff 11 - 14
  4. Abbildungsverzeichnis Kein Zugriff 15 - 16
  5. Einleitung Kein Zugriff 17 - 23
  6. Literaturdiskussion: Normative Argumente in internationalen Verhandlungen Kein Zugriff 24 - 51
  7. Untersuchungsgegenstand: EU-Vertragsverhandlungen Kein Zugriff 52 - 68
  8. Theorie und Hypothesen: Verwendung und Wirkung normativer Argumente in EU-Vertragsverhandlungen Kein Zugriff 69 - 115
  9. Forschungsdesign: Messung des Argumentationsverhaltens und der weiteren Variablen Kein Zugriff 116 - 163
  10. Analyse und Ergebnisse: Normative Argumente in EU-Vertragsverhandlungen Kein Zugriff 164 - 244
  11. Schlussfolgerungen und Ausblick Kein Zugriff 245 - 252
  12. Literaturverzeichnis Kein Zugriff 253 - 264
  13. Annex Kein Zugriff 265 - 272

Literaturverzeichnis (212)

  1. Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. Euro-pean Journal of International Relations, 3(3), 319–363. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003
  2. Alexa, M. (1997). Computer-assisted text analysis methodology in the social science (ZUMA Arbeitsbericht No. 97/07). Mannheim: ZUMA. Google Scholar öffnen
  3. Arregui, J., & Thomson, R. (2009). States´ bargaining success in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(5), 655–676. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760902983168
  4. Arrow, K. J. (Ed.) (1995). Barriers to Conflict Resolution. New York: Norton & Com-pany. Google Scholar öffnen
  5. Aspinwall, M., & Schneider, G. (2001). Institutional research on the European Union: mapping the field. In M. Aspinwall & G. Schneider (Eds.), The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe (pp. 1–187). Manchester: Manchester University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  6. Aspinwall, M., & Schneider, G. (Eds.) (2001). The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  7. Aubert, V. (1963). Competition and dissensus: two types of conflict and of conflict resolution. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7, 26–42. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/002200276300700105
  8. Bächtiger, A., & Steiner, J. (2005). Special Issue: Empirical Approaches to Deliberative Democracy. Acta Politica, 40(2). Google Scholar öffnen
  9. Bailer, S. (2006a). Nationale Interessen in der Europäischen Union: Macht und Ver-handlungserfolg im Ministerrat. Frankfurt / New York: Campus Verlag. Google Scholar öffnen
  10. Bailer, S. (2006b). The Dimensions of Power in the European Union. Comparative Eu-ropean Politics, (4), 355–378. Google Scholar öffnen
  11. Bailer, S. (2004). Bargaining success in the European Union. European Union Politics, 5(1), 99–123. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1465116504040447
  12. Bailer, S. (2010). What factors determine bargainig power and success in EU negotiations? Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5), 743–757. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501761003748765
  13. Bara, J., Weale, A., & Biquelet, A. (2007). Analysing Parliamentary Debate with Computer Assistance. Swiss Political Science Review, 13(4), 577–605. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2007.tb00090.x
  14. Barry, B. (1980). Is it better to be powerful or lucky? Part 1. Political Studies, 28(2), 183–194. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1980.tb01244.x
  15. Beach, D. (2004). The unseen hand in treaty reform negotiations: the role and influence of the Council Secretariat. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(3), 408–439. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/rjpp13501760410001100279
  16. Behnke, J. (2005). Lassen sich Signifikanztests auf Vollerhebungen anwenden? Einige essayistische Anmerkungen. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 46(1), 1–15. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1007/s11615-005-0240-y
  17. Behnke, N. (2009). Agenda-Setting für Verfassungsreformen. In S. Shikano, J. Behnke, & T. Bräuninger (Eds.), Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie: Verfassungsreformen (pp. 11–53). Google Scholar öffnen
  18. Behnke, N., & Benz, A. (2006). Verfassungswandel und Verfassungspolitik (Antrag für eine DFG-Forschergruppe). Hagen. Google Scholar öffnen
  19. Behnke, N., & Benz, A. (2009). The Politics of Constitutional Change between Reform and Evolution. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 39(2), 213–240. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjn039
  20. Benoit, K., Laver, M., Arnold, C., Pennings, P., & Hosli, M. O. (2005). Measuring Na-tional Delegate Positions at the Convention on the Future of Europe Using Comput-erized Word Scoring. European Union Politics, 6(3), 291–313. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1465116505054834
  21. Benoit, K., Laver, M., & Mikhaylov, S. (2009). Treating Words as Data with Error: Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 495–513. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00383.x
  22. Benz, A. (1994). Kooperative Verwaltung: Funktionen, Voraussetzungen, Folgen. Ba-den-Baden: Nomos. Google Scholar öffnen
  23. Biesenbender, J. (2011). The Dynamics of Treaty Change: Measuring the Distribution of Power in the European Union? European Integration Online Papers, (5), Article 5, from http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2011_005a. Google Scholar öffnen
