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Wie Neues entsteht

Eine Kritik mechanistischer Erklärungsansätze
Authors:
Publisher:
 2021

Keywords

Bibliographic data

Copyright year
2021
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-8320-5
ISBN-Online
978-3-7489-2710-5
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Language
German
Pages
201
Product type
Book Titles

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access 1 - 8
    1. 1.1 Kausalerklärungsansätze und die Willensfreiheitsdebatte No access
    2. 1.2 Begriffliche Klärungen No access
      1. 1.3.1 Die britischen Emergentisten der 1920er Jahre: Das Neue und die Seinsstufen No access
      2. 1.3.2 Die neuen Mechanisten der 1990er Jahre: Das Neue in konstitutiver Hinsicht No access
      3. 1.3.3 Forschungsdesiderat: Das Neue in ätiologischer Hinsicht No access
    4. 1.4 Fragestellung und Struktur der Arbeit No access
    1. 2.1 Einleitung No access
    2. 2.2 Das konzeptuelle Problem evolutionärer Neuerung No access
    3. 2.3 Zwei Definitionen des evolutionär Neuen No access
    4. 2.4 Mechanistische Erklärung für evolutionär Neues No access
    5. 2.5 Zwischenfazit No access
    1. 3.1 Einleitung No access
    2. 3.2 Der Begriff der Art in den Wissenschaften No access
    3. 3.3 Veränderung von Arten und kausale Potenz: „Power“-Realismus No access
    4. 3.4 Veränderung von Arten und kausale Relevanz: Kontrafaktischer Ansatz No access
    5. 3.5 Singularistische und generalistische Erklärungsansätze No access
    6. 3.6 Das Exklusionsargument in Hinblick auf ätiologisch Neues No access
    7. 3.7 Zwischenfazit No access
    1. 4.1 Einleitung No access
      1. 4.2.1 Erstes Horn des Dilemmas: Neues ohne kausale Potenz No access
      2. 4.2.2 Zweites Horn des Dilemmas: Kausale Potenz und Erklärungslücke No access
    3. 4.3 Zwischenfazit No access
    1. 5.1 Einleitung No access
      1. 5.2.1 Konzeptuelle Auffassung des multipel realisierten Artgegenstands No access
      2. 5.2.2 Realistische Auffassung des multipel realisierten Artgegenstands No access
      1. 5.3.1 Absolute Auffassung der multiplen Realisierung No access
      2. 5.3.2 Relative Auffassung der multiplen Realisierung No access
    4. 5.4 Zwischenfazit No access
    1. 6.1 Einleitung No access
    2. 6.2 Rekapitulation: Neues (I) nach dem mechanistischen Modell No access
    3. 6.3 Neues (II) in ätiologischer Hinsicht No access
    4. 6.4 Exkurs: Beispielfall Entwicklungspsychologie No access
    5. 6.5 Zurück zum Exklusionsproblem No access
    6. 6.6 Zwischenfazit No access
    1. 7.1 Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse No access
    2. 7.2 Ausblick auf die Willensfreiheitsdebatte No access
  9. Literatur No access 195 - 201

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