, to see if you have full access to this publication.
Book Titles No access
Hume and the Demands of Philosophy
Science, Skepticism, and Moderation
Authors:
Publisher:
2022
Summary
Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation offers a comprehensive interpretation of the relationship between Hume’s scientific project and his skepticism. Nathan I. Sasser argues that Hume is a radical epistemic skeptic who has purely practical reasons for retaining the beliefs that are essential for ordinary life and scientific research. On Sasser’s reading, the key to Hume’s epistemology is his conception of philosophy as a normative method of inquiry governing the special sciences. Philosophy approves of the mental faculties that produce reasoning and sensory beliefs. But sensory beliefs and the products of reason themselves face insuperable rational defeater arguments, and because they do, philosophy demands that we suspend these beliefs. Hume’s solution to this skeptical dilemma is to point out the fatal practical consequences of doing so. He advises us not to submit to the demands of philosophy when doing so is neither agreeable nor useful to ourselves or others. Hume’s moderate approach to philosophy recognizes that if the human mind is not created by a beneficent deity, then we must learn to live with the divergence between the epistemic demands of philosophy and the practical demands of life.
Search publication
Bibliographic data
Copyright year
2022
ISBN-Print
978-1-7936-2321-8
ISBN-Online
978-1-7936-2322-5
Publisher
Lexington, Lanham
Language
English
Pages
192
Product type
Book Titles
Table of contents
ChapterPages
Contents No access
Acknowledgments No access
List of Abbreviations No access
Introduction No access Pages 1 - 22
Ch01. An Overview of Book 1 of the Treatise No access Pages 23 - 52
Ch02. Philosophy and Justification in the Treatise No access Pages 53 - 68
Ch03. Reason and Skepticism in the Treatise No access Pages 69 - 86
Ch04. The Senses and Skepticism in the Treatise No access Pages 87 - 102
Ch05. Hume’s Purely Practical Response to Skepticism in the Treatise No access Pages 103 - 126
Ch06. Philosophy and Justification in the Enquiry No access Pages 127 - 146
Ch07. Hume’s Purely Practical Response to Skepticism in the Enquiry No access Pages 147 - 168
Ch08. Skepticism, Irreligion, and Moderation No access Pages 169 - 178