  24. Biesenbender, J. (2012). Bargaining at EU Intergovernmental Conferences 1996 - 2004. Dissertation Universität Konstanz. Unpublished manuscript, Konstanz. Google Scholar öffnen
  25. Bräuninger, T., & König, T. (2000). Making Rules for Governing Global Commons: The case of deep-sea mining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(5), 604–629. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/0022002700044005003
  26. Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundation of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  27. Bueno Mesquita, B. de (2003). Principles of International Politics. People´s Power, Preferences, and Perception (2nd ed.). Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  28. Bürgin, A. (2007). Die Legitimität der EU: Normative Standards als Verhandlungsres-source im Verfassungskonvent. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/9783845205304
  29. Checkel, J. T. (2001). Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. International Organization, 55(3), 553–588. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1162/00208180152507551
  30. Checkel, J. T., & Moravcsik, A. (2001). A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies? European Union Politics, 2(2), 219–249. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1465116501002002004
  31. Christiansen, T., Falkner, G., & Joergensen, K. E. (2002). Theorizing EU treaty reform: beyond diplomacy and bargaining. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(1), 12–32. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760110104154
  32. Christiansen, T., Joergensen, K. E., & Wiener, A. (Eds.) (1999). Special Issue on the Social Construction of Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, (6). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/135017699343450
  33. Christiansen, T. & Reh, C. (2009). Constitutionalizing the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-10281-2
  34. Closa, C. The European Union Constitution Database: Universität Zaragossa. Retrieved May 20, 2012, from http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/ Google Scholar öffnen
  35. Treaty_Const_Bibliography.htm. Google Scholar öffnen
  36. Closa, C., & Fossum, J. E. (Eds.) (2004). Arena Report: No 5. Deliberative Constitu-tional Politics in the EU. Oslo. Google Scholar öffnen
  37. Da Conceicaio-Heldt, E. (2006). Integrative and Distributive Bargaining Situations in the European Union: What Difference Does it Make? Negotiation Journal, 22(2), 145–165. Google Scholar öffnen
  38. Deitelhoff, N. (2006). Überzeugung in der Politik: Grundzüge einer Diskurstheorie in-ternationalen Regierens. Franfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Google Scholar öffnen
  39. Deitelhoff, N. (2009). The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Per-suasion in the ICC Case. International Organization, 63, 33–65. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S002081830909002X
  40. Deitelhoff, N., & Mueller, H. (2005). Theoretical Paradis- Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas. Review of International Studies, 31, 167–179. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0260210505006364
  41. Dingwerth, K. (2010). Research Project on Changing Norms of Global Governance: Universität Bremen, from http://www.globalnorms.uni-bremen.de/. Google Scholar öffnen
  42. Dryzek, J. S. (1990). Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/9781139173810
  43. Dryzek, J. S. (2006). Deliberative Global Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  44. Dür, A., & Mateo, G. (2010a). Bargaining Power and Negotiation Tactics: The Nego-tiations on the EU´s Financial Perspective, 2007-2010. Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(3), 557–578. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02064.x
  45. Dür, A., & Mateo, G. (2010b). Choosing a bargaining strategy in EU negotiations: power, preferences, and culture. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5), 680–693. Google Scholar öffnen
  46. Dür, A., Mateo, G., & Thomas, D. C. (2010). Negotiation theory and the EU: the state of the art. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5), 613–618. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501761003748500
  47. Elgström, O., & Jönsson, C. (2000). Negotiation in the European Union: Bargaining or Problem Solving? Journal of European Public Policy, 7(5), 684–704. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760010014902
  48. Elgström, O., & Jönsson, C. (2000). Negotiation in the European Union: bargaining or problem-solving? Journal of European Public Policy, 7(5), 684–704. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760010014902
  49. Elgström, O., & Smith, M. (Eds.) (2000). Negotiation and Policy Making in the Euro-pean Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(5). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760010014894
  50. Elster, J. (1986). The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory. In J. Elster & A. Hylland (Eds.), Foundations of Social Theory (pp. 103–132). Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  51. Elster, J. (1995). Strategic Arguing. In K. J. Arrow (Ed.), Barriers to Conflict Resolu-tion (pp. 237–257). New York: Norton & Company. Google Scholar öffnen
