The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia In 1968

Günter Bischof; Stefan Karner; Peter Ruggenthaler

doi:10.5771/9780739143063

Summary

On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the 'Prague Spring' reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decide that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for 'socialism with a human face.' Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that 'the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries' and that the Soviet Union had both a 'right' and a 'sacred duty' to 'defend socialism' in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia. The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a 'green light,' if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2009
ISBN-Print: 978-0-7391-4304-9
ISBN-Online: 978-0-7391-4306-3
Publisher: Lexington, Lanham
Language: English
Pages: 510
Product type: Edited Book

1. Contents No access
2. Foreword No access
1. Chapter 1. Introduction No access
2. Chapter 2. The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion in Historical Perspective No access
1. Chapter 3. Reforms in the Communist Party: The Prague Spring and Apprehension about a Soviet Invasion No access
2. Chapter 4. Soviet Society in the 1960s No access
3. Chapter 5. Politburo Decision-Making on the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1968 No access
4. Chapter 6. The KGB and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968: Preconditions for the Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia No access
5. Chapter 7. The Moscow “Negotiations”: “Normalizing Relations” between the Soviet Leadership and the Czechoslovak Delegation after the Invasion No access
1. Chapter 8. The Johnson Administration, the Vietnam War, and the American South’s Response to the Vietnam War No access
2. Chapter 9. “No Action”: The Johnson Administration and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 No access
3. Photospread No access
4. Chapter 10. Strategic Warning: The CIA and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia No access
5. Chapter 11. Defense and Détente: Britain, the Soviet Union, and the 1968 Czech Crisis No access
6. Chapter 12. Paris and the Prague Spring No access
7. Chapter 13. France, Italy, the Western Communists, and the Prague Spring No access
1. Chapter 14. The USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 No access
2. Chapter 15. Ulbricht, East Germany, and the Prague Spring No access
3. Chapter 16. Hungary and the Prague Spring No access
4. Chapter 17. Tito, the Bloc-Free Movement, and the Prague Spring No access
5. Chapter 18. Austria and the End of the Prague Spring: Neutrality in the Crucible? No access
Appendix 1. "Counterrevolution: in Prague No access Pages 441 - 442
Appendix 2. “We Are Ready at Any Time . . .to Assist the Czechoslovak People Together with the Armies . . . of the Warsaw Pact” No access Pages 443 - 446
Appendix 3. “Secret” Memorandum: Eugene V. Rostow to Dean Rusk, 10 May 1968 No access Pages 447 - 448
Appendix 4. On the Results of the Warsaw Meeting of the Delegations of Communist Parties and Workers’ Parties from Socialist Countries No access Pages 449 - 452
Appendix 5. CC Urging the United States to Halt “Hostile U.S. Media Campaign” against the Soviet Union No access Pages 453 - 454
Appendix 6. “Secret” Memorandum by Nathaniel Davis, “Czechoslovak Contingencies” No access Pages 455 - 456
Appendix 7. Memorandum from Ambassador McGhee to the Secretary of State, 21 August 1968 No access Pages 457 - 460
Appendix 8. Svoboda about Dubček: “If He Were to Resign from His Post, It Would Be Better for All of Us” No access Pages 461 - 464
Appendix 9. “Secret” and “Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, 1968 No access Pages 465 - 480
Appendix 10. “U.S. Propaganda Strengthening NATO” No access Pages 481 - 482
Index No access Pages 483 - 504
About the Contributors No access Pages 505 - 510