Aristotle on Self-Motion

Antonio Ferro

doi:10.24894/978-3-7965-4363-0

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2022
ISBN-Print: 978-3-7965-4163-6
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7965-4363-0
Publisher: Schwabe, Basel / Berlin
Series: Philosophical Studies in Ancient Thought
Volume: 1
Language: English
Pages: 465
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 8
1. Note to the reader No access
1. 0.1 Preliminaries: A bird's eye view No access
2. 1. 0.2.1 Scope of the present investigation: What is not found in this book No access
  2. 0.2.2 Contents: What is found in this book No access
1. 1.1 Dialectic and diaporetic method in de An. I 2–5: Three plausibility constraints No access
2. 1. a) Concern 1: The definition of soul as self-motion No access
  2. b) Concern 2: Soul as a first mover No access
3. 1. 1.3.1 Overall strategy of refutation No access
  2. 1.3.2 Plato's self-moving souls No access
  3. 1. 1.3.3.1 Aristotle's concerns about causal synonymy: T8.(i) No access
    2. 1.3.3.2 The distinction between motion καθ᾽ αὑτό and καθ᾽ ἕτερον: T8.(ii) No access
    3. 1.3.3.3 The per se motions of soul are neither natural nor violent: Arguments (1)‍–‍(5) No access
    4. 1.3.3.4 The ekstasis argument and Plato's definition of soul No access
4. 1.4 A positive lesson on the soul-body causal relation No access
5. 1.5 Timean “perceptions” as sui generis per se motions of soul No access
6. 1.6 Summary No access
1. 2.1 An overview No access
2. 1. 1. 2.2.1.1 Aristotle's proof No access
    2. 2.2.1.2 The eternity claim: Two readings No access
  2. 1. 2.2.2.1 Brief aperçu on Aristotle's argument in Ph. VIII 3–6 No access
    2. 2.2.2.2 The third aporia in Ph. VIII 2 No access
    3. 2.2.2.3 Aristotle's interim solution to the third aporia No access
3. 2.3 The relation between Ph. VIII 2 and Ph. VIII 6 No access
4. 1. 2.4.1 The argument in context No access
  2. 1. 2.4.2.1 From weak causal autonomy to the inability to cause continuous motion in two steps (Ph. VIII 6, 259b1‍–‍31) No access
    2. 2.4.2.2 The conclusion of the overarching argument in Ph. VIII 3‍–‍6 (Ph. VIII 6, 259b32‍–‍260a19) No access
  3. 1. 1. 2.4.3.1.1 The “orthodox” interpretation No access
      2. 2.4.3.1.2 Morison's interpretation No access
    2. 2.4.3.2 Justification of the οὐ κυρίως claim No access
  4. 2.4.4 Some loose ends: Metaphysical aspects of strong causal autonomy No access
1. 3.1 An overview No access
2. 3.2 A methodological prolegomenon: ^Plato, Aristotle, and two senses of capacity No access
3. 1. 3.3.1 Individuation without Separation: Two distinct concerns No access
  2. 1. 3.3.2.1 The argument in de An. III 9, 432a22–b13 No access
    2. 3.3.2.2 A rival interpretation of de An. III 9–10 No access
4. 1. 3.4.1 de An. III 10, 433a9–21: Occurrent desires and extensional distinctness No access
  2. 3.4.2 de An. III 10, 433a21–30: Erring desires and the ὀρεκτόν as a mover No access
  3. 3.4.3 de An. III 10, 433b5–13: Conflict of (occurrent) desires and the formal unity of the capacity for desire No access
  4. 3.4.4 de An. III 10, 433b13–30: Locomotive capacity defined and a coda No access
5. 3.5. Self-motion at the crossroads of ^de Anima III 9‍–‍10 and ^Ph. VIII: The daunting task of ^MA No access
1. 1. 4.1.1 Chapter 1 No access
  2. 4.1.2 Chapter 2 No access
  3. 4.1.3 Chapter 3 No access
2. 4.2 Ph. VIII 5: Self-motion and the unity of life No access
References No access Pages 433 - 442
Index locorum No access Pages 443 - 454
Index of names No access Pages 455 - 456
Index of subjects No access Pages 457 - 465