  52. Elster, J. (1998). Deliberation and constitution making. In J. Elster (Ed.), Deliberative Democracy (pp. 97–122). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  53. Elster, J. (Ed.) (1998). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139175005
  54. Eriksen, E. O., & Fossum, J. E. (2004). Europe in search of legitimacy: strategies of legitimation assessed. International Political Science Review, 25(4), 435–459. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/0192512104045089
  55. European Commission (1978). General considerations on the problems of enlargement: Communication sent by the Commission to the Council. COM(78) 120 final. Google Scholar öffnen
  56. European Commission (2004). Enlargement and institutional changes: MEMO/04/61. Google Scholar öffnen
  57. European Council (1996). Turin European Council. Presidency Conclusion. 29 March 1996. Google Scholar öffnen
  58. European Council (1999). Helsinki European Council. Presidency Conclusion. 11.12.1999. Google Scholar öffnen
  59. European Council (2001). The Future of the European Union: The Laeken Declaration: Bulletin or the European Union 12. (14-15 December). Google Scholar öffnen
  60. Falkner, G. (2002). EU treaty reform as a three-level process. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(1), 1–11. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760110104145
  61. Finke, D. (2009a). Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform: Understanding the Dynamics of Governmental Position-Taking. European Union Politics, 10(4), 482–506. Google Scholar öffnen
  62. Finke, D. (2009b). Challenges to Intergovernmentalism: An Empirical Anlaysis of EU Treaty Negotiations since Maastricht. West European Politics, 32(3), 466–495. Google Scholar öffnen
  63. Finke, D. (2010). European Integration and its Limits: Intergovernmental conflicts and their domestic origins. Essex: ECPR Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  64. Finke, D., König, T., Proksch, S.-O., & Tsebelis, G. (2012). Reforming the European Union: Realizing the Impossible. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  65. Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization, 52(4), 887–921. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789
  66. Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1981). Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without giving in. London: Hutchinson Business. Google Scholar öffnen
  67. Focault, M. (1974). Die Ordnung des Diskurses. Franfurt am Main: Fischer. Google Scholar öffnen
  68. Franck, T. (1990). The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. New York: Oxford Uni-versity Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  69. Früh, W. (2011). Inhaltsanalyse: Theorie und Praxis. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesell-schaft. Google Scholar öffnen
  70. Garret, G., & Tsebelis, G. (1999). Why resist the temptation to apply power indices to the European Union. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11(3), 291–308. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/0951692899011003001
  71. Gelman, A., & Hill, J. (2007). Data Analysis Using Regression and Multi-level/Hierarchical Models. New York: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  72. Grobe, C. (2010). The power of words: Argumentative persuasion in international ne-gotiations. European Journal of International Relations, 16(1), 5–29. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1354066109343989
  73. Gross, C., & Kriwy, P. (2009). Kleine Fallzahlen in der empirischen Sozialforschung. In C. Gross & P. Kriwy (Eds.), Quantitative empirische Sozialforschung mit kleiner Fallzahl (pp. 9–21). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Google Scholar öffnen
  74. Gross, C., & Kriwy, P. (Eds.) (2009). Quantitative empirische Sozialforschung mit kleiner Fallzahl. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Google Scholar öffnen
  75. Gulliver, P. H. (1979). Disputes and negotiations: a cross-cultural perspective. New York: Academic Press Inc. Google Scholar öffnen
  76. Haas, E. B. (1961). International Integration: The European and the Universal Process. International Organization, 15(3), 366–392. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300002198
  77. Habeeb, W. M. (1988). Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargaining with Strong Nations. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  78. Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 1 of Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  79. Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institu-tionalisms. Political Studies, 44, 936–957. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x
  80. Hanrieder, T. (2008). Moralische Argumente in den Internationalen Beziehungen: Grenzen einer verständigungsorientierten "Erklärung" moralischer Debatten. Zeit-schrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 15(2), 161–186. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0946-7165-2008-2-161
  81. Hanrieder, T. (2011). The false promise of the better argument. International Theory, 3(3), 390–415. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S1752971911000182
  82. Hatakoy, A. (2008). The Effectiveness of Decision Making in European Union Treaty Negotiations: An Empirical Analysis of Arguing and Bargaining in the Debates on the European Constitutional Convention. Dissertation FU Berlin. Unpublished manuscript. Google Scholar öffnen
