The focus of this study is Sextus Empiricus’s skeptical strategy of how to guard against deceptive arguments in a practical context. Schmitt investigates Sextus’s understanding of fallacies and contextualizes it in comparison with those of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Galen. She analyzes Sextus’s argument, engaging with the question of which expertise is necessary for the solution of fallacies. Sextus argues against the common view that logic is the relevant expertise, countering instead that it is any expertise regarding the objects referred to by the words used in the fallacy. The book shows that Sextus’s argument is informed by his empirical background and is in fact a contribution to a medical debate of his time about the relevance of logic for medicine. Furthermore, it argues that Sextus attacks dogmatic doctors of Galen’s persuasion.
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Bibliographische Angaben
Auflage
1/2026
Copyrightjahr
2026
ISBN-Print
978-3-7965-5486-5
ISBN-Online
978-3-7965-5487-2
Verlag
Schwabe, Basel / Berlin
Reihe
Philosophical Studies in Ancient Thought
Band
4
Sprache
Englisch
Seiten
114
Produkttyp
Monographie
Inhaltsverzeichnis
KapitelSeiten
Table of Contents Kein Zugriff
Abbreviations Kein Zugriff
Introduction Kein Zugriff Seiten 9 - 14
1.1 What is a fallacy?_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
1.2 The classification of fallacies_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
1.3 The Stoics on assent to conclusions_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
1.4 Interim conclusion_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
2.1 The expertise argument and its place in Sextus’s chapter on fallacies_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
2.2.1.1 Instances of the first premise: Fallacies and (some) solutions_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
2.2.1.2 “Useful” and “useless”_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
2.2.2 Second premise: Why dialecticians in particular are able to solve fallacies whose solutions are useless anyway_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
2.2.3 Third premise: Why it is experts in special sciences who are able to solve those fallacies that are useful to be solved_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
3.1 Historical background_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
3.2 Galen on logic, demonstrations, and fallacies_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
3.3 Galen on skepticism and sophistry_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
4 Conclusion Kein Zugriff Seiten 95 - 98
Primary sources_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
Translations_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
Secondary literature_#0.00.00.00 Kein Zugriff
Index Kein Zugriff Seiten 107 - 113
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