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Profiles of Judicial Epistemology
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Publisher:
2018
Summary
Angewandte rechtswissenschaftliche Methoden erlangen ihre Anerkennung und Gültigkeit letztlich vor Gericht. Zugleich besteht die Notwendigkeit eines Rückbezugs in der zeitgenössischen philosophischen und wissenschaftlichen Debatte. Die Darstellung dieser Wechselwirkung ist die Inspiration für den vorliegenden Band. Er zeigt auf, was „juristische Wahrheit“ für die Gerechtigkeit leistet. Der gerichtliche Prozess ist dabei der typische Ort für die Verbalisierung von Erfahrungen. Dort wird das semantische Konzept der Wahrheit aufgrund seiner erkenntnistheoretischen Neutralität angewandt: bei der Rekonstruktion eines strittigen Sachverhalts, dem dialektischen Begriff des Beweises oder dem Finden eines „gerechten“ Urteils.
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Bibliographic data
Copyright year
2018
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-5118-1
ISBN-Online
978-3-7489-0697-1
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Language
English
Pages
156
Product type
Book Titles
Table of contents
ChapterPages
Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages I - XIII
Judicial truth No access
The illusion of “objective judicial knowledge” No access
Argumentative and demonstrative conceptions of the evidence No access
The epistemological neutrality of the process: a) the proceedings as a verbalisation of experience No access
b) the semantic conception of truth and factual reconstruction No access
The “logic of judgment”: a brief historical explanation No access
Continued: terminological issues No access
Context of decision and context of justification No access
Context of inquiry and judicial epistemology No access
Procedure as the science of limitation of power in the administration of justice and procedural systems No access
Peculiarities of criminal procedure: a) preliminary considerations No access
b) the adversarial and inquisitorial systems No access
c) the criminal procedure system and polity No access
d) mixed systems No access
Due process (criminal, civil and administrative) No access
Changes to the regulatory framework of the code of criminal procedure in force No access
Thema probandum and evidentiary subject (or theme) No access
Profiles (external and internal) of the dialectical conception of evidence and evidentiary relativism No access
The (juridical and epistemological) principle of the adversary system (audiatur et altera pars) No access
Equality of arms No access
Naturalness of the judge No access
The dialectical relationship between quaestio facti and quaestio iuris No access
The Court of cassation as judge of legitimacy No access
Components of the evidentiary sequence No access
Common sense generalisations No access
Known facts No access
Distinction between logical and scientific laws and common sense generalisation No access
The sterile nomenclature function of traditional evidentiary classification No access
The epistemological importance of the distinction between representative evidence and critical evidence No access
Evidence in a narrow sense and circumstantial evidence (or rebuttable presumption) No access
Circumstantial evidence (even with regard to precautionary measures) and suspicion No access
The proof No access
The evaluation of secondary facts and inference from item to outcome of evidence No access
Overall evaluation of evidence (and the specific functions of evidence and proof) No access
Evidentiary proceedings No access
Legal evidentiary rules: generalities No access
Methodological neutrality of the judge and the principle of trial acquisition (as well as burden of proof) No access
Evidentiary verisimilitude, pertinence and relevance No access
Continued: evidentiary relevance for epistemological fitness and “new scientific evidence” No access
The rules of evidentiary acquisition No access
The right to evidence No access
Atypical or unnamed evidence No access
The rules of evidentiary evaluation No access
The free conviction of the judge (and adjudication rules) No access
The evaluation of circumstantial evidence (and rebuttable presumption) No access
The evaluation of State’s evidence No access
The rule of “beyond any reasonable doubt” No access