  83. Helbling, M., Hoeglinger, D. & Wüest, B. (2010). How Political Parties Frame European Integration. European Journal of Political Research, 49(4), 496-521. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01908.x
  84. Heppt, A. (2008). "Theoretical Paradise-empirically saved"? Vorschlag zur Konzepti-onalisierung und empirischen Identifikation "besserer Argumente". Unpublished manuscript. Google Scholar öffnen
  85. Heritier, A. (2007). Explaining Institutional Change in Europe. Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199298129.001.0001
  86. Hix, S. (2002). Constitutional Agenda Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament won at Amsterdam. British Journal of Political Science, 32(2), 259-280. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0007123402000108
  87. Hobolt, S. B. (2009). Europe in Question: Referendums on European Integration. Ox-ford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199549948.001.0001
  88. Hoffman, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. Daedalus, (85), 862–915. Google Scholar öffnen
  89. Holzinger, K. (2001a). Kommunikationsmodi und Handlungstypen in den Internatio-nalen Beziehungen. Anmerkungen zu einigen irreführenden Dichotomien. Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 8, 243–286. Google Scholar öffnen
  90. Holzinger, K. (2001b). Verhandeln statt Argumentieren oder Verhandeln durch Argu-mentieren? Eine empirische Analyse des Verhältnisses von Argumentieren und Verhandeln auf der Basis der Sprechakttheorie. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 42(3), 414–446. Google Scholar öffnen
  91. Holzinger, K. (2004a). Strategic Arguing. Swiss Political Science Review, 10, 201–210. Google Scholar öffnen
  92. Holzinger, K. (2004b). Bargaining Through Arguing. An Empirical Analysis Based on Speech Act Theory. Political Communication, 21(2), 195–222. Google Scholar öffnen
  93. Holzinger, K. (2005). Context or Conflict Types: Which Determines the Selection of Communication Mode. Acta Politica, 50, 239–254. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500100
  94. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integra-tion: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Po-litical Science, 39, check, from doi: 10.1017/S0007123408000409. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000409
  95. Hopmann, P. T. (1995). Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solv-ing. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (542), 24–47. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/0002716295542001003
  96. Hopmann, P. T. (1996). The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  97. Hosli, M. O. (2008). Negotiating the European Economic and Monetary Union. Homo Oeconomicus, 25(2), 203–223. Google Scholar öffnen
  98. Hug, S., & König, T. (2002). In view of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. International Organization, 56(2), 447–476. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1162/002081802320005531
  99. Hug, S., & König, T. (2007). Domestic structures and constitution-building in an inter-national organization. Review of International Organization, (2), 105–113. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1007/s11558-007-9021-2
  100. Hurrelmann, A., Krell-Laluhová, Z., Nullmeier, F., Schneider, S., & Wiesner, A. (2009). Why the democratic nation-state is still legitimate: A study of media discourse. European Journal of Political Research, 48, 483–515. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.00844.x
  101. Iklé, F. (1964). How nations negotiate. New York: Harper and Row. Google Scholar öffnen
  102. Jachtenfuchs, M. (2002). Deepening and widening integration theory. Journal of Eu-ropean Public Policy, 9(4), 650–657. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760210152475
  103. Jachtenfuchs, M. (2002). Die Konstruktion Europas. Verfassungsideen und institutio-nelle Entwicklung. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Google Scholar öffnen
  104. Katzenstein, P. (Ed.) (1996). The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  105. Kelemen, D. R. (2006). Comment: Shaming the shameless? The constitutionalization of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), 1302–1307. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760601000199
  106. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. (1977). Power and Interdependence: world politics in tran-sition. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. Google Scholar öffnen
  107. Klüver, H. (2009). Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Anal-ysis. European Union Politics, 10(4), 535–549. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1465116509346782
  108. Kohler, U., & Kreuter, F. (2008). Datenanalyse mit Stata: Allgemeine Konzepte der Datenanalyse und ihre praktische Anwendung (3rd ed.). München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. Google Scholar öffnen
  109. Kohler-Koch, B. (2000). Framing: the bottleneck of constructing legitimate institutions. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(4), 513–531. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760050165343
  110. König, T., & Hug, S. (Eds.) (2006). Policy-making Processes and the European Con-stitution: A Comparative Study of Member States and Accession Countries. London: Routledge. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.4324/9780203965801
