Transition 2.0

Dr. h.c. Michal Bobek; Dr. Adam Bodnar; Prof. Dr. Armin von Bogdandy; Prof. Dr. Pál Sonnevend

doi:10.5771/9783748914938

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Copyrightjahr: 2023
ISBN-Print: 978-3-7560-0079-1
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7489-1493-8
Verlag: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Reihe: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht
Band: 320
Sprache: Englisch
Seiten: 0
Produkttyp: Sammelband

Inhaltsverzeichnis

KapitelSeiten

Titelei/InhaltsverzeichnisSeiten 1 - 10 Download Kapitel (PDF)
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. II. Constitutional Democracy as a Normative Ideal
  3. 1. 1. Realist Approach to Transition 2.0
    2. 2. Structural Approach to Transition 2.0
    3. 3. Principled Approach to Transition 2.0
    4. 4. Inclusive Approach to Transition 2.0
  4. IV. Conclusion
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. II. Transformative Constitutionalism: Preliminary Questions
  3. III. The Liberation of Democracy from Illiberal Politics: Theory and Practice
  4. IV. External Assistance or Internal Threat? On the EU's Ambivalent Rule of Law, its Democratic Deficit and Dividend in 'New Europe'
  5. V. Why Populism Matters: On Theoretical Misconceptions of Constitutionalism and Populism
  6. VI. The Absolute Concept of Constitution and the Authenticity of Constituent Power in Populism
  7. VII. Political Doxa, Legal Episteme and Transformative Constitutionalism's Teleology: Concluding Remarks on Law's Community of Values and Social Justice
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. 1. 1. Transition from what?
    2. 2. The Agents of transformation
  3. 1. 1. Experiences from Latin America
    2. 2. Anti-authoritarian coordination strategies in and out of government
  4. 1. 1. The social dimension – Boosting democratic performance from below
    2. 2. The political-institutional dimension
  5. V. Conclusions
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. II. Major Global Threats to Judicial Independence
  3. III. A Growing Threat of Authoritarianism and Regional Responses
  4. 1. 1. General remarks
    2. 2. Colombia and Guatemala – case studies
    3. 3. UN Convention against Corruption
    4. 4. Specific role of transitional justice in the context of corrupted judiciary
  5. 1. 1. General remarks on democratic transitions
    2. 2. Role of truth commissions
    3. 3. Peru’s success story – transition from Fujimori regime to democracy
    4. 4. Colombia – transition from FARC
  6. VI. Final Remarks
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. 1. 1. Activation
    2. 2. Limits
  3. 1. 1. Value compliance in process vs. value compliance in substance
    2. 2. Which way out?
  4. 1. 1. The Polish case: Restoring an independent judiciary
    2. 2. The Hungarian case: Breaking constitutional entrenchments
  5. 1. 1. Transformative constitutionalism: Concept and practice
    2. 2. European transformative constitutionalism
  6. 1. 1. On politicisation
    2. 2. On social support
  7. VII. Conclusion
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  1. 1. 1. The role of law: formality vs. informality
    2. 2. The regime’s hyper-pragmatism: adhocism and ideological agnosticism
    3. 3. Reasons explaining the formation of the regime
  2. 1. 1. a) First stage: things that can also be done with a simple majority
      2. b) Second stage: achieving two-thirds majority in order to change two-thirds majority rules
      3. c) Third stage: adopting a new Constitution (timing, procedural steps and key provisions)
    2. 2. When and how might still be forced the new parliamentary majority to abandon the current legal system?
    3. 1. a) “This is formalism”
      2. b) “This is legalism”
      3. c) “This is blindness to the moral content of the legal system”
      4. d) “Legal positivism is untenable: the Nazis also legally introduced the dictatorship”
      5. e) “Why are we so sure that the deep state will not sabotage the newly elected democratic government?”
      6. f) “If we wait until the deep state check mates the new government, it will be too late”
      7. g) “A fascist regime does not deserve to follow its rules”
      8. h) “There is no rule of law here, as the recent case X shows, so we don't have to follow the legal rules in force”
  3. 1. 1. a) “Written (positive) law allows two-thirds majority rules to be disregarded”
      2. b) “The two-thirds majority rules can be disregarded on the grounds of morality/natural law/legitimacy”
      3. c) “From a practical political point of view, there is no other choice but to disregard certain two-thirds majority provisions”
      4. d) “Several excellent constitutions (which conform to high standards of the rule of law and democracy) have been adopted procedurally illegally in foreign constitutional history”
    2. 1. a) The legal form of the parliamentary decision, the signature of the President, and publication in the Hungarian Gazette
