Naturalism, Quietism, and the Threat to Philosophy

Thomas J. Spiegel

doi:10.31267/978-3-7574-0062-0

Summary

Two opposed movements of thought threaten philosophy as an autonomous practice from the inside: scientific naturalism and quietism. Naturalism (qua methodological thesis) threatens to turn philosophy into a mere ancilla of the sciences, quietism understood as the prescription to remain silent in philosophy would not countenance any more “positive” philosophy. This book reconstructs naturalism and quietism such that it becomes clear naturalism does have the potential to end philosophy as an autonomous practice and that quietism, correctly understood, does not. To this end, this book provides arguments against the prevailing orthodox status of naturalism and a heterogenous reading of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical quietism as the rejection of a certain kind of theories in philosophy, namely quasi-scientific theories.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2021
ISBN-Print: 978-3-7574-0061-3
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7574-0062-0
Publisher: Schwabe, Basel / Berlin
Language: English
Pages: 203
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 8
Preface No access Pages 9 - 12
Introduction No access Pages 13 - 24
1. 1. Modest Naturalism No access
2. 1. The Ontological Thesis No access
  2. Placement Problems No access
  3. The Methodological Thesis No access
  4. Are the Methodological Thesis and the Ontological Thesis Related? No access
  5. The Result No access
3. 1. Calculation No access
4. 1. What are Philosophical Theories? No access
  2. 1. Unobservables – Abstract and Concrete No access
    2. Calculability No access
    3. Some Examples of Quasi-Scientific Theories No access
    4. Quasi-Scientific Theory and Metaphysics No access
5. §5 Arguing against Naturalism: Thesis and Worldview No access
6. 1. Proper Incoherence: The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning as an Example No access
  2. The Precarious Status of Methodological Naturalism No access
  3. First Response: The Success Argument No access
  4. Second Response: Liberalizing “Science” No access
  5. Third Response: Naturalism as a Project No access
  6. Fourth Response: Naturalism as a Synoptic View No access
7. §7 Arguments against Naturalism: Nature No access
8. §8 Arguments against Naturalism: Ideology No access
1. 1. 1. Local quietism No access
2. §2 A Reconception of Quietism: Quietism and Theory No access
3. 1. Kripkenstein and Wittgensteinian Quietism No access
  2. The Object of Wittgensteinian Quietism No access
  3. Some Challenges for Wittgensteinian Quietism No access
  4. A minor Conclusion No access
4. 1. Rorty's Neo-Pragmatism No access
  2. Price's Global Pragmatism No access
  3. Some Challenges for Pragmatist Quietism No access
  4. Pragmatist Quietism, Metaphysics, and Quasi-Scientific Theory No access
1. §1 Naturalism and Quietism – an Unhappy Relation No access
2. §2 An End to Philosophy? No access
3. §3 Liberal Naturalism, Near-Naturalism, and Minimal Naturalism No access
4. §4 Explaining, Understanding, and Describing No access
5. §5 One Threat Avoided, one Threat Remaining No access
Bibliography No access Pages 187 - 203