  111. König, T., & Luetgert, B. (2003). The Treaty of Nice. Intergovernmental Prenferences, Domestic Constraints and the Reform of European Institutions (Konferenzpapier ECPR General Conference Marburg). Google Scholar öffnen
  112. König, T., Warntjen, A., & Burkhart, S. (2006). The European Convention: Consensus without unity? In T. König & S. Hug (Eds.), Policy-making Processes and the Eu-ropean Constitution: A Comparative Study of Member States and Accession Coun-tries. London: Routledge. Google Scholar öffnen
  113. Kratochwil, F. (1989). Rules, Norms, and Decisions. On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559044
  114. Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content Analysis. An Introduction to Its Methodology. Thou-sands Oaks: Sage Publications. Google Scholar öffnen
  115. Landwehr, C., & Holzinger, K. (2010). Institutional determinants of deliberative inter-action. European Political Science Review, 2(3), 373–400. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S1755773910000226
  116. Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data. American Political Science Review, 97(2), 311–331. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000698
  117. Laver, M., & Garry, J. (2000). Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts. Amer-ican Journal of Political Science, 44(3), 619–634. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.2307/2669268
  118. Lax, D. A., & Sebenius, J. K. (1985). The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Nego-tiation. Negotiation Journal, 163–179. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1985.tb00304.x
  119. Lax, D. A., & Sebenius, J. K. (1986). The Manager as Negotiator. Bargaining for Co-operation and Competitive Gain. New York, London: The Free Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  120. Liese, A. (2006). Staaten am Pranger. Zur Wirkung internationaler Regime auf die inner-staatliche Menschenrechtspolitik. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Google Scholar öffnen
  121. Linhart, E. (2006). Die Erklärungskraft spiel- und tauschtheoretischer Verhandlungs-modelle in Abhängigkeit vom Institutionalisierungsgrad des Verhandlungssystems. Mannheim: Mannheim University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  122. Lorenz, A. (2008). Verfassungsänderungen in etablierten Demokratien: Motivlagen und Aushandlungsmuster. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Google Scholar öffnen
  123. Lowe, W. (2008). Understanding Wordscores. Political Analysis, 16, 359–371. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpn004
  124. Luhn, H.-P. (1958). A Business Intelligence System. IBM Journal, 314–319. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1147/rd.24.0314
  125. Magnette, P., & Nicolaidis, K. (2004). The European convention. Bargaining in the shadow of rhetoric. West European Politics, 27(3), 381–404. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000228068
  126. McKibben, H. E. (2010). Issue characteristics, issue linkage, and states´ choice of bar-gaining strategies in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5), 694–707. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501761003748682
  127. Milner, H. (1997). Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and Inter-national Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  128. Monroe, B. L., & Schrodt, P. A. (2008). Introduction to the Special Issue: The Statistical Analysis of Political Text. Political Analysis, 16, 351–355. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpn017
  129. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  130. Moravcsik, A., & Nicolaidis, K. (1999). Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(1), 59–85. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00150
  131. Moravcsik, A., & Vachudova, M. A. (2003). National Interests, State Power and EU Enlargement. East European Politics and Societies, 17(1), 42–57. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/0888325402239682
  132. Morgenthau, H. J. (1952). The national interest of the United States. American Political Science Review, 46, 961–988. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.2307/1952108
  133. Morgenthau, H. J. (1967). Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (2nd ed.). New York: Knopf. Google Scholar öffnen
  134. Morin, J.-F., & Gold, R. E. (2010). Consensus-seeking, distrust and rhetorical entrap-ment: The WTO decision on access to medicines. European Journal of Internatio-nal Relations, 16(4), 563–587. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1354066110366054
  135. Müller, H. (1994). Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln. Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 1(1), 15–44. Google Scholar öffnen
  136. Müller, H. (2004). Arguing, Bargaining and all that: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations, 10(3), 395–435. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1354066104045542
  137. Müller, H., & Deitelhoff, N. (2005). Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas. Review of International Studies, 31(1), 167–179. Google Scholar öffnen
