Thinking thinking

Donata Schoeller; Vera Saller

doi:10.5771/9783495828205

Summary

Wie kann der Prozess des Denkens erfasst werden, wenn doch unsere Reflexionen bereits das Resultat dessen sind, was erfasst werden soll? Die Tätigkeit des Denkens in Worte zu fassen, scheint dazu verurteilt zu sein, hinter dem Phänomen her zu hinken, das erfasst werden sollte.

Das Denken zu untersuchen, ohne seine Prozesshaftigkeit auszuklammern, kann als radikale Reflexion bezeichnet werden. Sie behauptet nicht, ihren Gegenstand als unabhängig von der Art des Herangehens „gegeben“ zu beschreiben, sondern stellt sich der Denkerfahrung und auch den Gefühlsnuancen, die eine wichtige Rolle beim Denken und Artikulieren spielen. Sie manifestiert sich in originellen Ansätzen aus Philosophie, Psychotherapie, Anthropologie und Kognitionswissenschaften und bringt innovative Denkstile jenseits hergebrachter Dualismen hervor.

Mit Beiträgen von Vincent Colapietro, Terrence Deacon, Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch, Eugene Gendlin, Steven Hayes, Claire Petitmengin, Vera Saller, Donata Schoeller und Susan Stuart.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2017
ISBN-Print: 978-3-495-48820-1
ISBN-Online: 978-3-495-82820-5
Publisher: Karl Alber, Baden-Baden
Series: Schriftenreihe der DGAP
Volume: 5
Language: English
Pages: 240
Product type: Edited Book

