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Paying for Productivity
A Look at the Evidence
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Publisher:
2011
Summary
Will higher pay provide an incentive for better work? Can productivity be increased by changing the way workers are compensated? In response to the urgent need to improve productivity performance in American industry, leading economists examine alternative compensation schemes to assess their efficiency in raising productivity.
Over the years a number of suggestions have been made for improving labor productivity by changing the manner in which laborers are compensated for their efforts. The ideas presented and analyzed in this volume have all been put into practice, in modified form or on a small scale, in the United States or elsewhere. Some are new; others quite old.
David I. Levine and Laura D'Andrea Tyson consider the effects of employee participation in decisionmaking on firm performance, and Martin L. Weitzman and Douglas L. Kruse discuss the implications of profit sharing and related forms of pay for group performance. Michael A. Conte and Jan Svejnar analyze employee stock ownership plans in the United States and other forms of worker ownership in Europe; Masanore Hashimoto uses a transaction-cost perspective to assess Japanese employment and wage systems. Daniel J. B. Mitchell, David Lewin, and Edward E. Lawler III give an overall analysis of traditional and alternative pay systems, their history, development, and curent use, and recommend further experimentation with alternative compensation plans to ensure more adaptability on the part of U.S. firms. Blinder provides an overview of the findings and conclusions.
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Bibliographic data
Copyright year
2011
ISBN-Print
978-0-8157-0999-2
ISBN-Online
978-0-8157-1712-6
Publisher
Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham
Language
English
Pages
308
Product type
Edited Book
Table of contents
ChapterPages
Contents No access
Alternative Pay Systems: The Lessons of History No access
Profit Sharing and Productivity: Theory and Evidence No access
Employee Stock Ownership Plans No access
Appraising Worker Participation No access
Labor Relations in Japan No access
Summary No access
Productivity, Pay Systems, and Human Resource Practices No access
Alternative Pay Systems No access
The Incidence of Alternative Pay Systems No access
The Early History of Alternative Pay Systems No access
Alternative Pay Systems, 1930–79 No access
The Current View of Pay for Performance No access
The Case Study Approach No access
Linking Pay System Data to Financial Performance No access
Conclusions No access
Comment by Ronald G. Ehrenberg No access
Economic Theory No access
Comparative Systems No access
Case Studies No access
Attitude Surveys No access
Simple Statistical Studies No access
Econometric Literature No access
Conclusions and Implications No access
Comment by David Card No access
ESOP Structure and Tax Incentives No access
Basic ESOP Statistics No access
Employee Ownership and Productivity No access
Empirical Results Relating to ESOPs No access
Empirical Results Relating to Non-ESOP Worker Ownership No access
Conclusions No access
Appendix No access
Comment by Joseph Raphael Blasi No access
The Theory of Participation No access
The Empirical Evidence No access
Employee Participation and the Firm's External Environment No access
The Interaction of Participation and the External Environment No access
Conclusions No access
Comment by Derek C. Jones No access
A Profile of the Japanese Employment and Wage Systems No access
Variability of Labor Inputs, Wages, and Bonuses No access
A Transaction Cost Theory of Industrial Relations No access
