Cover of book: Minding Law's Gaps
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Minding Law's Gaps

Hermann Kantorowicz, Free Law and the Science of Judicial Discretion
Authors:
Series:
Studien zur Rechtstheorie, Volume 2
Publisher:
 2026

Bibliographic data

Edition
1/2026
Copyright Year
2026
ISBN-Print
978-3-465-04675-2
ISBN-Online
978-3-465-14675-9
Publisher
Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main
Series
Studien zur Rechtstheorie
Volume
2
Language
English
Pages
499
Product Type
Monograph

Table of contents

ChapterPages
    1. Table of Contents No access
    2. Acknowledgments No access
    3. Preface No access
    1. 1. Jurisprudential Background No access
    2. 2. Hermann Kantorowicz’s Life and Career No access
    3. 3. His Character No access
            1. (i) His ‘Copernican turn’ to critical philosophy No access
            2. (ii) The a priori categories of pure reason No access
            3. (iii) Synthetic a priori judgements No access
            4. (iv) The distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy No access
              1. (i) The relationship between the human mind and moral laws No access
              2. (ii) The concept of and need for a metaphysics of morals No access
              3. (iii) Law and ethics (morality) No access
              4. (iv) The categorical imperative No access
              1. (i) The science of law No access
              2. (ii) Law No access
              3. (iii) The universal principle of right No access
              4. (iv) Law and coercion No access
          1. 1.2.1 Introduction No access
          2. 1.2.2 Rationale for a philosophy of right No access
            1. (i) Right, law and legal science No access
            2. (ii) Right and freedom No access
              1. (1) Right as law No access
              2. (2) The Volksgeist and the World Spirit No access
        1. 2.1 Introduction No access
          1. 2.2.1 The object of cognition of philosophy is value No access
          2. 2.2.2 Philosophy is clearly distinguishable from psychology No access
          3. 2.2.3 Philosophy employs a distinctive ‘critical’ method No access
          4. 2.2.4 Neo-Kantian philosophy is a middle way between idealism and positivism No access
          5. 2.2.5 The defining feature of the critical method is its transcendence No access
          6. 2.2.6 The requirements for universally valid (objective) knowledge No access
          7. 2.2.7 A philosophy of science is a second order activity No access
          8. 2.2.8 Attachment of meaning is attachment of value No access
          9. 2.2.9 A philosophy of history No access
            1. (i) Legal positivism (‘general jurisprudence’) and legal philosophy No access
            2. (ii) The speculative metaphysics of natural law No access
            3. (iii) The historicism of positivist legal science No access
            1. (i) Individual-ethical and social ideals of law No access
            2. (ii) Legal philosophical Hegelianism and Kantianism No access
            3. (iii) A system of social purposes No access
            4. (iv) Law as a social phenomenon related to a social value type No access
            5. (v) Law and justice No access
            6. (vi) Excursus: Radbruch’s later perspective on law as a social phenomenon related to social value No access
            1. (i) General comments on methodology No access
            2. (ii) Method dualism in legal science No access
            3. (iii) Two broad themes of legal methodology No access
            4. (iv) The relationship of legal concept construction to its empirical substrate No access
            5. (v) The systematising function of legal science No access
        1. 3.1 Philosophical relativism No access
        2. 3.2 Relativism in legal philosophy No access
      1. 1. Background No access
        1. 2.1 The dogma of instrumentality No access
        2. 2.2 Greek and Roman conceptions of law No access
        3. 2.3 From the European Middle Ages to the Enlightenment No access
        4. 2.4 18th-century natural law No access
        5. 2.5 Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers No access
        6. 2.6 Article 4 of the Code Civil No access
        1. 3.1. Introduction No access
        2. 3.2 An ‘historical’ understanding of the civil law No access
        3. 3.3 The arguments against codification No access
        4. 3.4 The problem(s) with the Code Napoleon No access
        5. 3.5 The historical method better than codification for law reform No access
        6. 3.6 The Volksgeist No access
        7. 3.7 Savigny’s method of legal interpretation No access
        8. 3.8 Early reaction against the legal historical method No access
        1. 4.1 Introduction No access
        2. 4.2 Jhering’s ‘conversion’ and Kantorowicz’s take on his conversion No access
          1. 4.3.1 Introduction No access
          2. 4.3.2 Struggle is the source of right No access
            1. (i) The battle for right is a duty to the self No access
            2. (ii) The battle for right is also a duty to society No access
            3. (iii) The battle for right is central to all law No access
        1. 5.1 A Germanist perspective No access
        2. 5.2 The social task of private law No access
        1. 6.1 Introduction No access
        2. 6.2 Le bon juge Magnaud No access
          1. 6.3.1 The scientific and technical elements of law No access
          2. 6.3.2 Libre recherche scientifique No access
      7. 7. Ernst Zitelmann (1852–1923) No access
        1. 8.1 Introduction No access
        2. 8.2 The free discovery of law No access
        3. 8.3 The sources of adjudicatory norms No access
      1. 1. Background to the Publication of Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft No access
        1. 2.1 Preface No access
        2. 2.2 The consequences for law of the new approach No access
          1. 2.3.1. The primacy of the will over reason No access
          2. 2.3.2. Legal interpretation is not an exercise in logic No access
          3. 2.3.3. The historical approach to law No access
          4. 2.3.4. Legal science is no different from the scientific method of the social sciences No access
          5. 2.3.5 Law and theology No access
        4. 2.4 The consequences for adjudication of the new approach No access
        5. 2.5 The ideals of the free law movement No access
