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Monographie Kein Zugriff

Parliamentary Representation of Citizens’ Preferences

Explaining the Differences Between Parliamentarians’ Votes and Popular Referendum Results
Autor:innen:
Verlag:
 2014

Zusammenfassung

Die Vertretung von Wählerpräferenzen ist eine zentrale Aufgabe von Parlamenten, deren Gesetzgebung alle Lebensbereiche der Bürger betreffen. Wie Vertretung verstanden und gemessen werden kann und letztlich die Frage, wie Institutionen die Beziehung zwischen Parlamentsmitgliedern und Bürgern formen, ist indes schwer zu beantworten.

Diese Studie bietet einen innovativen Ansatz, die Vertretung von Wählerpräferenzen durch Parlamentsmitglieder zu konzeptualisieren. Anhand des Vergleichs von schweizerischen Parlamentsabstimmungen mit den Resultaten von Volksabstimmungen werden zahlreiche Determinanten und Konsequenzen einer höheren oder tieferen Kongruenz zwischen Politiker- und Wählerentscheidungen untersucht.

Der Fokus der Analyse liegt auf dem Einfluss von Wahlsystemen, etwa den Unterschieden zwischen der Verhältnis- und Mehrheitswahl und der Wirkungsweise der Wahlkreisgröße. Weitere Analysen beleuchten, unter anderem, den Zusammenhang zwischen Repräsentation und Wiederwahlchancen.

In englischer Sprache.

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Bibliographische Angaben

Auflage
1/2014
Copyrightjahr
2014
ISBN-Print
978-3-8487-1288-5
ISBN-Online
978-3-8452-5386-2
Verlag
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Reihe
Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie
Band
15
Sprache
Englisch
Seiten
230
Produkttyp
Monographie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten
  1. Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis Kein Zugriff 1 - 14
  2. Thesis Overview Kein Zugriff 15 - 24
  3. Using Referenda and Roll Call Votes as a Measure for Representation: Methodological Principles Kein Zugriff 25 - 78
  4. Evaluating the Median Voter Model’s Explanatory Power Kein Zugriff 79 - 85
  5. Voters Elect Politicians Who Closely Matched Their Preference Kein Zugriff 86 - 95
  6. Quantifying Parliamentary Representation of Constituents’ Preferences and Explaining Divergence Kein Zugriff 96 - 114
  7. District Magnitude and Representation of the Majority’s Preferences: Evidence from Popular and Parliamentary Votes Kein Zugriff 115 - 144
  8. A Refined View on the Relationship Between District Magnitude and Representation Kein Zugriff 145 - 159
  9. Representatives’ Majority Decisions: The law of Large Numbers Kein Zugriff 160 - 180
  10. A Comparative Analysis of the Voting Behavior of Constituents and Their Representatives for Public Debts Kein Zugriff 181 - 194
  11. Conclusion and Research Perspective Kein Zugriff 195 - 206
  12. Appendix Kein Zugriff 207 - 216
  13. Bibliography Kein Zugriff 217 - 230

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