      2. b) The Constitutional Court
      3. c) The duplication of the legal system: conflict between law enforcement agencies and chaos
      4. d) Organising a referendum
      5. e) Weighing costs and benefits: potential number of victims, setting a precedent, increasing polarisation
    3. 1. a) Stepping out of the legal system, stepping into the legal system
      2. b) Orbán’s deep state is both strong and weak
      3. c) We will not tell you the procedural details of how we plan to disregard the two-thirds majority rules, so that Fidesz does not build up new two-thirds majority defences against our plan
      4. d) We advise the public and the politicians on how to organise the transition – but we only talk about philosophical foundations, without the question of practical feasibility
      5. e) Problems related to the timing of the revolution: having it early is not smart, having it late is not useful
      6. f) The deep state officials are all fanatical blind followers of Orbán, but we will quickly convince the Fidesz voters with rational arguments that they should participate in our constitution-making p...
  4. 1. 1. Can the rule of law only be built in a process conforming with the rule of law?
    2. 2. Legal academia and politics: tasks and responsibilities of legal scholars
    3. 3. Polarisation as part of the cultural problem
    4. 4. Optimism and pessimism in public speaking/writing
    5. 5. Is planning a revolution an offence under Hungarian criminal law?
  5. V. Conclusions for a Future Hungarian Transition to Restore Constitutional Democracy
  6. VI. Postscript on the Differences between Poland and Hungary – and a Few Potential Lessons for a Polish Transition
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  1. I. Preliminary Remarks
  2. II. The Constitutional Authorities Destroying the Constitutional Order
  3. III. The Status of the President
  4. IV. The Status of the Constitutional Tribunal
  5. V. The Mortal Sins of the Constitutional Tribunal
  6. VI. The President as a Detractor of the Constitutional Order
  7. 1. 1. Civil service
    2. 2. Freedom of media
    3. 3. Deformation of judiciary
    4. 4. Scope of deformation of judiciary
  8. VIII. The Real Risk of a Constitutional Clinch
  9. IX. Irremovability of the Judges
  10. X. Three Types of Unconstitutional Judicial Appointments
  11. 1. 1. General remarks
    2. 2. Disciplinary responsibility of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal?
    3. 3. State-organized corruption
    4. 4. Excessive radicalism?
  12. XII. The Higher Loyalty
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  1. I. The Transnational Law of Democratic Transitions 1.0
  2. II. The Challenges of Transition 2.0
  3. III. Enforcing Directly Applicable Transnational Law
  4. IV. Erga Omnes Effects of Transnational Law
  5. V. Supererogatory Effects of Transnational Law
  6. VI. Asymmetric Rupture: Breaking the Law to Establish the Rule of Law in Recovering Democracies
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  1. I. The Dreams of New Constitutionalism
  2. II. Illiberal Revolution and the Abuse of Constitutional Courts
  3. III. The Struggle for the Autonomous Role of Ordinary Judges to Promote Constitutionalism
  4. IV. Empowering Ordinary Courts as a Rule of Law Counterrevolution
  5. V. Conclusions
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. II. Constitutional and Political Constraints of Potential Judicial Reforms
  3. 1. 1. Constitutional Court
    2. 2. National Council of Judiciary
    3. 3. System of disciplinary actions towards judges
    4. 4. Status of neo-judges
    5. 5. Re-opening of judicial proceedings
    6. 6. Administration of judiciary
    7. 7. Prosecution Service
    8. 8. Other changes
  4. IV. Role of the EU and International Organizations in Securing Judicial Reforms
  5. V. Transitional Justice Schemes
  6. VI. Legitimacy of the Judiciary – Search for Effectiveness
  7. VII. Conclusions
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. 1. 1. Conceptualisation(s) of court-packing
    2. 2. Good vs. bad court-packing
    3. 3. Specifics of cyclical court-packing
  3. 1. 1. “Packers” stay in power: What can they do?
    2. 2. “Packers” lose power: What can the new rulers do?
    3. 3. A brief summary
  4. 1. 1. “Just cause”
    2. 2. Techniques
    3. 3. Proportionality: How to differentiate unpacking from new court-packing?
    4. 4. Other issues to consider when resorting to court-unpacking
    5. 5. Alternative reform options
  5. V. Conclusion: The Ultimate Goal of Unpacking
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. II. The Enchantment and the Promise
  3. III. The Central European Experience: A Couple of Revolutions Too Many?
  4. IV. The Euro-Wave: From Euro-Timidity to the Judicial Self-Defence
  5. V. The Revolutionary Tribunals (in Whatever Direction the Next Revolution Goes)
