Explaining Resistance to Change

Dr. Jan Philipp Krügel

doi:10.5771/9783845284576

Summary

Many organisational changes fail because of resistance to change by employees. Changes require new ways of thinking, and the general uncertainty that surrounds them tends to make people uncomfortable. Jan Philipp Krügel examines the circumstances under which employees are more accepting of change with a laboratory experiment. His findings suggest that if employees are treated well by their employer in the first place, they are also more willing to help implement changes. The general uncertainty about the outcome of change, however, does not necessarily lead to strong resistance.

Jan Philipp Krügel is currently working as a research assistant for the chair of behavioural economics at Helmut-Schmidt-University in Hamburg. His research focuses on experimental economics, game theory and behavioural economics.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2017
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-4188-5
ISBN-Online: 978-3-8452-8457-6
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Language: English
Pages: 156
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 15
Introduction No access Pages 17 - 22
1. 1. Definitions No access
  2. 1. Social Psychology No access
    2. Management Science No access
    3. Political Economy No access
  3. Relevance No access
  4. Overcoming Resistance No access
2. 1. Threshold Contribution Games No access
  2. Voter Participation Games No access
  3. 1. The Shirking Model No access
    2. Empirical Studies No access
    3. The Fair-Wage Effort Hypothesis No access
  4. The Gift Exchange Game No access
  5. Upshot No access
1. 1. 1. Assumptions No access
    2. Nash-Equilibria No access
    3. Equilibrium Selection No access
  2. 1. Basic Design No access
    2. Equilibrium Analysis No access
  3. 1. Social Preferences No access
    2. Beliefs and Risk Aversion No access
2. 1. Overview No access
  2. Mechanism and Procedures No access
  3. Limitations No access
3. 1. The Baseline Treatment No access
  2. Treatment Variations No access
  3. Elicitation of Social Preferences and Risk Attitudes No access
  4. Procedure No access
4. 1. Descriptive Statistics No access
  2. 1. Reciprocity and Efficiency No access
    2. Coordination No access
    3. Free Riding No access
  3. Individual Outcomes No access
5. Implications No access Pages 121 - 124
Bibliography No access Pages 125 - 138
1. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria No access
2. Additional Regressions No access
3. Instructions No access