Theory of Value Structure

Erich H. Rast

doi:10.5771/9781793616951

Summary

The theory of value structure concerns the meaning of “better than” and “good,” as well as the way in which values serve as a basis for rational decision making. Drawing methodologically from economics and theories of decision making, the aim of serious axiology in metaethics is to do justice to problems that have puzzled philosophers of value for centuries. Can value comparisons be cyclic? Are all values comparable with each other and can decision makers just add up different aspects of an evaluation to determine the best course of action? A Theory of Value Structure: From Values to Decisions starts with a thorough introduction to the modeling of “better than” comparisons from a normative perspective. In the philosophical part of the book, Erich H. Rast argues that aspects of “better than” comparisons can differ qualitatively so much that one aspect may outrank another. Consequently, the classical weighted sum aggregation model fails. Values cannot always be summed up and comparisons may be fundamentally noncompensatory, an indeterminacy that explains problems like the apparent nontransitivity of “better than” and hard cases in decision making. Using a lexicographic method of value comparisons, Rast develops a multidimensional theory of “better than” and shows how and to which extent it can be combined with standard methods of decision making under uncertainty by using rank-dependent utility theory.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2022
ISBN-Print: 978-1-7936-1694-4
ISBN-Online: 978-1-7936-1695-1
Publisher: Lexington, Lanham
Language: English
Pages: 219
Product type: Book Titles

1. Contents No access
2. Preface No access
1. 1. 1.1 Introduction No access
  2. 1.2 Comparative Forms No access
  3. 1.3 Representation by Preorders No access
  4. 1.4 Incommensurability and Partial Orderings No access
2. 1. 2.1 Nontransitive Value Equality and Equipreference No access
  2. 2.2 Partial Semiorders No access
  3. 2.3 Weak Eligibility No access
  4. 2.4 Strong Eligibility No access
  5. 2.5 What Consistency Requirements Are Needed? No access
3. 1. 3.1 A Historical Remark No access
  2. 3.2 Representation of the Standard Model No access
  3. 3.3 Representations for All Models No access
  4. 3.4 Ordinal Versus Cardinal Utilities No access
4. 1. 4.1 Positive, Comparative, Superlative No access
  2. 4.2 Good in Terms of Better Than No access
  3. 4.3 Satisficing No access
  4. 4.4 How Context-Sensitive Are Values? No access
5. 1. 5.1 Introduction No access
  2. 5.2 Additive Value Aggregation No access
  3. 5.3 Other Forms of Utility Aggregation No access
  4. 5.4 Value Aggregation and Social Choice No access
  5. 5.5 The Most General Aggregation Method? No access
1. 1. 6.1 The Good as a Primitive No access
  2. 6.2 The Paradox of Analysis No access
  3. 6.3 A Fregean Solution No access
  4. 6.4 The Connection to Meaning and Value Metaphysics No access
2. 1. 7.1 Motivation and Key Properties No access
  2. 7.2 Using Interval Orders No access
  3. 7.3 Modeling Parity by Sets of Relations No access
  4. 7.4 Trichotomic Parity No access
  5. 7.5 Comparison No access
3. 1. 8.1 Typical Scenarios No access
  2. 8.2 Ways to Preserve Transitivity No access
  3. 8.3 Why a Lexicographic Approach? No access
4. 1. 9.1 Overview No access
  2. 9.2 Formalization for Ordinal Value No access
  3. 9.3 The Aggregation Problem No access
  4. 9.4 Explaining the Puzzles No access
  5. 9.5 Towards a General Axiology No access
5. 1. 10.1 Risk versus Uncertainty No access
  2. 10.2 Basic Notions No access
  3. 10.3 Expected Value No access
  4. 10.4 Choquet Expected Utility No access
  5. 10.5 On the Rationality of Risk Attitudes No access
  6. 10.6 Limitations No access
Notes No access Pages 185 - 198
Index No access Pages 199 - 204
Bibliography No access Pages 205 - 218
About the Author No access Pages 219 - 219