Human Dignity in the General Theory of Fundamental Rights

Dr. Augusto Wiegand Cruz

doi:10.5771/9783748949732

Summary

This research concerns the legal doctrine of human dignity in the general theory of fundamental rights in the Chilean constitutional order. This research further examines how the constitutional concept of human dignity has been treated in Germany, where the doctrinal work around human dignity has seen unparalleled evolution and development. The question of how one can benefit from comparative legal perspectives in general and the German perspective in particular will be discussed. Against this background, three dimensions of the German experience are of particular importance for the interpretation of the human dignity clause of the Chilean Constitution. The latter arises from three perspectives: the methodological, the dogmatic and the sociological.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2025
ISBN-Print: 978-3-7560-2324-0
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7489-4973-2
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht
Volume: 343
Language: English
Pages: 328
Product type: Book Titles

1. Preface No access
2. Abbreviations No access
1. § 1 Introduction No access
2. 1. 1. Historical context No access
  2. 2. The general theory of fundamental rights in Chile No access
  3. 1. 1. 3.1.1. Description No access
      2. 3.1.2. Analysis No access
  4. 1. 4.1. The constitutional chapter on “Institutional Foundations” No access
    2. 1. 4.2.1. Previous constitutional texts No access
      2. 4.2.2.1. The proceedings of the CSNC No access
        4.2.2.2. The proceedings of the State Council No access
  5. 1. 5.1. Status of international treaties on human rights No access
    2. 5.2. “Essential rights which emanate from human nature:” analysis No access
  6. 6. Final considerations No access
1. 1. 1. 1.1. Description of sources No access
    2. 1.2. Dignity as a value or principle No access
    3. 1. 1.3.1. The concept of human dignity in the work of Humberto Nogueira No access
      2. 1.3.2. José Luis Cea’s approach to dignity No access
      3. 1.3.3.1. Summary of other understandings No access
        1.3.3.2. The remarks of Eduardo Aldunate No access
    4. 1. 1.4.1. Ruling opinion No access
      2. 1.4.2. Other approaches No access
  2. 1. 2.1. Legal form No access
    2. 2.2. Concept and content of human dignity No access
    3. 2.3. Holders of human dignity No access
    4. 2.4. Effects of human dignity on the legal doctrine of fundamental rights No access
  3. 3. Summary No access
  4. 1. 4.1. General remarks No access
    2. 4.2. Indistinct characterization of the term as a principle or value No access
    3. 4.3. Indistinct substrate of dignity No access
    4. 4.4. Connection to the positive constitutional text No access
  5. 5. Open questions - construction of an operative concept supported by the positive text No access
2. 1. 1. Scholarship No access
  2. 1. 2.1. Foundation of all rights in general No access
    2. 1. 2.2.1. The legal doctrine of strictly personal rights No access
      2. 2.2.2.1. Right to personal identity No access
        2.2.2.2. Right to conscientious objection No access
        2.2.2.3. Right to free development of personality No access
  3. 1. 3.1. Lack of strong positive-legal text support for dignity as the foundation of rights in general No access
    2. 3.2. Theory of strictly personal rights: not sufficiently convincing No access
    3. 3.3. Implicit rights - risk of arbitrariness No access
3. 1. 1. Description of sources No access
  2. 1. 2.1. The civil law-based concept of a constitutional person No access
    2. 1. 2.2.1. Approaches not based on positive law No access
      2. 2.2.2.1. Vivanco’s approach No access
        2.2.2.2. Aldunate and the confusing wording of the CPR No access
  3. 1. 3.1. Rulings not based on civil law norms No access
    2. 3.2. Change of criterion No access
  4. 1. 4.1. Criticism of the non-civil-law-based conceptualization of a person No access
    2. 4.2. Criticism of the civil law-based conceptualization of a person No access
