Armed Reprisals from Medieval Times to 1945

Dr. Christophe Wampach

doi:10.5771/9783748921110

Summary

Since the 19th Century, armed reprisals escaped the efforts of regulation, despite at that time being a burning issue in international law. Why was this? Beginning with the law of reprisals in Medieval Times and its progressive obsolescence in Modern Times, this study demonstrates that the great Powers made a privilege out of this employment of force in peacetime and kept it in a legal grey zone. This enabled them to resort to armed reprisals against small States without incurring the consequences of a formal war. The work also explains the legal scholars’ hesitant attitude to clarify these armed reprisals and shows why the League of Nations failed to solve the problem.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2020
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-7718-1
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7489-2111-0
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series: Studien zur Geschichte des Völkerrechts
Volume: 40
Language: English
Pages: 336
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/InhaltsverzeichnisPages 1 - 18 Download chapter (PDF)
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1. 1. 1. Contextualisation of a Remark by Karl Strupp
  2. 2. Blurry Line between Armed Reprisals and War
  3. 3. Pre-1919 Practice
2. II. Leading Question
3. III. State of Research
4. IV. Research Hypotheses
5. V. Sources
6. VI. Structure
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1. I. Introduction
2. 1. 1. Emergence and Development of Reprisals in the Early and High Middle Ages
  2. 1. (a) Significance for the Law of Reprisals
    2. (b) Justification of Reprisals
    3. 1. i) Superior’s Consent
      2. ii) Just Cause
    4. (d) Execution
  3. 3. Risks of Abuse
3. 1. 1. (a) Diplomatic Interposition of the Sovereign
    2. (b) Progressive Exclusion of Private Individuals from the Execution
  2. 1. (a) General Aspects
    2. (b) Blurring of the Line between War and Peace
    3. (c) Vattel’s Pertinent Remark
4. IV. Interim Conclusion
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1. I. Introduction
2. 1. 1. (a) Preliminary Observation: ‘Reprisal Clause’ in Bilateral Treaties
    2. (b) Characteristics of Inferiority
  2. 1. (a) Issues of Commercial Nature
    2. (b) Assertion of National Dignity: ‘Civis Romanus Sum’, 1850
3. 1. 1. A Question of Political Opportunism: Palmerston’s Policy, 1847
  2. 1. (a) Denial of Justice debated in the British Parliament, 1850
    2. 1. i) The Principle laid down in the 23rd Paris Protocol of 1856
      2. ii) The Cagliari affair, 1857–1858
      3. iii) The Prince of Wales case: British Reprisals against Brazil, 1862–1863
4. 1. 1. (a) Standard of Proportionality versus Efficacy
    2. (b) Widening of the Category of Reprisals
  2. 2. Confusion between War and Peace
  3. 3. A Right in Vertical Power Relations
5. V. Interim Conclusion
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1. I. Introduction
2. II. Precursors of the Doctrinal Debate on Armed Reprisals: Wurm and Hautefeuille
3. 1. 1. Rising Interest and Controversy, 1849–1887
  2. 1. (a) First Contact at The Hague, 1875
    2. 1. i) Triggering Event: The French Blockade of Formosa, 1884
      2. ii) The Work of the Institute
    3. (c) Reception of the Institute’s Declaration
  3. 3. Departing State Practice: The Blockades of Siam (1893) and Crete (1897–1898)
  4. 1. (a) “Mais si la doctrine proteste, la politique agit”
    2. (b) Dialogue of the Deaf
    3. (c) Opinio Juris
4. 1. 1. (a) Variety of Armed Reprisals
    2. (b) The Uncertain Dividing Line between Peace and War
    3. (c) State of Reprisals
  2. 1. (a) Background
    2. (b) The Venezuelan Preferential Claims
    3. 1. i) Previous Efforts of Prevention of Armed Reprisals in International Law
      2. ii) The Drago Doctrine as Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine
      3. iii) From Political Policy to Norm of International Law
      4. iv) Second Hague Peace Conference, 1907
      5. v) Mixed Impact of the Second Hague Conference on Armed Reprisals
5. V. Interim Conclusion
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1. I. Introduction
2. 1. 1. Enforcement of War Reparations: The Ruhr Occupation, 1923–1925
  2. 1. (a) Right of Acting Unilaterally
    2. (b) Allowed Measures
  3. 3. Outlook: The Unlikely Limitation of Armed Reprisals
3. 1. 1. (a) Organisation of the League of Nations
    2. (b) Dispute Settlement Procedure
    3. (c) Deficiency Regarding Armed Reprisals
  2. 1. (a) The Facts
    2. (b) Discussion in the Council
    3. 1. i) Interpretation of the Covenant by the Special Commission of Jurists
      2. ii) Renewal of the Doctrinal Debate
      3. iii) Opinion of the Small Member States
  3. 1. (a) The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925
    2. (b) Japan’s Invasion of Chinese Manchuria
4. 1. 1. Session of Paris, 1934
  2. 2. Criticisms
5. 1. 1. An Insoluble Issue?
  2. 2. Prohibition of the Use of Force under the UN-Charter
6. VI. Interim Conclusion
ConclusionPages 289 - 292 Download chapter (PDF)
BibliographyPages 293 - 336 Download chapter (PDF)