Dynamic Détente
The United States and Europe, 1964–1975- Authors:
- Publisher:
- 2016
Summary
This book examines the dynamic evolution of Western détente policies which sought to transform Europe and overcome its Cold War division through more communication and engagement. Kieninger challenges the traditional Cold War narrative that détente prolonged the division of Europe and precipitated America’s decline in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Rather, he argues that policymakers in the U.S. Department of State and in Western Europe envisaged the stability enabled by détente as a precondition for change, as Communist regimes saw a sense of security as a prerequisite for opening up their societies to Western influence over time. Kieninger identifies the Helsinki Accords, Lyndon Johnson’s bridge building, and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik as efforts aimed at constructive changes in Eastern Europe through a multiplication of contacts, communication, and cooperation on all societal levels. This study also illuminates the longevity of America’s policy of peaceful change against the background of the nuclear stalemate and the military status quo.
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Bibliographic data
- Copyright year
- 2016
- ISBN-Print
- 978-1-4985-3241-9
- ISBN-Online
- 978-1-4985-3242-6
- Publisher
- Lexington, Lanham
- Language
- English
- Pages
- 358
- Product type
- Book Titles
Table of contents
- Contents No access
- Acknowledgments No access
- Introduction. The United States and the Power of Dynamic Détente Policies No access
- List of Abbreviations No access
- Chapter One. The Origins of America’s Transformation Approach in the Cold War, 1947–1963 No access
- Chapter Two. “Thawing the Cold War”: Lyndon Johnson, Bridge Building, and the Search for Détente, 1964–1966 No access
- Chapter Three. Peaceful Engagement and Plans for Europe’s Transformation, 1966–1968 No access
- Chapter Four. Power Politics: Richard Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s Concept for Détente No access
- Chapter Five. SALT: “Diverting the Arms Race into the Permitted Channels,” 1969–1976 No access
- Chapter Six. “Do you want it done or do you want to have it talked about?”: The Détente Dualism and NATO’s Policy on MBFR, 1970–1975 No access
- Chapter Seven. Ostpolitik and the Idea for a European Security Conference: Catalysts for the Continuation of the Transformation Policy, 1969–1972 No access
- Chapter Eight. Transformation or Status Quo? CSCE, MBFR, and European Security, 1970–1972 No access
- Chapter Nine. Bridge Building after Richard Nixon’s Reelection: The Multilateral Preparatory Talks for the CSCE, 1972–1973 No access
- Chapter Ten. Transatlantic Networking and the Sustainability of the Transformation Approach in the CSCE Negotiations, 1973–1974 No access
- Chapter Eleven. The Final Months of the CSCE Negotiations: The Codification of the Transformation Agenda in the Helsinki Final Act No access
- Conclusion. The Durability of America’s Transformation Policy No access Pages 305 - 316
- A Note on Sources No access Pages 317 - 320
- Bibliography No access Pages 321 - 346
- Index No access Pages 347 - 356
- About the Author No access Pages 357 - 358