  5. 5. Open questions: the role of dignity as a criterion for the attribution of legal personhood No access
4. 1. 1. Introduction No access
  2. 2. The case law of the CCT No access
  3. 3. Summary and open questions No access
1. 1. 1. 1.1. Preliminary No access
    2. 1.2. Historical semblance No access
    3. 1.3. Basic rights as elements of an “objective order of values” and the place of dignity within this order No access
  2. 1. 1. 2.1.1.1. Transcendental versions of the Theory of Dowry No access
        2.1.1.2. Immanentist versions of the Theory of Dowry No access
        2.1.1.3. Reception and critique of the Theory of Dowry No access
      2. 2.1.2. Theory of Performance No access
      3. 2.1.3. Theory of Recognition No access
  3. 1. 1. 3.1.1. Dürig’s seminal position of dignity as a principle No access
      2. 3.1.2. Böckenförde’s extension of Dürig's approach No access
      3. 3.1.3. Dreier – drawing the doctrinal consequences No access
      4. 3.1.4. Enders and Kirste: dignity as the right to have rights No access
    2. 1. 3.2.1. Respect for dignity No access
      2. 3.2.2. Protection of dignity No access
    3. 3.3. Other objective-law effects of dignity No access
  4. 1. 4.1. Functional use of the human dignity clause No access
    2. 4.2. Theories of the legitimation of dignity No access
    3. 4.3. Compatibility within limits No access
    4. 4.4. Indigenous thought No access
    5. 4.5. Inclusion v. exclusion No access
2. 1. 1. Introduction No access
  2. 2. Human dignity as the foundation of basic rights in the general sense No access
  3. 1. 1. 3.1.1. The principle of the social state No access
      2. 3.1.2. Jurisprudential history of the MSI No access
      3. 3.1.3. Scope of protection of the MSI No access
    2. 1. 3.2.1. Jurisprudential history of the general right of personality No access
      2. 3.2.2. Scope of protection of the GRoP No access
  4. 1. 4.1. Right to a subsistence income in accordance with human dignity – absolute and relative No access
    2. 1. 4.2.1. Independent doctrinal development of general freedom of action and the GRoP No access
      2. 4.2.2. Doctrinal difficulties of the inviolable core area of private lifestyle No access
3. 1. 1. Introduction No access
  2. 2. Basic legal capacity and human dignity No access
  3. 1. 1. 3.1.1.1. Critique of the prenatal ownership of human dignity No access
        3.1.1.2. Protection of human dignity from the moment of fertilization No access
        3.1.1.3. Critique of protection from the point of fertilization No access
      2. 3.1.2. Ownership from birth No access
      3. 3.1.3.1. Decoupling the right to life from human dignity No access
        3.1.3.2. An increasing protection of human dignity No access
    2. 1. 3.2.1. Protection of human dignity after death No access
      2. 3.2.2. Critique of the protection of dignity after death No access
  4. 1. 4.1. Human dignity and basic legal capacity No access
    2. 4.2. Human dignity as a basic right No access
    3. 4.3. Human dignity as a principle No access
    4. 4.4. Dignity – a clause of constitutional openness No access
4. 1. 1. Introduction No access
  2. 1. 2.1. First step: determining the scope of protection No access
    2. 2.2. Second step: identifying the existence of an interference No access
    3. 1. 2.3.1. Restriction clauses No access
      2. 2.3.2. Basic rights without restriction clauses [vorbehaltlose Grundrechte] No access
      3. 2.3.3.1. Additional controls for the intrusive state activity No access
        2.3.3.2. The principle of proportionality No access
  3. 1. 1. 3.1.1. The Elfes Case No access
      2. 3.1.2. The Reiten im Walde Case No access
    2. 1. 3.2.1. Critique of the doctrine of guaranteed content No access
      2. 3.2.2. Balance No access
  4. 1. 4.1. Dignity as a principle No access
    2. 1. 4.2.1.1.1. Doctrinal antecedents and jurisprudential development No access
        4.2.1.1.2. Critique of the object-formula No access
        4.2.1.1.3. Assessment No access
        4.2.1.2. The negative approach No access