        1. 3.1 Introduction No access
        2. 3.2 Free law theory does not promote a ‘lawless’ jurisprudence No access
          1. 3.3.1 Core features of free law theory No access
          2. 3.3.2 The gap-filling role of free law No access
          3. 3.3.3 Free law represents reciprocity between the reason of logic and a sense of justice No access
          4. 3.3.4 Hans Kelsen, judicial discretion and gaps in the law No access
          5. 3.3.5 Not impressed: Rudolf Stammler’s critique of free law theory No access
        4. 3.4 Kantorowicz: groundbreaking, unconventional, unappreciated No access
            1. (i) Exposing the judicial ‘crypto sociologists’ No access
            2. (ii) A ‘science of justice’ rather than a ‘science of law’ No access
            3. (iii) Filling gaps in the law No access
          2. 3.5.2 Three modes of adjudication No access
        6. 3.6 Interessenjurisprudenz – a jurisprudence of interests No access
          1. 3.7.1 The rationality of law and its practice No access
          2. 3.7.2 Anti-formalist responses to the formal rationality of law No access
          3. 3.7.3 Counter demands for the recognition of absolute formal values No access
          4. 3.7.4 Weber’s assessment of anti-formalist movements No access
          5. 3.7.5 Paul Vinogradoff and the ‘crisis’ in modern jurisprudence No access
      1. 1. Introduction No access
      2. 2. Epochs of Legal Philosophy No access
            1. (i) Law’s inviolability No access
            2. (ii) Law’s autocracy (its non-invitational nature) No access
            3. (iii) Law’s externality No access
          2. 3.1.2 What justifies legal coercion? No access
          3. 3.1.3What is the right content of law? No access
        2. 3.2 Is Stammler’s definition of ‘right law’ materially (empirically) true? No access
        3. 3.3 Is Stammler’s definition of ‘right law’ formally (logically) correct? No access
        1. 4.1 Right law conceived as a unity of effect rather than a unity of essence No access
        2. 4.2 The absence of objective values does not impede a conceptionof right law No access
        3. 4.3 ‘Critical’ relativism: objective values but not universal truths No access
        4. 4.4 Relativist legal philosophy and legal definition No access
        5. 5. Stammler’s Method for Right Law Debunked No access
          1. 1.1.1 Background: sociology of law as an auxiliary science to law No access
          2. 1.1.2 The scientific nature of a sociology of law No access
          3. 1.1.3 Method dualism confirmed No access
            1. (i) Background: basic principles of the historical school of law No access
              1. 1. For the jurist, law belongs to the present; for the historian, it belongs to the past No access
              2. 2. For the jurist, law is a normative system; for the historian, law is a fact No access
              3. 3. For the jurist, law is a practical science; for the historian, a theoretical science No access
              4. 4. For the jurist, law is about structure, purpose and uniformity; for the historian, law is about complexity, diversity and an evolving consciousness No access
            3. (iii) Savigny’s historicist legacy for dogmatic legal science: Begriffsjurisprudenz No access
            1. (i) The formalist epoch of the early Middle Ages (6th–11th centuries) No access
            2. (ii) The formalist epoch of the medieval glossators (12th–13th centuries) No access
            3. (iii) The finalist epoch of the Italian consiliators (14th–15th centuries) No access
            4. (iv) The formalist epoch of French humanism and the Germanreception movement (16th–17th centuries) No access
            5. (v) The finalism of the natural law epoch (17th–18th centuries) No access
            6. (vi) The formalist epoch of the 19th-century German historical school No access
            7. (vii) The new finalist / formalist epoch from the mid-19th century No access
        1. 2.1 Law has no phenomenological ‘intuitions of essence’ No access
        2. 2.2 Identifying meaning constructs of the law (Sinngebilde) No access
        1. 3.1 Background: sociology as a concept, types of sociology and its relation to other culture sciences No access
        2. 3.2 The different modes of cognition of sociology of law and dogmatic legal science: a third mode of cognition of law unveiled No access
          1. (i) Objects of cognition experienced as reality (Da-Sein) No access
          2. (ii) Objects of cognition as meaning constructs (So-Sein) No access
          3. (iii) Objects of cognition as judgements of value (Dasein-Sollen) No access
          1. (i) Legal sciences of meaning No access
          2. (ii) Legal sciences of value No access
          3. (iii) Legal sciences of reality No access
          1. (i) The dogmatic-constructive conception No access
          2. (ii) The empirical conception No access
          3. (iii) The critical conception No access
        4. 4.4 Extra-legal conceptions of the state No access
      5. 5. Gustav Radbruch’s Version of Method Trialism No access
        1. 1.1 Content No access
          1. (i) The world of reality No access
          2. (ii) The world of objective meaning No access
          3. (iii) The world of values No access
        3. 1.3 Form, relation, purpose No access
        4. 1.4 Classification of the individual sciences No access
        1. 2.1 The concept ‘law’ No access
        2. 2.2 Legal science No access
          1. (i) Types of formal law No access
          2. (ii) Types of free law No access
          1. (i) ‘Practical’ reasons No access
          2. (ii) ‘Theoretical’ reasons No access
        1. 3.1 Legal realism, free law theory and sociology of law No access
        2. 3.2 The substantive realist theory on the nature of law: law comprises facts, not rules No access
        3. 3.3 The formal realist theory on the nature of legal science: it is an empirical, not a rational science No access
      1. 1. The ‘Legitimate Core’ of Free Law Theory No access
      2. 2. The Positivist Scourge in Adjudicatory Practice No access
        1. 3.1 Aufwertungsjurisprudenz (revaluation jurisprudence) No access
        2. 3.2 Nazi injustice: Radbruch (and Kantorowicz) No access
  5. Bibliography No access 445 - 456
  6. Index of Persons No access 457 - 460
  7. Index of Subjects No access 461 - 474

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