Big Data and the Abuse of Dominance by Multi-Sided Platforms

Dr. Noby Thomas Cyriac LL.M.

doi:10.5771/9783748934714

Summary

Der Autor untersucht interdisziplinär, inwieweit Art. 102 AEUV geeignet ist, den Wettbewerb vor dem missbräuchlichen Verhalten marktbeherrschender Plattformen zu schützen. Nach einer ersten Erörterung der Grundlagen der digitalen Wirtschaft, insbesondere Big Data und mehrseitige Plattformen, werden die relevanten Konzepte, die von EU-Kommission und EU-Gerichten in ihrer Entscheidungspraxis zur Auslegung von Art. 102 AEUV entwickelt wurden, näher beleuchtet, um ihre Eignung für das Missbrauchsverbot mit Blick auf Plattformbetreiber vor dem Hintergrund der Besonderheiten mehrseitiger Märkte zu bewerten. Auch das Vorhandensein und die Abgrenzung eines Datenmarktes werden diskutiert.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2022
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-9008-1
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7489-3471-4
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series: Schriftenreihe des EUROPA-KOLLEGS HAMBURG zur Integrationsforschung
Volume: 85
Language: English
Pages: 322
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 16
1. Background No access
2. The Objective of the Study No access
3. Outline of the Dissertation No access
4. Methodology No access
1. 1. 1.1 Volume No access
  2. 1.2 Variety No access
  3. 1.3 Velocity No access
  4. 1.4 Value No access
2. Part 2 – Competitive Significance of Big Data No access
1. 1. 1. 1. 1.1.1.1 Cookies No access
      2. 1.1.1.2 Other Tracking Mechanisms No access
    2. 1.1.2 Application on Consumer Data No access
    3. 1. 1.1.3.1 Advancement in Algorithmic Functions No access
      2. 1.1.3.2 The Mechanism behind Algorithms No access
  2. 1. 1.2.1 Collection: Tracking through Algorithms No access
    2. 1.2.2 Application on Business Data No access
2. 1. 2.1 Rise of Data-Analytical Firms No access
  2. 1. 1. 2.2.1.1 Product No access
      2. 2.2.1.2 Price No access
      3. 2.2.1.3 Place No access
      4. 2.2.1.4 Promotion No access
    2. 2.2.2 Changing Online Market Transactional Scenario No access
1. 1. 1.1 The Legal Concept No access
  2. 1. 1.2.1 General Aspects No access
    2. 1. 1.2.2.1 SSNIP Test No access
      2. 1.2.2.2 Price No access
      3. 1.2.2.3 Physical characteristics and end-use of the product No access
      4. 1.2.2.4 Consumer preferences No access
      5. 1.2.2.5 Exclusion of in-house production No access
      6. 1.2.2.6 Existence of specialised producers No access
      7. 1.2.2.7 Specific distribution channels No access
      8. 1.2.2.8 Product representing a small part of the overall final product cost No access
      9. 1.2.2.9 Switching time/cost/investment No access
      10. 1.2.2.10 Supply-side substitutability No access
2. 1. 2.1 Explicitly Traded Data Market/Pure Data Markets No access
  2. 1. 2.2.1 Multi-Sided Platforms No access
    2. 2.2.2 The existence of a market for data in multi-sided platforms No access
    3. 2.2.3 Data Markets in Facebook – An Illustration No access
    4. 1. 2.2.4.1.1 Inadequacy of the SSNIP Test in Multi-Sided Platforms No access
        2.2.4.1.2 The relevant factors for data No access
      2. 2.3.4.2. Geographical Market No access
1. 1. 1.1 The Legal Concept of Dominance No access
  2. 1.2 Market Shares No access
  3. 1. 1.3.1 Relevance of the Concept No access
    2. 1.3.2 Legal and Regulatory Barriers No access
    3. 1.3.3 Economies of Scale and Sunk Costs No access
    4. 1.3.4 Access to Essential Factors No access
    5. 1.3.5 Privileged Access to Sources of Supply No access
    6. 1.3.6 Network Effects and Switching Cost No access
    7. 1.3.7 Unavoidable Trading Partner No access
    8. 1.3.8 Established Position of the Incumbent Firm No access
    9. 1.3.9 Highly Developed Distribution and Sales Network and Product Range No access
2. 1. 2.1 Relevant Considerations No access
  2. 2.2 Market Shares – A Shadow of Monopoly Power? No access
  3. 1. 2.3.1 Economies of Scale and Scope No access
    2. 2.3.2 Access to Data No access
    3. 2.3.3 Privileged Access to Critical Inputs: Coupling of Data Access and the Ability to draw Customer Attention No access
    4. 1. 2.3.4.1 The functioning of network effects No access
      2. 2.3.4.2 Market Tipping No access
      3. 2.3.4.3 High switching cost No access
      4. 2.3.4.4 Lock-in of users No access
    5. 2.3.5 Unavoidable Trading Partner No access
1. 1. 1.1 The Concept of Abuse No access
  2. 1. 1. 1.2.1.1 Predatory Pricing No access
      2. 1.2.1.2 Margin Squeeze No access
      3. 1.2.1.3 Price Discrimination No access
      4. 1.2.1.4 Rebate Schemes No access
      5. 1.2.1.5 Bundling No access
      6. 1.2.1.6 Exploitative Pricing No access
      7. 1.2.1.7 Effect of pricing abuses on inter-state trade No access
    2. 1. 1.2.2.1 Tying No access
      2. 1.2.2.2 Refusal to Supply No access
      3. 1.2.2.3 Exclusive Dealings No access
      4. 1.2.2.4 Effect of non–pricing abuses on inter-state trade No access
2. 1. 2.1 Information Asymmetry in Digital Markets No access
  2. 1. 1. 2.2.1.1 Predatory Pricing No access
      2. 2.2.1.2 Margin Squeeze No access
      3. 2.2.1.3 Personalised Price Discrimination No access
      4. 2.2.1.4 Rebate Schemes No access
      5. 2.2.1.5 Exploitative Pricing No access
      6. 2.2.1.6 Bundling No access
    2. 1. 2.2.2.1 Tying No access
      2. 2.2.2.2 Refusal to Supply No access
      3. 2.2.2.3 Exclusive Dealings No access
      4. 2.2.2.4 Exploitative terms and conditions No access
      5. 2.2.2.5 Self-preferencing No access
CONCLUSION No access Pages 279 - 288
1. Legislations No access
2. Cases No access
3. Reports and Guidance Papers No access
4. Articles No access
5. Books No access
6. Conference & Speeches No access
7. Internet Sources No access