Cover of book: Antitrust Enforcement and Standard Essential Patents
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Antitrust Enforcement and Standard Essential Patents

Moving beyond the FRAND Commitment
Authors:
Publisher:
 2017

Summary

The present thesis discusses the implications of the enforcement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) for competition law. Formal standard setting has the potential to result in near-optimal investment in research and development and at the same time in rapid implementation of innovative standards.

Bibliographic data

Copyright year
2017
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-4217-2
ISBN-Online
978-3-8452-8519-1
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series
Munich Intellectual Property Law Center - MIPLC Studies
Volume
29
Language
English
Pages
78
Product type
Book Titles

Table of contents

ChapterPages
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 - 10 Download chapter (PDF)
  2. . Introduction 11 - 14 Download chapter (PDF)
  3. Download chapter (PDF)
      1. Economic Benefits of Formal Standardisation
      2. Formal Standardisation and its Superior Efficiency
      3. Anticompetitive Risks Prior-Adoption of a Standard
    2. Theories of Post-Adoption Harm
    3. Responses to Hold-Up – SSOs Self-Regulation and the Voluntary FRAND Commitment
    4. Hold-Up or Hold-Out?
  4. Download chapter (PDF)
    1. The Nature of the FRAND Commitment
    2. Injunctive Relief Post-eBay
    3. Exclusion Orders and the International Trade Commission
    4. Antitrust Enforcement by the DOJ and the FTC
  5. Download chapter (PDF)
    1. Case-Law in Member States – The Orange Book Standard
    2. Enforcement Action by the Commission
    3. Huawei V. ZTE
  6. Download chapter (PDF)
      1. The PAE and Privateer or Hybrid-PAE Business Model
      2. Implications of PAE Activities for Social Welfare and Efficiency
    2. PAEs and Privateers in the Context of Cooperative Standards-Setting
    3. PAEs and Opportunistic Assertion of SEPs: A Competition Law Problem?
      1. Legal Formalism in the Enforcement of EU Competition Law in the Context of Coordinated Standards-Setting
      2. An Effects-Based Approach to Opportunism with SEPs: Anticompetitive Foreclosure and Article 102 TFEU
      3. Privateering Arrangements and Article 101 TFEU
  7. . Conclusion 71 - 72 Download chapter (PDF)
  8. Download chapter (PDF)
    1. Books
    2. Articles
      1. E.U.
      2. U.S.

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