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 6
Contents No access Pages 7 - 8
Donata Schoeller, Vera Saller
1. Radical Reflectivity No access Donata Schoeller, Vera Saller
2. Challenges No access Donata Schoeller, Vera Saller
3. Introducing the authors No access Donata Schoeller, Vera Saller
4. References No access Donata Schoeller, Vera Saller
Claire Petitmengin
1. 1. Forgetting the experience of the scientist No access Claire Petitmengin
2. 2. Research method No access Claire Petitmengin
3. Claire Petitmengin
  1. 3.1 The propitious inner disposition No access Claire Petitmengin
  2. 3.2 The microgenesis of the idea No access Claire Petitmengin
4. Claire Petitmengin
  1. Coming into contact No access Claire Petitmengin
  2. Confrontation with the felt meaning No access Claire Petitmengin
  3. Transformation of the felt meaning No access Claire Petitmengin
5. Claire Petitmengin
  1. Specificity No access Claire Petitmengin
  2. Transmodality No access Claire Petitmengin
  3. Rhythmic and gestural character No access Claire Petitmengin
  4. Vitality dynamics No access Claire Petitmengin
6. Claire Petitmengin
  1. Re-enchanting school No access Claire Petitmengin
  2. »Abstract« thought No access Claire Petitmengin
7. Conclusion No access Claire Petitmengin
8. References No access Claire Petitmengin
Eugene Gendlin
1. Eugene Gendlin
  1. I-1) The »background« is implicit in the figure No access Eugene Gendlin
  2. I-2) Accessing the implicit: We can always easily say a lot from the implicit No access Eugene Gendlin
  3. I-3) A direct referent (DR, also called a »felt sense«) No access Eugene Gendlin
  4. I-4) Readiness to speak; implying-occurring No access Eugene Gendlin
  5. I-5) Occurring into implying No access Eugene Gendlin
  6. I-6) Implying is body-environment interaction No access Eugene Gendlin
  7. I-7) We can move on from where philosophy is currently stopped No access Eugene Gendlin
  8. I-8) The apparent »breaks« in the logic of science are actually its reciprocity with the implicit No access Eugene Gendlin
2. Eugene Gendlin
  1. II-1) Two questions: the coming and the taking account No access Eugene Gendlin
  2. II-2) The space of behavior possibilities No access Eugene Gendlin
  3. II-3) We perceive objects in the implicit space of behavior possibilities No access Eugene Gendlin
  4. II-4) Immediate formation is forming-into No access Eugene Gendlin
3. Eugene Gendlin
  1. III-1) Logic consists of external relations: No access Eugene Gendlin
  2. III-2) Pitfalls of theory in the unit model No access Eugene Gendlin
  3. Eugene Gendlin
    1. a) Behavior is more than motion No access Eugene Gendlin
    2. b) Behavior formation unites the intakes from the sense organs No access Eugene Gendlin
    3. c) Agency and consciousness are generated in the course of behavior formation No access Eugene Gendlin
  4. III-4) The practice of thinking No access Eugene Gendlin
  5. Eugene Gendlin
    1. a) We can differentiate a strand of meaning No access Eugene Gendlin
    2. b) Differentiating ordinary language No access Eugene Gendlin
    3. c) New concepts No access Eugene Gendlin
    4. d) Reversal; the specific can redefine the generality No access Eugene Gendlin
    5. e) A new set of units No access Eugene Gendlin
    6. f) Using many models and systems No access Eugene Gendlin
    7. g) Using an actual sample of what we want to formulate No access Eugene Gendlin
    8. h) Operational definitions No access Eugene Gendlin
    9. i) Choosing among research instruments No access Eugene Gendlin
    10. j) Protection against mistakes No access Eugene Gendlin
4. References No access Eugene Gendlin
Susan A. J. Stuart
1. Introduction No access Susan A. J. Stuart
2. Reid’s ›Natural Language‹ No access Susan A. J. Stuart
3. Enkinaesthesia and Experiential Spilling Over No access Susan A. J. Stuart
4. Conclusion No access Susan A. J. Stuart
5. References No access Susan A. J. Stuart
Donata Schoeller
1. 1. Language as Process No access Donata Schoeller
2. 2. Close Talking No access Donata Schoeller
3. 3. Responsive Process No access Donata Schoeller
4. 4. Felt Sense and Somatic Marker No access Donata Schoeller
5. References No access Donata Schoeller
Terrence W. Deacon
1. Introduction No access Terrence W. Deacon
2. Brain development parallels No access Terrence W. Deacon
3. Language as a differentiation process No access Terrence W. Deacon
4. »Languaging« in the brain No access Terrence W. Deacon
5. Language as semiosis No access Terrence W. Deacon
6. Counter-current information processing No access Terrence W. Deacon
7. Implications and conclusions No access Terrence W. Deacon
8. References No access Terrence W. Deacon
Vincent Colapietro
1. References No access Vincent Colapietro
Vera Saller
1. What is abduction? No access Vera Saller
2. New Ideas No access Vera Saller
3. Peirce as detective No access Vera Saller
4. Guesses No access Vera Saller
5. Abduction goes along with an emotion No access Vera Saller
6. Imagination No access Vera Saller
7. Freud as a detective No access Vera Saller
8. Holmes’, Peirce’s and Freud’s musings No access Vera Saller
9. Abduction, Perception, Emotion No access Vera Saller
10. Conclusions No access Vera Saller
11. References No access Vera Saller
Steven C. Hayes
1. Functional Contextualism No access Steven C. Hayes
2. The Tribal Primate No access Steven C. Hayes
3. The Cooperative Core of Symbolic Meaning No access Steven C. Hayes
4. The Cognitive Extension of Perspective-Taking and Sense of Self No access Steven C. Hayes
5. Applying this Analysis No access Steven C. Hayes
6. Conclusion No access Steven C. Hayes
7. References No access Steven C. Hayes
Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
1. »Third-person« sciences such as neurobiology and cognitive science No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
2. Nonreductive philosophy of mind No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
3. Emergence theories No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
4. Downward causation No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
5. The »hard« and »easy« problems of consciousness No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
6. The »explanatory gap« No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
7. Buddhist tradition and psychoanalysis have practices and techniques No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
8. Buddhist practices and techniques No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
9. Problems of mutual understanding could possibly arise No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
10. Psychoanalysis No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
11. Psychoanalytic technique No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
12. Integrating »first-« and »third-person« methodologies No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
13. References No access Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
Index of Authors No access Pages 238 - 240