  138. Naurin, D. (2007). Deliberation Behind Closed Doors. Transparency and Lobbying in the European Union. Colchester: ECPR Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  139. Naurin, D. (2010). Most Common When Least Important: Deliberation in the European Union Council of Ministers. British Journal of Political Science, 40(1), 31–50. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0007123409990251
  140. Naurin, D., & Wallace, H. (Eds.) (2008). Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1057/9780230583788
  141. Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). The Content Analysis Guidebook. London: Sage Publications. Google Scholar öffnen
  142. Neyer, J. (2006). The Deliberative Turn in Integration Theory. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(5), 779–791. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760600809160
  143. Niemann, A. (2004). Between communicative action and strategic action: the Article 113 Committee and the negotiations on the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(3), 379–407. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760410001694237
  144. Odell, J. S. (2000). Negotiating the World Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  145. Odell, J. S. (2010). Three islands of knowledge about negotiation in international or-ganizations. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5), 619–632. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501761003748534
  146. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collectiv action. New York: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807763
  147. Panke, D. (2006). More Arguing than Bargaining? The Institutional Design of the Eu-ropean Convention and Intergovernmental Conferences Compared. Europe-an Integration, 28(4), 357–379. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/07036330600853976
  148. Panke, D. (2010). Small States in the European Union Structural Disadvantages in EU Policy-Making and Counter-strategies. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(6), 801–819. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2010.486980
  149. Pierson, P. (1996). The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 29(2), 123–163. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/0010414096029002001
  150. Plümper, T., Schneider, C., & Troeger, V. (2005). The Politics of EU Eastern En-largement: Evidence from a Heckman Selection Model. British Journal of Political Science, 36, 17–38. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0007123406000020
  151. Pollack, M. A. (1996). The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis. Governance, 9(4), 429–458. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1996.tb00251.x
  152. Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027697
  153. Rabe-Hesketh, S., & A.Skrondal (2008). Multilevel and longitudinal modeling using stata (2nd ed.). College Station Texas: Stata Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  154. Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-versity Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  155. Reh, C. (2007). Pre-cooking the European Constitution? The role of government repre-sentatives in EU reform. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(8), 1186–1207. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760701656411
  156. Reh, C. (2009). The Lisbon Treaty: De-Constitutionalizing the European Union? Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(3), 625–650. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.01819.x
  157. Reinhard, J. (2012). "Cause we are all Europeans!" When do EU Member States use normative arguments? Journal of European Public Policy (online first), from DOI:10.1080/13501763.2012.662072. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.662072
  158. Risse, T. (2000). Let´s argue! Communicative Action in International Relations. Inter-national Organization, 54(1), 1–39. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1162/002081800551109
  159. Risse, T., & Kleine, M. (2010). Deliberation in Negotiations. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5), 708–726. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501761003748716
  160. Risse, T., Ropp, S., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.) (1999). The Power of Human Rights: Interna-tional Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598777
  161. Rittberger, B. (2005). Building Europe´s Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1093/0199273421.001.0001
  162. Rittberger, B., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2006). Special Issue: The Constitutionalization of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760600999474
  163. Schaal, G. S., & Ritzi, C. (2009). Empirische Deliberationsforschung (MPIfG Working Paper No. 09/9). Köln. Google Scholar öffnen
  164. Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games real actors play. Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  165. Scharpf, F. W. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Ox-ford University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295457.003.0001
  166. Schelling, T. (1963). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  167. Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). The Community Trap: Liberal Normen, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. International Organization, 55(1), 47–80. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1162/002081801551414
