Can the Government Govern?

John E. Chubb; Paul E. Peterson

doi:10.5771/9780815707141

Summary

Effective government requires that institutions be strong enough to control the efforts of organized, entrenched special interests in favor of the broader interests shared but poorly articulated by most members of society. Recent changes in our institutions and in the problems they face raise doubts about the capacity of contemporary American government to handle these parochial forces. Congress has seemingly become more fragmented, the presidency more politicized, and the bureaucracy more labyrinthine. After a decade or more of trying, our institutions have not mastered a variety of problemsthe budget deficit, the trade imbalance, and energy insecuritythat threaten society's general interest in an economic future as bright as its past.

Can the Government Govern? argues that the problem is inherently and substantially institutional and discusses the politically difficult requirements for overcoming it. In so doing, this volume opens the debate and public discussion necessary for change. Contributors include John E. Chubb writing on energy policy, David B. Yoffie on trade policy, Paul E. Peterson and Mark Rom on macroeconomic policy, Samuel Kernell on the presidency, Kenneth A. Shesple on Congress, and Terry M. Moe on the bureaucracy.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2010
ISBN-Print: 978-0-8157-1407-1
ISBN-Online: 978-0-8157-0714-1
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham
Language: English
Pages: 339
Product type: Edited Book

1. Contents No access
1. Political Institutions and Government Performance No access
2. The Historical Legacy No access
3. The Contemporary System No access
4. Toward a New Institutional Equilibrium No access
1. 1. The Energy Security Problem No access
  2. The Delegation Problem No access
  3. The Old Delegation No access
  4. The New Delegation No access
  5. The Politics of Delegation and the Obstacles to Reform No access
2. 1. Trade Problems and Trade Policy No access
  2. Protection: Demand and Availability No access
  3. An Obsolete Bargain? No access
  4. Implications for American Trade Policy and Institutions No access
3. 1. Is There an Institutional Problem? No access
  2. Presidential Incentives No access
  3. Presidential Control No access
  4. The Future of Economic Policymaking No access
1. 1. Development of the Modern White House No access
  2. Toward An Explanation of White House Development No access
  3. A History of White House Organization No access
  4. Governability and the Modern White House No access
2. 1. The Textbook Congress: The Late 1940s to the Mid-1960s No access
  2. The Changing Textbook Congress: The 1970s and 1980s No access
  3. A New Textbook Congress? No access
3. 1. A Perspective on Structural Politics No access
  2. Self-Interest and the New Social Regulation No access
  3. Conclusion No access
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