Metaepistemology and Skepticism

Richard A. Fumerton

doi:10.5771/9781461639275

Summary

In this excellent treatment of the internalism-externalism debate in contemporary epistemology, Richard Fumerton explores its implications for traditional skeptical concerns. When one fully understands these implications, Fumerton argues, one will see philosophical usefulness of a foundationalism relying on acquaintance. Contending that the externalist response to skepticism is too quick and easy, Fumerton defends a version of internalism, but in doing so puts into stark relief the radically different alternatives for dealing with skepticism that our metaepistemological views force upon us.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 1995
ISBN-Print: 978-0-8476-8106-8
ISBN-Online: 978-1-4616-3927-5
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham
Language: English
Pages: 235
Product type: Book Titles

1. Contents No access
2. Preface No access
1. The Distinction Between Metaepistemology and Normative Epistemology No access
2. Metaepistemology No access
1. Kinds of Skepticism No access
2. The Structure of Skeptical Arguments for Strong Local Skepticism No access
3. Metaepistemological Presuppositions of the Skeptical Arguments No access
4. Clarification of the Skeptical Arguments and Charges of Self-Refutation No access
1. The Principle of Inferential Justification and the Epistemic Regress Argument for Foundationalism No access
2. Internalisml Extemalism Controversi No access
3. Traditional Accounts of Noninferential Justification No access
4. The Acquaintance Theory of Noninferential Justification and the Internalism/Externalism Debate No access
5. Inferential Internalism, the Analysis of Inferential Justification,and a Conceptual Regress Argument for Foundationalism No access
1. Goldman's Reliabilism No access
2. Fundamental Objections to Reliabilism No access
3. Nozick's Analysis of Epistemic Concepts No access
4. Summary No access
1. Coherence Theories of Truth No access
2. The Coherence Theory of Justification No access
1. Externalism, Foundationalism, and the Traditional Skeptical Argument No access
2. Skepticism, Externalism, and Inferential Justification No access
3. Externalism, Normative Epistemology, and the Limits of Philosophy No access
4. Second Level Skepticism, and the Fundamental Problem with Externalism No access
1. Internalism, Noninferential Justification, and the Traditional Skeptical Argument No access
2. Skepticism and Inferential Internalism No access
3. The Dialectical Alternatives No access
References No access Pages 225 - 230
Index No access Pages 231 - 234
About the Author No access Pages 235 - 235