  168. Schimmelfennig, F. (2003). The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: rules and rhetoric. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492068
  169. Schimmelfennig, F., & Moravcsik, A. (2009). Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), European Integration Theory (2nd ed., pp. 67–87). Ox-ford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  170. Schimmelfennig, F., & Rittberger, B. (2006). Explaining the Constitutionalization of the European Union,. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), 1148–1167. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760600999474
  171. Schimmelfennig, F., Rittberger, B., Bürgin, A., & Schwellnus, G. (2006). Conditions for EU constitutionalization: a qualitative comparative analysis. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), 1168–1189. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760600999482
  172. Schneider, C. (2009). Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  173. Schneider, G., & Cederman, L.-E. (1994). The change of tide in political cooperation: a limited information model of European integration. International Organization, 48(4), 633–662. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028332
  174. Schneider, G., Finke, D., & Bailer, S. (2010). Bargaining Power in the European Union: an evaluation of competing game-theoretic models. Political Studies, 58(1), 85–103. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x
  175. Schnell, R., Hill, P. B., & Esser, E. (2005). Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung (7th ed.). München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. Google Scholar öffnen
  176. Schonhardt-Bailey, C. (2008). The congressional debate on partial-birth abortion: Con-stitutional gravitas and moral passion. British Journal of Political Science, 38, 383–410. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000203
  177. Schwellnus, G. (2006). Reasons for constitutionalization: non-discrimination, minority rights and social rights in the Convention on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), 1265–1283. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760600999565
  178. Sebenius, J. K. (1984). Negotiating the law of the sea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-versity Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  179. Seeger, S. (2008). Die Institutionen- und Machtarchitektur der Europäischen Union mit dem Vertrag von Lissabon. In W. Weidenfeld (Ed.), Lissabon in der Analyse. (pp. 63–98). Baden-Baden: Nomos. Google Scholar öffnen
  180. Selck, T. J. (2006). The effects of issue salience on political decision-making. Consti-tutional Political Economy, 17, 5–13. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1007/s10602-006-6790-1
  181. Slapin, J. (2006). Who is Powerful? Examining Preferences and Testing Sources of Bargaining Strength at European Intergovernmental Conferences. European Union Politics, 7(1), 51–76. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1465116506060912
  182. Slapin, J. (2008). Bargaining Power at Europe´s Intergovernmental Conferences: Testing Institutional and Intergovernmental Theories. International Organization, 62, 131–162. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080053
  183. Slapin, J. (2009). Exit, Voice and Cooperation: Bargaining Power in International Or-ganizations and Federal Systems. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 21(2), 187–211. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/0951629808100763
  184. Slapin, J., & Proksch, S.-O. (2008). A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Party Positions from Texts. American Journal of Political Science, 52(3), 705–722. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00338.x
  185. Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Wordon S.K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. American Sociological Review, 51, 464–481. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.2307/2095581
  186. Steiner, J., Bächtiger, A., Spörndli, M., & Steenbergen, M. R. (2004). Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  187. Stone, P. D. D. C. S. M. S., & Ogilvie, D. M. (1966). The General Inquirer: A Com-puter Approach to Content Analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  188. Stone Sweet, A., & Sandholtz, W. (1997). European integration and supranational governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(3), 297–317. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501769780000011
  189. Sullivan, J., & Lowe, W. (2010). Chen Shui-bian: On independence. China Quarterly, (203), 619–638. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/S0305741010000627
  190. Tallberg, J. (2006). Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492075
  191. Tallberg, J. (2008). Bargaining Power in the European Council. Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(3), 685–708. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.00798.x
  192. Tallberg, J. (2010). Explaining the institutional foundations of European Union negoti-ations. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5), 633–647. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501761003748559
  193. Thomson, R. (2008). Responsibility with Power: The Council Presidency of the Euro-pean Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 46, 593–617. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.00793.x