      2. 4.2.2.1. Ruling opinion: no justification possible No access
        4.2.2.2. Minority opinion: the relativity of human dignity No access
  5. 1. 5.1. Human dignity as an inherent limit in the constitution No access
    2. 5.2. Human dignity - unwaivable guarantee No access
    3. 5.3. Dignity versus dignity No access
  6. 1. 6.1. The theory of the human dignity-content or human dignity-core of fundamental rights No access
    2. 6.2. Critique No access
  7. 1. 1. 7.1.1. Doctrinal perfectionism No access
      2. 7.1.2. “In conjunction with” No access
      3. 7.1.3. Dignity versus dignity No access
    2. 7.2. Absoluteness of human dignity from a comparative law perspective No access
1. 1. 1. Introduction No access
  2. 2. Recalling Part I: Origin of the Chilean Constitution, general theory of basic rights and system of constitutional justice No access
  3. 1. 3.1. Content of human dignity in Chile No access
    2. 3.2. Human dignity and the foundation of basic rights in Chile No access
    3. 3.3. Human dignity and ownership of basic rights in Chile No access
    4. 3.4. Human dignity and restrictions on basic rights in Chile No access
  4. 1. 4.1. Content of human dignity in Germany No access
    2. 4.2. Human dignity and the foundation of basic rights in Germany No access
    3. 4.3. Human dignity and ownership of basic rights in Germany No access
    4. 4.4. Human dignity and restrictions on basic rights in Germany No access
  5. 1. 5.1. Antecedents No access
    2. 5.2. Comparison of the legal form and content of human dignity No access
    3. 5.3. Comparison of human dignity and foundation of basic rights No access
    4. 5.4. Comparison of human dignity and ownership of basic rights No access
    5. 5.5. Comparison of human dignity and restrictions on basic rights No access
2. 1. 1. Preliminary: the distinction between concept, content, and grounding of human dignity No access
  2. 2. First: definition of the legal form No access
  3. 1. 3.1. Independence No access
    2. 1. 3.2.1. The minimal protective purpose of the constitutional concept of human dignity No access
      2. 3.2.2. Theoretical sources for completing human dignity’s content: the legitimation of human dignity No access
      3. 3.2.3.1.1. Grounding dimension No access
        3.2.3.1.2. Sociological dimension No access
        3.2.3.1.3. Doctrinal dimension No access
3. 1. 1. 1. 1.1.1. The dignity clause as a preamble No access
      2. 1.1.2. The openness of the constitutional text No access
      3. 1.1.3. Legal character No access
      4. 1.1.4. Juridical interpretation No access
    2. 1. 1.2.1. Supreme constitutional norm No access
      2. 1.2.2. Human nature and human dignity No access
    3. 1. 1.3.1.1. Grammar No access
        1.3.1.2. Location No access
        1.3.1.3. Genealogy No access
        1.3.1.4. Remedy of protection No access
    4. 1. 1.4.1. Minimal content: Basic legal capacity No access
      2. 1.4.2.1.1. Defensive sphere No access
        1.4.2.1.2. Protective sphere No access
        1.4.2.1.3. Benefit sphere No access
        1.4.2.2. Universality of human dignity and the particularity of the Chilean community that guarantees it No access
  2. 1. 1. 2.1.1. Grounding of basic rights in a general sense No access
      2. 2.1.2. Grounding of implicit rights No access
    2. 2.2. Ownership of basic rights No access
    3. 1. 2.3.1. Restrictions on human dignity No access
      2. 2.3.2. Human dignity as an inherent limit in the constitution No access
      3. 2.3.3. Human dignity as a limit to restrictions on basic rights No access
4. Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung No access
1. 1. Scholarship and Proceedings No access
2. 1. 2.1. Chilean Constitutional Tribunal [Tribunal Constitucional – CCT] No access
  2. 2.2. German Federal Constitutional Court [Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG] No access
  3. 2.3. Supreme Court of Justice [Bundesgerichthof – BGH] No access
  4. 2.4. Federal Administrative Court [Bundesverwaltungsgericht – BVerwG] No access