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Book Titles No access

Normative Argumente in EU-Vertragsverhandlungen

Das bessere Argument als Verhandlungsressource?
Authors:
Series:
Internationale Beziehungen, Volume 22
Publisher:
 2014


Bibliographic data

Copyright year
2014
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-0507-8
ISBN-Online
978-3-8452-4797-7
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series
Internationale Beziehungen
Volume
22
Language
German
Pages
272
Product type
Book Titles

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 6
  2. Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 7 - 10
  3. Tabellenverzeichnis No access Pages 11 - 14
  4. Abbildungsverzeichnis No access Pages 15 - 16
  5. Einleitung No access Pages 17 - 23
  6. Literaturdiskussion: Normative Argumente in internationalen Verhandlungen No access Pages 24 - 51
  7. Untersuchungsgegenstand: EU-Vertragsverhandlungen No access Pages 52 - 68
  8. Theorie und Hypothesen: Verwendung und Wirkung normativer Argumente in EU-Vertragsverhandlungen No access Pages 69 - 115
  9. Forschungsdesign: Messung des Argumentationsverhaltens und der weiteren Variablen No access Pages 116 - 163
  10. Analyse und Ergebnisse: Normative Argumente in EU-Vertragsverhandlungen No access Pages 164 - 244
  11. Schlussfolgerungen und Ausblick No access Pages 245 - 252
  12. Literaturverzeichnis No access Pages 253 - 264
  13. Annex No access Pages 265 - 272

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