  194. Thomson, R., Stokman, F. N., Achen, C. H., & König, T. (Eds.) (2006). The European Union Decides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  195. Thurner, P. W., & Pappi, F. U. (2009). European Union Intergovernmental Conferences: Domestic Preference Formation, Transgovernmental Networks, and the Dynamics of Compromise. New York/London: Routledge. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.4324/9780203879702
  196. Thurner, P. W., Pappi, F. U., & Stoiber, M. (2002). EU Intergovernmental Conferences: A Quantitative Analytical Reconstruction and Data-Handbook of Domestic Preference Formation, Transnational Networks, and Dynamics of Compromise dur-ing the Amsterdam Treaty Negotiations (Arbeitspapiere No. 60). Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung. Google Scholar öffnen
  197. Tsebelis, G. (1990). Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics. California series on social choice and political economy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  198. Tsebelis, G., & Proksch, S.-O. (2007). The Art of Political Manipulation in the Euro-pean Convention. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(1), 157–186. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00707.x
  199. Ulbert, C., & Risse, T. (2005). Deliberately Changing the Discourse: What Does Make Arguing Effective? Acta Politica, (40), 351–367. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500117
  200. Voigt, S. (1999). Explaining constitutional change: a positive economics approach. Cheltenham: Elgar. Google Scholar öffnen
  201. Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. B. (1965). A Behavioural Theory of Labor Negotia-tions: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System. New York: McGraw-Hill. Google Scholar öffnen
  202. Warntjen, A. (2008). The Council Presidency: Power Broker or Burden? An Empirical Analysis. European Union Politics, 9(3), 316–338. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1177/1465116508093487
  203. Warntjen, A. (2010). Between bargaining and deliberation: decision-making in the Council of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5), 665–679. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501761003748641
  204. Weidenfeld, W. (Ed.) (1998). Amsterdam in der Analyse: Strategien für Europa. Gü-tersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Google Scholar öffnen
  205. Weidenfeld, W. (Ed.) (2001). Nizza in der Analyse. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. Google Scholar öffnen
  206. Weidenfeld, W. (Ed.) (2005). Die Europäische Verfassung in der Analyse. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. Google Scholar öffnen
  207. Weidenfeld, W. (Ed.) (2008). Lissabon in der Analyse. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/9783845210117
  208. Wiener, A. (2006). Comment: Fact or artefact? Analysing core constitutional norms in beyond-the-state contexts. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), 1308–1313. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1080/13501760601000215
  209. Young, P. H. (1991). Chapter 1: Negotiation Analysis. In P. H. Young (Ed.), Negotia-tion Analysis (pp. 1–23). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  210. Young, P. H. (Ed.) (1991). Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Google Scholar öffnen
  211. Zangl, B., & Zürn, M. (1996). Argumentatives Handeln bei internationalen Verhand-lungen: Moderate Anmerkungen zur post-realistischen Debatte. Zeitschrift für In-ternationale Beziehungen, 3(2), 341–366. Google Scholar öffnen
  212. Zürn, M., & Stephen, M. (2010). The View of Old and New Powers on the Legitimacy of International Institutions. Politics, 30(1), 91–101. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01388.x

Ähnliche Veröffentlichungen

aus dem Schwerpunkt "Internationale Organisationen & NGOs", "Europapolitik & Europäische Union"
Cover des Buchs: Weltbilder und Weltordnung
Lehrbuch Kein Zugriff
Gert Krell, Peter Schlotter, Alexandra Homolar, Frank A. Stengel
Weltbilder und Weltordnung
Cover des Buchs: Europa
Monographie Kein Zugriff
Hans Jörg Schrötter
Europa
Cover des Buchs: Le sanzioni dell’UE nei confronti della Russia tra sicurezza internazionale e diritti umani
Sammelband Kein Zugriff
Antonino Alì
Le sanzioni dell’UE nei confronti della Russia tra sicurezza internazionale e diritti umani
Cover des Buchs: Understanding the Emergence of Joint Debt Issuance on the EU Agenda
Monographie Kein Zugriff
Sara Arezes
Understanding the Emergence of Joint Debt Issuance on the EU Agenda
Cover des Buchs: Kritische Normenforschung in den Internationalen Beziehungen
Sammelband Vollzugriff
Stephan Engelkamp, Katharina Glaab, Antonia Graf
Kritische Normenforschung in den Internationalen Beziehungen

Hinweis

Dieses Werk ist urheberrechtlich geschützt und darf nur nach den Vorgaben der Nutzungs- und Lizenzvereinbarung genutzt werden. Jede darüber hinaus gehende Nutzung des Werkes ist ausdrücklich untersagt und wird verfolgt.

Feedback geben

Wir freuen uns über Ihr Feedback zu Inhalten und Funktionen. Ihre Nachricht hilft uns, unseren Service stetig zu verbessern.

Bewertung
Bild anhängen
oder hier ablegen
PNG oder JPG (max. 3 MB)

Anmelden

Passwort vergessen?
Login via Open Athens
Noch kein Benutzerkonto?
Jetzt registrieren

Publikation zitieren

Download: RIS BibTex