Quine&#039;s Naturalized Epistemology

Dr. Miloš V. Bogdanović

doi:10.5771/9783495990735

Summary

The subject of this book is the epistemology of Willard Van Orman Quine who holds that the problems of knowledge are accessible to the methodology of the natural science. Based on the weaknesses of Quine's theory and its interpretations, Miloš Bogdanović argues that epistemological inquiry can ultimately be approached from one of two mutually incompatible perspectives: the traditional, or Cartesian, and the Kantian. In light of this, the author discusses the possibility of establishing a synthesis of Quine's approach with Kant's view. Apart from preserving certain naturalistic elements, it is an interpretation that would ultimately satisfy most of the demands that Quine himself placed on epistemological inquiry.

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Bibliographic data

Publication year: 2025
Publication date: 22.05.2025
ISBN-Print: 978-3-495-99072-8
ISBN-Online: 978-3-495-99073-5
Publisher: Karl Alber, Baden-Baden
Language: English
Pages: 172
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 10
1. Introduction No access Pages 11 - 14
1. 2.1. Foundationalism No access
2. 2.2. Quine's Attitude Towards Foundationalism and 'First Philosophy' No access
1. 3.1. Dogmas of Empiricism No access
2. 3.2. Carnap and Logical Postivists No access
3. 3.3. Quine's Methodological Monism and Holism No access
1. 4.1. Neurath No access
2. 4.2. Anti-realist Elements of Quine's Empiricism No access
3. 4.3. Ontological Relativity No access
1. 5.1. Observation Sentences and Holism No access
2. 5.2. Epistemological and Semantic Aspects of Observation Sentences No access
3. 5.3. The Relationship Between Ontology and Epistemology in Quine's Work No access
1. 6.1. Externalized Empiricism and Behaviorism No access
2. 6.2. The Naturalistic-Behavioristic Thesis No access
3. 6.3. The Place of Naturalism in Quine's Philosophy No access
1. 7.1. Quine's Anti-Cartesianism and Antecedents No access
2. 7.2. The 'Conditional Correctness of Skepticism' and 'Epistemology's Meta-context' No access
3. 7.3. Basic Premises of Quine's Naturalized Epistemology No access
1. 8.1. Stroud's Criticism of the Bi-partite Conception of Knowledge No access
2. 8.2. Kim's Non-normativity Objection No access
1. 9.1. Coherentism as an Alternative No access
2. 9.2. Genetic Approach No access
3. 9.3. Interdisciplinarity of Epistemology No access
1. 10.1. Background of Gibson's Interpretation No access
2. 10.2. Gibson's Naturalism No access
3. 10.3. Consequences of Gibson's Ontologism/Naturalism No access
1. 11.1. Underlying Mechanisms of Language Learning No access
2. 11.2. Quine's Empiricism and Coherentism No access
3. 11.3. Dummett's Argument from Language Acquisition and Holism No access
4. 11.4. Verificationism, Cognitive Language and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method No access
12. Anti-realism and the Innate Mechanisms of Language Learning: Concluding Remarks No access Pages 155 - 168
Bibliography No access Pages 169 - 172