  6. VI. The Way Forward for Courts: Moderate Nudging Within the Bounds of the Constitutional Settlement?
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. 1. 1. The Polish problem with the judicial appointments – an outline
    2. 2. The axiological context: The identity of the EU legal order
    3. 3. National judicial decisions in breach of EU Law
  3. 1. 1. Legal ineffectiveness
    2. 2. Reopening of judicial proceedings
    3. 3. Damages actions
    4. 4. Infringement proceedings
  4. IV. Conclusions
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. 1. 1. National v. European competence to regulate the process of appointing judges
    2. 2. Minimum European conditions of the procedure for appointing judges
    3. 3. Methodology for assessing the procedure for the appointment of judges: Ástráðsson, Simpson and A.K.
  3. 1. 1. General and systemic deficiencies
    2. 2. Failure to comply with the requirement of statutory regulation
    3. 3. Absence of a guarantee of a merit-based nomination process
    4. 4. Compromised fairness of the procedure
    5. 5. Lack of effective judicial review
  4. 1. 1. Axiological and systemic objectives
    2. 2. Ensuring the capacity of judges to adjudicate
    3. 3. Reinforcement of the rule of law and judicial independence
  5. 1. 1. Ensuring an effective right to a court
    2. 2. Interests of the parties to the closed proceedings
    3. 3. Legal certainty and res judicata
    4. 4. Irremovability of judges
  6. 1. 1. A precondition: re-composition of the NCJ
    2. 2. Recognition of defective appointments
    3. 3. Rejection of defective appointments
    4. 4. Balancing exercise: search for temperate options and a lesson from Ástráðsson
    5. 5. Verification mechanisms
    6. 6. Mitigating measures
    7. 7. Other instruments: disciplinary and criminal responsibility
  7. VII. Conclusions
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. II. Context
  3. 1. 1. Articles 2 and 19 TEU
    2. 2. National courts as enforcers of judicial independence – Article 267 TFEU
  4. 1. 1. Jurisdiction: overarching supranational judicial oversight
    2. 2. Admissibility: selective role of national courts as ‘vigilantes’
    3. 3. EU Law and the material redlines of renewed democracies
  5. V. Conclusion
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  1. 1. I. Introduction
    2. II. Transition 2.0: A Process Embedded in EU Law
    3. 1. 1. Non-regression from the fundamental commitment to respect and promote EU values
      2. 2. Non-regression from membership commitments
    4. 1. 1. Under Article 7 TEU
      2. 2. Outside Article 7 TEU
      3. 3. State’s obligations
      4. a) In the context of Article 7 TEU
        b) Outside Article 7 TEU
    5. V. Conclusion
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  1. I. Introduction
  2. 1. 1. Transitional justice and transformative constitutionalism
    2. 2. The union framework for transitional justice in the union
    3. 3. Union values as a basis for transitional justice in Member States
    4. 4. Tools for transitional justice provided by secondary union law
  3. 1. 1. Right of the union legislator to define the rule of law
    2. 2. Constitutional minimum harmonisation in the union
  4. 1. 1. A functional view of the rule of law
    2. 2. A ‘System of Values’ doctrine for the rule of law
    3. 3. Negative and positive obligations emanating from the rule-of-law value
    4. 4. The promotion of the rule of law as a constitutional mandate
  5. 1. 1. Residual union competences for promoting the rule of law
    2. 2. Making use of the union’s sectoral competences
    3. 3. How to mainstream the rule of law in union law
    4. 4. Supporting transitional justice by mainstreaming the union rule of law
  6. VI. Conclusion
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  1. I. Why Democracy?
  2. II. The Matter with Cardinal Laws
  3. 1. 1. Ensuring democratic legitimacy of the EU or a general requirement of democratic legitimacy at the national level?
    2. 2. The right to vote as a key
    3. 3. The doctrinal framework
  4. IV. Conclusions
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  1. I. The Challenge of the ‘Transition 2.0’
  2. 1. 1. Deadlock in presidential elections – the Moldovan example
    2. 2. Radical effects of vetting procedures – the Albanian example
  3. 1. 1. The reversal of constitutional amendments – the case of Kyrgyzstan
    2. 2. The reversal of constitutional amendments – the case of Ukraine
    3. 3. Self-interested decisions of the Constitutional Court – the case of Ukraine
    4. 4. Politically motivated constitutional court judgments – the case of Moldova
  4. 1. 1. Characteristics of transition 2.0
    2. 2. Anti-deadlock mechanisms
  5. V. An Outsider’s Role in Deblocking Constitutional Impasses

Transition 2.0

Zusammenfassung

Schlagworte

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Bibliographische Angaben

Inhaltsverzeichnis

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